Trafficking and Contract Migrant Workers in the Middle East
Author | Ray Jureidini |
Published date | 01 August 2010 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00614.x |
Date | 01 August 2010 |
Trafficking and Contract Migrant
Workers in the Middle East
Ray Jureidini*
ABSTRACT
The paper addresses a number of issues regarding the extent to which traf-
ficking may be applied to migrant domestic workers who enter under the
kafala system of sponsorship in the Middle East. Migrant domestic work-
ers are the most numerous of those mentioned in reports on trafficking for
labour exploitation in the region. The discussion seeks to determine
whether ‘‘trafficking’’ can be ex post facto, rather than ex ante? In other
words, can the label of trafficking be attributed only after the worker has
arrived in the receiving country and is victimized according to the princi-
ples of trafficking protocols? In addition, must there be a proven intent to
traffic by agents, or can employers who harm and ⁄or exploit them be con-
sidered as traffickers alone? Should the harm done to workers on arrival at
their place of work be classified (and assisted) as victims of trafficking, or
as exploited workers?
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, questions are raised regarding the extent to which traffick-
ing may be applied to migrant domestic workers in the Middle East,
with specific reference to Lebanon. The situation of migrant domestic
workers is important because not only are they significant in terms of
the numbers of migrant workers in the Middle East, but also because
they are probably the most numerous of those mentioned in reports on
trafficking for labour exploitation in the region.
It is argued here that, while the conditions of employment may be abu-
sive and exploitative, and while migration agents may have deceived,
misled or failed to warn prospective contract migrant workers of these
* Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, Cairo.
2010 The Author
Journal Compilation 2010 IOM Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
International Migration Vol. 48 (4) 2010 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK,
ISSN 0020-7985 and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00614.x
MIGRATION
Edited by Elzbieta Gozdziak, Georgetown University
conditions, it is not a simple matter to label it as trafficking, although it
is commonly assumed. Without actually extracting work from a migrant,
simply crossing borders with the ‘‘intent’’ to exploit the individual is not
trafficking. In the case of domestic workers, we can identify abuse of
migrant workers by middlemen in transit and abuse by employers at
their work sites, but there is little evidence of a systemic conspiracy
between the middlemen and employers that is clearly trafficking.
With 1.2 million migrant domestic workers employed in Saudi Arabia
(Human Rights Watch, 2008) and 600,000 in the United Arab Emirates
(IRIN, 2006) alone, it can be estimated that there are well over 2 million
migrant domestic workers in the Middle East.
In the case of Lebanon, at the time of a survey conducted by this author
in 2005–6, female migrant domestic workers were estimated to be
around 160,000, mainly from Sri Lanka (100,00), the Philippines
(30,000) and Ethiopia (30,000). Following the civil war (1975–1990) local
Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian women had ceased to undertake these
positions (see Jureidini, 2009). Private agencies in Lebanon contract with
other agencies in the sending countries to bring migrants into Lebanon.
Employers in Lebanon contract with and pay the Lebanese agents
(between $1,500-$3,000) and the employee signs a contract with the
employer. The standard ‘‘Contract of Employment for Domestic Helpers
from Sri Lanka in the Middle East Countries’’ stipulates the salary,
working hours ‘‘not exceeding 12 staggered hours per day’’; that the
employer is to provide free passage to and from Sri Lanka; that
arrangement and payment of the visa ⁄work permit is the responsibility
of the employer along with suitable living quarters and adequate food,
medical services (health insurance is compulsory by law); conditions of
termination. ‘‘Special provisions’’ prohibit the employee from being
required to work anywhere other than in the employer’s residence; and
the requirement that the employer ‘‘shall treat the employee in a just
and humane manner. In no case shall physical violence be used upon
the employee.’’
The regulation and monitoring of recruitment and placement agencies in
Lebanon has been a problem since the civil war (1975–1990). It is not
clear what criteria the government requires in order to issue an agency
licence. There are no knowledge or character tests that are required as
in other countries. Agents must place a $33,500 non-interest bearing
guarantee with the government’s Housing Bank (Bank de l’Habitat).
For this they are able to bring 150 migrants per year into the country.
Trafficking contract migrants 143
2010 The Author
Journal Compilation 2010 IOM
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