Thomas v Bunn
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Keith of Kinkel,Lord Brandon of Oakbrook,Lord Brightman,Lord Templeman,Lord Ackner |
| Judgment Date | 13 December 1990 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1990] UKHL J1213-1 |
| Date | 13 December 1990 |
| Court | House of Lords |
and
and
[1990] UKHL J1213-1
Lord Keith of Kinkel
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook
Lord Brightman
Lord Templeman
Lord Ackner
House of Lords
My Lords,
I have had the opportunity of considering in draft the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Ackner. I agree with it and for the reasons he gives would allow each of these appeals. I would add that I agree also with the supplementary observations of my noble and learned friend Lord Brightman.
My Lords,
For the reasons given in the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Ackner, I would allow the appeal and make the orders proposed by him.
My Lords,
I have had the privilege of reading in advance the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend, Lord Ackner, and for the reasons given by him I would allow the appeals.
My Lords, I agree with my noble and learned friend that the precise wording of the judgment or order in this type of case is not significant, pace Eve J. in Ashover Fluor Spar Mines Ltd. v. Jackson [1911] 2 Ch. 355 to which he refers. The order made by the registrar in Thomas v. Bunn was that "interlocutory judgment be entered for damages to be assessed," in contrast to the orders in Wilson v. Graham and Lea v. British Aerospace Plc, which were in the form that "the defendant do pay damages to be assessed." Thomas v Bunn accordingly falls within the first of the two alternative forms of order described by Eve J. at p. 359 of the report, while Wilson v. Graham and Lea v. British Aerospace Plc. fall within the second alternative. Eve J. considered that the latter form of order, which not only directs an inquiry but also itself contains an express order to pay the amount found due, was within section 18 of the Judgments Act 1838. If the present appeals are allowed, it must follow that Eve J.'s dichotomy is incorrect and that, where there is a split trial, the precise form taken by the order is immaterial, and it does not matter whether the liability judgment does or does not direct payment of the damages to be assessed.
My only other observation is that the conclusion reached by this House, if your Lordships allow the appeals, is entirely in accord with the decision in Attorney-General v. Lord Carrington (1843) 6 Beav. 454. This case is of respectable antiquity. It was decided only five years after the Judgments Act was passed, and therefore at a time when the pre-existing practice against which the Act falls to be construed, must have been well present in the minds of all concerned. In that case an information had been filed seeking to recover two annuities from the estates of the second Lord Carrington. By a decree made in December 1842 the lands were declared chargeable with one of the annuities and the Master was directed to take an account of the arrears. It was also ordered in the same decree that the amount so found due should be paid by the defendant into the bank. The Master made his report in April 1843. It was contended by the informant that under sections 17 and 18 of the Act the defendant was liable to pay interest on the sum certified calculated from the date of the decree down to the date of the Master's report. The defendant, however, argued, at p. 461: "that there was no decree whereby any sum of money was payable, at least until the amount had been ascertained by the Master." The Master of the Rolls, Lord Langdale, found for the defendant and held that he was not chargeable with interest during this period. This case has stood for 150 years without, so far as I am aware, exciting any adverse comment, and I see no compelling reason for departing from its principle today.
My Lords,
By section 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (inserted by section 15 of and Schedule 1 to the Administration of Justice Act 1982), interest is payable at such rate as the court thinks fit or as Rules of Court may provide on all or part of the damages for personal injury between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of judgment. The interest currently awarded under the Act of 1981 is 2 per cent. per annum on general damages from the- date of the writ and half the special investment account rate (half of 15 per cent.) on special damages from the date of the injury.
By section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838 every judgment debt carries interest from the date of the judgment until payment. For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Ackner, I agree that in personal injury cases the interest runs from the date of the damages judgment.
In Thomas v. Bunn the accident occurred on 22 October 1983. The defendant paid £15,000 on 2 August 1984, admitted liability on 23 May 1985 and made a further payment of £55,000 on 12 November 1985. On 5 December 1989 there was judgment by consent for £270,000 which sum took into account the £70,000 already paid and any interest payable pursuant to section 35A of the Act of 1981. No interest is payable under section 17 of the Act of 1838 for any period prior to 5 December 1989.
