The Recognition Game
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836702037002973 |
| Date | 01 June 2002 |
| Author | ERIK RINGMAR |
| Published date | 01 June 2002 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The Recognition Game
Soviet Russia Against the West
ERIK RINGMAR
ABSTRACT
The problem with traditional explanations of relations between states
is that they focus on matters of interests and pay insufficient attention
to matters of identities.This article seeks to improve on this situation by
providing a formal discussion of the role of recognition. World politics
is best described as a recognition game rather than as a prisoner’s
dilemma. To prove the applicability of this argument, an analysis is
made of the relations that obtained between Soviet Russia and the
West. From the perspective of the alternative, identity-based, model,a
number of the most important events of the twentieth century are
explained in quite a new fashion.
Keywords: Cold War; constructivism; end of Communism; First World
War; League of Nations
As a country on the periphery of the European continent, Russia has
always had a troubled relationship with the countries of the European core.
Already when Sigmund von Herberstein, the envoy of the Habsburg
emperor, visited Moscovy in 1526 there was an obvious sense of insecurity
on the part of the tsar. For the occasion, tsar Basil III Ivanovich had herded
together a large number of people in his castle. No doubt, as von
Herberstein concluded, ‘so that foreigners may note the size of the crowd
and the mightiness of its lord’ (Shennan, 1974: 13).At the same time, the
presence of ‘such great potentates in the persons of their respected ambas-
sadors’ was designed to show the tsar’s own vassals ‘the respect in which
their master is held’ in the rest of the world.
The insecurity of tsar Basil Ivanovich had structural rather than psycho-
logical causes. In the Renaissance, a European system of states had begun
to be formed. The world had come to be understood as a stage on which
princes were acting and inter-acting with each other (Bozeman, 1960:
480–3; Ringmar,1996a).The question was only who had the right to partic-
ipate in this performance and which role each state was to play.This is the
origin of Russia’s insecurity.Compared to proper European nations, Russia
would always come up short. Europe was the centre of civilization and cul-
ture, and Russia was backward,its people primitive and its rulers hopelessly
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol.37(2): 115–136. Copyright ©2002 NISA
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
0010-8367[200206]37:2;115–136;023973
uncouth. Naturally,such conclusions undermined the position of the tsar in
relation to other Renaissance princes and also in relation to his own
subjects. In a rather desperate attempt to shore up his position, Basil III
Ivanovich sought the presence of respected foreigners in order to impress
his subjects, and the presence of his subjects in order to impress his foreign
visitors.
Contemporary scholars of international relations are constitutionally
unable to understand concerns such as these. According to the most influ-
ential — realist — analysis, the only standard that matters in world politics
is that by which power is measured (Waltz, 1979/1986: 27–130). A state’s
position in the world is ultimately determined by the military capability it
can muster, and, by implication, by the economic and technological foun-
dation that makes a certain military capability possible. The anarchical
structure of world politics has a strong socializing effect, and states are
forced to mimic the behaviour of each other if they are to survive.
As the Russian example shows, however, socialization in international
politics can operate on many different levels and not just security concerns
make states copy each other. Not only physical,but also social survival is at
stake. The squalor of a prince’s court can give rise to a sense of inferiority
and the spirituality of a people can give rise to a sense of superiority.These
feelings, in turn, influence the way in which foreign policy is made. A coun-
try that considers itself inferior to others may try to catch up, either by
peaceful means — like Japan after 1868 — or by military means — like
Japan after 1931. A country which considers itself superior may seek to
dominate others, be it militarily — like France after 1799 — or peacefully
— like the United States after 1945.
On an intuitive level it is easy to agree that factors like these are impor-
tant to a study of world politics, yet it is far from clear how to incorporate
them into a scientific account. The theoretical aim of this article is to give
these intuitions a more precise analytical content. Indeed the aim is to high-
light an alternative, non-rationalist,interpretation of the fundamental logic
of world politics. According to this logic, states not only pursue their
‘national interest’, but also — and before anything else — they seek to
establish identities for themselves. In fact, questions regarding a state’s
identity must always be more fundamental than questions regarding its
interests (Ringmar, 1996a).The empirical aim of this article is to apply this
analytical framework to the relations that obtained between Soviet Russia
and the West in the twentieth century. When seen from this alternative
point of view,many of the most familiar events of recent history will receive
quite a different interpretation.
Fighting for Interests, Fighting for Identities
According to realist scholars,questions of war and peace must ultimately be
answered by reference to the nature of the international system. The struc-
ture of world politics is decentralized and anarchic, they argue, and under
such circumstances each state is forced to fend for itself. Yet, since each
116 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 37(2)
To continue reading
Request your trial