The Queen (on the Application of Amin) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Richard Clayton |
| Judgment Date | 14 June 2021 |
| Neutral Citation | [2021] EWHC 2106 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | No. CO/2338/2020 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
[2021] EWHC 2106 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Richard Clayton QC
(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
No. CO/2338/2020
Mr J. Gajjar (instructed via Direct Access) appeared on behalf of the Claimant.
Mr Z. Malik QC (instructed by The Government Legal Department) appeared on behalf of the Defendant.
( via Cloud Video Platform)
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THE DEPUTY JUDGE:
In this case the claimant seeks judicial review of the defendant' decision naturalisation application. The claimant submits that the refusal was an irrational conclusion, or involved the misapplication of the good character guidance. He contends that the defendant failed to properly follow an applier guidance dated 14 January 2019 and, secondly, that the defendant irrationally concluded that the claimant's new evidence was his historic statements, specifically the alleged discrepancies the defendant found simply do not exist and/or were given excessive weight.
The claimant's submissions were refined in the oral submissions made by Mr Gajjar. I have carefully considered all the submissions made by Mr Gajjar, and Mr Malik QC for the defendant, both written and orally, and the fact I do not expressly refer to a particular submission should not be understood as meaning I did not take that submission into account.
The Factual Background.
On 1 June 1978 the claimant was born and was a citizen of Iraq. On 20 October 2001 he arrived in the UK illegally and claimed asylum. On 2 September 2011 he was granted exceptional leave to remain. On 9 May 2017 he applied for naturalisation as a British citizen. On 23 October 2019 Robin Purchas QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused the claimant's application for the delay resulting from the failure to deal with his naturalisation application.
On 14 January 2019 the application was refused. On 28 October 2019 a Form NR was submitted seeking reconsideration.
On 2 April 2020 the defendant did reconsider but, again, refused. On 10 June 2020 the claimant sent a pre-action protocol letter. On 30 June 2020 the defendant's letter refused to change the position that had been taken. On 2 July 2020 the claimant launched judicial review proceedings. On 28 July 2020, the defendant's acknowledgement of service was filed which contested all claims. On 14 September 2020 Margaret Obi, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused permission on the papers. On 9 December 2020, Stacey J granted permission at an oral hearing on grounds 1 and 2.
On 15 January 2021, the claimant amended the grounds of review. On 21 January 2021 there was the consent order to extend time to file the amended grounds. On 22 February 2021 a supplementary letter was given and also detailed grounds of defence were filed.
The Legal Principles to be Applied.
The legal principles to be applied in this case are agreed. It is also agreed that the defendant is entitled to refer to the supplementary decision by reliance on the decision Caroopen & Myrie v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 2339 per Underhill LJ at paras. 30 to 33, and R(on the application of Ellis) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Discretionary Leave: Supplementary Reasons) [2020] UKUT 82 (IAC), a decision of Chamberlain J.
Nevertheless, it is important to examine the relevant principles in a bit more detail because of their impact on how I should approach Mr Gajjar's submission. Section 6 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (“the 1981 Act”) states:
“(1) If, on an application for naturalisation as a British citizen made by a person of full age and capacity, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the applicant fulfils the requirements of Schedule 1 for naturalisation as such a citizen under this subsection, he may, if he thinks fit, grant to him a certificate of naturalisation as such a citizen.
(2) If, on an application for naturalisation as a British citizen made by a person of full age and capacity who on the date of the application is married to a British citizen, or is the civil partner of a British citizen the Secretary of State is satisfied that the applicant fulfils the requirements of Schedule 1 for naturalisation as such a citizen under this subsection, he may, if he thinks fit, grant to him a certificate of naturalisation as such a citizen.”
Schedule 1, para.1(1) requires the applicant to be of good character.
Mr Malik drew attention to the case law concerning the principles to be applied to good character. He relied upon the views expressed by Nourse LJ in R v The Secretary of State For The Home Department (Ex Parte Al-Fayed) No.2 [2001] Imm A R 134 at para. 41, where Nourse LJ said the following:
“In R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fayed [1998] 1 WLR 763, 773F-G, Lord Woolf MR referred in passing to the requirement of good character as being a rather nebulous one. By that he meant that good character is a concept that cannot be defined as a single standard to which all rational beings would subscribe. He did not mean that it was incapable of definition by a reasonable decision-maker in relation to the circumstances of a particular case. Nor is it an objection that a decision may be based on a higher standard of good character than other reasonable decision-makers might have adopted. Certainly, it is no part of the function of the courts to discourage ministers of the Crown from adopting a high standard in matters which have been assigned to their judgment by Parliament, provided only that it is one which can reasonably be adopted in the circumstances.”
Mr Malik also relied on The Secretary of State for the Home Department v SK (Sri Lanka) [2012] EWCA Civ 16 per Stanley Burnton LJ.
“31 … the test is whether the Secretary of State is satisfied that the applicant is of good character. It is for the applicant to so satisfy the Secretary of State. Furthermore, while the Secretary of State must exercise her powers reasonably, essentially the test for disqualification from citizenship is subjective. If the Secretary of State is not satisfied that an applicant is of good character, and has good reason not to be satisfied, she is bound to refuse naturalisation. For these reasons too a decision in one context is not binding in the other.”
Mr Malik further stressed the proper approach to a rationality challenge in this context, and relied upon R (DA(Iraq) v The Secretary of State For the Home Department [2013] EWHC 279 (Admin) per Lang J at para.59:
“… The test for irrationality is set high, namely, that no rational decision-maker could have reached this conclusion. This test is especially difficult to satisfy in an area where Parliament has conferred a broad discretion on the Secretary of State and the Court of Appeal has declared that ‘it is no part of the function of the courts to discourage ministers of the Crown from adopting a high standard in matters which have been assigned to their judgment by Parliament, provided only that it is one which can reasonably be adopted in the circumstances’.”
That is a reference to Nourse LJ in ex parte Al-Fayed to which I have already referred.
Furthermore, since the claimant challenges the adequacy of the defendant's reasons, it is of assistance to stress the views expressed by Lord Brown in South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No.2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at para. 36:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But...
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