In Wilson v. Graham the accident happened on 10 January 1986 and judgment for £196,970 was entered on 3 April 1990. No interest is payable under section 17 of the Act of 1838 for any period prior to 3 April 1990.
In Lea v. British Aerospace Plc. the accident happened on 18 February 1985, the defendant admitted liability in 1986, paid £10,000 in February 1988, a further £10,000 in February 1990 and paid £303,000 into court on 9 February 1990. The plaintiff and the defendant agreed damages at £450,000 and judgment for that sum was entered on 9 April 1990. No interest is payable under section 17 of the Act of 1838 for any period prior to 9 April 1990.
The incidence and rates of interest payable under the Act of 1838 and the Act of 1981 do not encourage early settlements of substantial claims for damages for personal injuries even when liability is admitted.
My Lords,
These three appeals by defendants in actions for damages for personal injuries reach your Lordships' House by virtue of leave given pursuant to section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969. They arise in the following circumstances:
The respondent Christine Thomas was involved in a road accident on 22 October 1983. A writ was issued on 18 April 1984 and on 23 May 1985 a defence was served admitting liability. On 1 July 1986 interlocutory judgment was entered for damages to be assessed. On 12 October 1987 the District Registrar in the Birmingham District Registry made an order by consent that the action proceed to trial before a judge as respects damages. The action was listed for trial on 5 December 1989 in Birmingham. The parties on that day agreed Miss Thomas's compensation at £340,000. By reason of two voluntary interim payments, £15,000 on 2 August 1984 and a further £55,000 on 12 November 1985, there fell to be deducted from this figure £70,000. Accordingly on 5 December 1989 Jowitt J. ordered that judgment be entered for Miss Thomas in the sum of £270,000 with costs to be taxed if not agreed. He further ordered interest on this sum under the Judgments Act 1838 at the rate of 15 per cent. per annum backdated to 1 July 1986, the date of the interlocutory judgment referred to above. The entitlement to this interest was contested by the appellant Mr. Bunn.
On 10 January 1986 the respondent Mr. Neil Wilson was involved in a road accident and he issued his writ on 14 April 1987. On 21 March 1989 Tucker J. ordered that the issue of liability be tried as preliminary issue before the trial of the issue of damages. On 14 April 1989 Mr. Steven Desch Q.C., sitting as a deputy judge of the Queen's Bench Division, heard the preliminary issue, found in favour of Mr. Wilson and adjudged that the damages sustained by Mr. Wilson be assessed by a judge of the Queen's Bench Division. On 3 April 1990 Drake J. gave judgment in favour of Mr. Wilson in the sum of £196,970. On Mr. Wilson's application, resisted by the appellant Mr. Graham, the judge awarded interest on a part of this sum at the rate of 15 per cent. per annum under the Judgments Act 1838 from the date of the judgment on liability, that is from 14 April 1989.
The respondent, Mr. Lea, who at the material time was employed by the appellants, British Aerospace Plc, was seriously injured on 18 February 1985 when a boiler in his employers' premises suddenly exploded. On 22 January 1988 no defence having been served by the appellants, judgment was entered for Mr. Lea with damages to be assessed. On 9 April 1990 the action having come on before Jowitt J. for the assessment of the damages, and the parties having agreed the damages at £450,000, judgment was entered in favour of Mr. Lea for this figure. On his application, resisted by the appellants, it was ordered that the latter pay interest on the sum of £450,000 from the date of the interlocutory judgment given on 22 January 1988 up to the date of the iterim payment of £20,000 and thereafter on the sum of £430,000 from the date of the interim payment until the date of the judgment 9 April 1990.
All three appeals raise the same question, namely whether interest on the damages awarded pursuant to section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838 should run from the date of the order or judgment made or given on liability (the liability judgment) or from the date when the damages were agreed or assessed and final judgment...
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