Trade and Security in the Nordic Area
| Published date | 01 November 1969 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676900400301 |
| Author | Mats Bergquist |
| Date | 01 November 1969 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Trade
and
Security
in
the
Nordic
Area
Mats
Bergquist
1
The
connexion
between
trade
and
se-
curity
may
be
discussed
on
two
rela-
tively
different
levels:
on
the
one
hand
it
is
possible
to
use
a
long-range
per-
spective
and
ask
to
what
extent
the
security
of
a
nation
may
be
affected
as
a
consequence
of
changes
in
trade
patterns
and
economic
cooperation
generally.
Thus
a
certain
country
may,
through
membership
of
a
customs
union,
substantially
change
its
trade
patterns;
it
acquires
new
trade
partners
and
reduces
its
trade
with
old
ones.
Through
this
process
economic
con-
tacts
and
relations
change.
The
mem-
bership
of
a
customs
union
may
also
entail
modifications
in
the
commodity
pattern
in
a
given
country’s
foreign
trade;
a
certain
product
that
has
been
produced
domestically,
may
instead
be
imported
from
fellow
member
states
in
the
customs
union,
due
to
price
con-
ditions.
If
this
particular
change
con-
cerns
so-called
strategic
goods,
conse-
quences
may
be
felt.
It
is
true
that
if
a
country
bases
its
foreign
trade
on
multilateralism,
changes
occur
only
slowly,
but
a
trend
may
be
difficult
to
stop.
We
shall
discuss
the
connexion
between
trade
and
security
from
this
standpoint:
what
consequences
related
to
security
may
be
caused
by
member-
ship
or
association
with
EFTA,
EEC
or
NORDEK
(the
organization
for
economic
cooperation
between
Den-
mark,
Finland,
Norway
and
Sweden
presently
under
discussion
on
the
poli-
tical
level).
It
is
also
possible
to
view
the
con-
nexion
between
trade
and
security
from
a
more
short-range
point
of
view.
Trade
that
is
built
upon
bilateralism
is
obviously
more
sensitive
to
political
pressure
than
trade
built
upon
multi-
lateralism -
this
is
so
because
the
bilateralization
itself
generally
requires
a
degree
of
state
control;
multilateral
trade
is,
however,
&dquo;free’
in
the
sense
that
it
functions
without
detailed
agreements,
as
a
rule
is
not
balanced
and
is
paid
for
in
convertible
currency.
If
a
country
in
the
Western
world
has
a
substantial
measure
of
bilateral
trade
with,
say,
Eastern
European
countries,
it
is
possible
for
the
latter
to
try
to
exert
political
pressure
by
means
of
changing
its
exports
and
imports:
they
can
cut
it
off
whenever
they
feel
like
it,
something
that
is,
of
course,
parti-
cularly
sensitive
if
the
bilateral
trade
comprises
strategic
goods
of
some
kind
or
other,
such
as
oil.
However,
a
coun-
try
relying
upon
multilateralism
can
introduce
an
embargo
on
a
certain
product
that
is
of
vital
importance
to
the
importer
-
such
things
have
hap-
pened
in
the
past.
But
it
is
easier
for
a
state-trading
nation
to
change
its
trade
pattern
since
this
may
require
only
administrative
decisions,
whilst
a
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