The Soviet Union and Nordic Security
| Author | Johan Jörgen Holst |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677100600301 |
| Published date | 01 November 1971 |
| Date | 01 November 1971 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The
Soviet Union
and
Nordic Security
JOHAN
JORGEN
HOLST
Norwegian
Institute of
International
Affairs
Holst, ].
].
The
Soviet
Union
and
Nordic
Security.
Coo/lcmtion
and
Conflict,
VI,
1971,
137
-45.
The
author
distinguishes between Soviet objectives of system
preservation
and
system
extension. Soviet policies lIis-fi-vis the
Nordic
area
have
been conceived
primarily
in
the context of system preservation.
Thus
the Soviet
Union
has pursued apolicy of no
experiments
and
accepts the status 'II/a as tolerable.
The
preferred
Soviet model is
that
of a
neutralist
and
fragmented
Nordic
system.
The
Soviet
naval
expansion has resulted in the
forward
deployment of
the-Northern
and
Baltic fleets to the
Greenland
-Iceland -Faeroe Islands gap.
There
are
several
structural
instabilities associated with a Soviet
naval
strategy
of
forward
deployment.
It
also affects the efficacy
and
credibility of US reinforcements to
Norway.
The
North
European
security zone is likely to remain of considerable significance to
the
management
of the
Central
Balance while oil
drilling
on the
Norwegian
continental
shelf introduces a new clement of uncertainty. In their negotiations with the EC the
Nordic
states
appear
to be preserving the regional equilibrium
and
the Soviet Union
has
made
no serious objections.
[ohun [iirgen
ll
olst. Noriaegian Institute of [ntrrnutionul Affairs.
I.
CONTEXTUAL
ASSUMPTIONS
The
structure and process of European pol-
itics have entered aperiod of reconstruction
and transformation. There is widespread
expectation that the patterns of tomorrow
will differ in distinguishable ways from
the patterns of today and yesterday.
The
politics and structures of collective defence
seem in the process of being modified and
augmented by elements of collective secur-
ity.
While
rivalry will not disappear it
will take place within acontext of in-
creased interdependence and perceptions
of shared interests.
The
signals of change,
however, are ambiguous and the 'realities
of power' will act to circumscribe the
range of novel departures. In the new
state of flux in Europe - and it also en-
compasses, we should note, uncertainties
in regard to the range and scope of the
commitment of American power for the
defence of Europe - Soviet policy must
be counted among the variable factors.
For
purposes of analysis it may be use-
ful to think of the system of European
security as the sum total of three distinct
security zones.'
10 Cooperation and Conflict 1971:3-4
(I) Northern Europe
(2) Central Europe
(3) Mediterranean Europe
One of the principal structural functions
of the collective defence system of
NATO
has been to link the three zones by the app-
lication of American glue. Thus in a very
fundamental way the notion about the
indivisibility of the peace in Europe has
been predicated on the pivotal role of the
United States in the collective defence for
Western Europe. No West European power
possessed or possesses the ability to project
relevant capabilities into the three zones
of security.
The new mobility in the political rela-
tionships obtaining in Central Europe and
the trends in the direction of introvert
American preoccupations raise the possi-
bility of the peace in Europe being split
and the process of detente assuming dif-
ferentiated qualities in the three zones. It
is of significance in this context to note
that
the security situations obtaining in the
North European and Mediterranean secur-
ity zones arc to an increasing extent- being
influenced by Soviet-American maritime
rivalry.
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