A Trade Union Information Strategy – The Case Of The German Metal Workers Union
| Author | Jörg Horstmann,Heinz Hartmann |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1987.tb00725.x |
| Published date | 01 November 1987 |
| Date | 01 November 1987 |
A
Trade Union Information Strategy
-
The Case Of The German Metal
Workers Union
Heinz Hartmann
*
and
Jorg
Horstmann
t
I.
TRADE UNION INFORMATION: EXIGENCIES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
The campaign by the Industrial Metal Workers Union
(IG
Metal1
or
IGM)
in favour of a thirty-five hour week' was cast against such odds that in mid-
1984
this West German trade union was forced to mobilise all
of
its resources
to the fullest. Among other efforts, the IGM made ingenious and systematic
use of publicity campaigns both to influence its members as well as important
sections of public opinion. In the nature of this case, its activities involved
generalised campaign information rather than specialised bargaining in-
formation; informational materials included statistics on employment and
working time, data from opinion polls and attitude surveys, partisan
interpretations of such facts, and appeals for support. Since this campaign,
improvisation and mechanical handling of information which long characte-
rised trade union activities clearly appear old-fashioned. Instead, new
questions tend to dominate trade union information practice. How much
planning and evaluation is necessary for the efficient organisation
of
an
information campaign? How can different informational activities be geared
to each other? Which are the structural pre-requisites of strategic success? In
the following text, we address ourselves to the emerging answers in the
context
of
the
1984
thirty-five hour campaign.
From the beginning
of
this campaign, the
IGM
was given to understand by
various parties that its demand for a
five
hour reduction in working time was
considered ill-advised. Purchasing power had been declining among the
gainfully employed in the Federal Republic since
1980
and there were many
who would have expected a drive toward higher wages
or
other monetary
premiums rather than a request for fewer hours per week (and the attendant
rejection of overtime work).
A
decrease in working time was markedly low
on the rank order of preferences among trade union members. True there
had been stirrings of support several years before when the
IGM
first
ventilated the idea. At that time, however, the union leadership came to
consider the idea premature and resolutely squashed spontaneous moves in
*Professor
of
Sociology
,
University
of
Miinster,
FRG.
tLecturer
in
adult education, University
of
Miinster.
372
British Journal
of
Industrial Relations
its favour on the part
of
minorities in the rank and file.
So
in 1984, the IGM
faced a real problem of activating members to participate in industrial action
for shorter working time rather than for financial rewards. If this problem
was to be solved, it would take more than instructions and orders; a long and
difficult road of education and persuasion lay ahead.
Members not only were not
in
the mood, but also were dwindling. Ever
since 1981, the German trade union movement had felt the sting
of
decreasing membership. The IGM, the largest
of
the seventeen constituent
organisations
of
the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB), showed a
more-than-average decline. Due to a sizeable loss
of
members in 1982 and
1983, its membership in 1984 had fallen to below
2.5
million.* In this
situation, caution suggested that easy to achieve goals should have priority
over unwieldy and unpopular objectives. Besides, the
IGM
stood in danger
of an accelerated decline
of
members in case
of
industrial strife, especially
on the part of those who, due to lockouts and lack
of
compensatory support
by the union, would suffer before they could hope to gain. Furthermore, the
increasing proportion of white-collar employees and growing differentiation
in the qualificational structure
of
the labour force augured
ill
for the
recruitment of new members.
If
the IGM wanted to carry on its campaign for
a thirty-five hour week and yet stem this exodus, something had to be done
to
influence the minds of its actual and prospective members.
Problems also loomed on the level of collective organisation. Most
importantly, employers in the metal industries were well organised and
more strongly backed by their national employers’ federation than the
IGM had been by its national confederation (DGB). While there
was
nothing really new in having to face determined employer resistance, there
was an unexpected and dangerous rift in policy among the assorted
constituents
of
the DGB. Member unions were
of
decidedly different
opinion about whether to pursue concessions on early retirement,
or
a
reduction in weekly working time. The Chemical Workers Union, for
example, defied the perfunctory top level consensus in organised labour to
give priority to a decrease in working hours; instead, it argued in favour of
improved conditions for early retirement. Such conflict between basic
notions among the major trade union actors called for a stepped-up
information campaign which would help sway opponents inside the union
camp
or
at least re- inforce followers against the attraction
of
competitive
ideas.
An important handicap which the IGM had
to
overcome was public
disapproval. Rank and
file
apathy toward the union’s campaign plans was in
part a reflection of the general coolness, and in fact negativism, among the
public at large. The Federal Republic in 1984 was just beginning to enjoy the
first benefits of another economic recovery
-
and people did not want the
IGM to rock the boat. This public attitude was actively promoted and
consolidated by public relations efforts on the part
of
those hostile to trade
union goals, but it certainly was not a product solely
of
employer
propaganda. If the IGM had hopes of winning popular support (or at least
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