TUV v Persons Unknown
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Eady |
| Judgment Date | 22 April 2010 |
| Neutral Citation | [2010] EWHC 853 (QB) |
| Docket Number | Case No: HQ10X01274 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Date | 22 April 2010 |
[2010] EWHC 853 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
SITTING IN PRIVATE
Before: The Honourable Mr Justice Eady
Case No: HQ10X01274
Richard Spearman QC (instructed by Schillings) for the Applicant
Hearing date: 14 April 2010
Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
Mr Justice Eady:
On 14 April 2010, I heard further submissions in this case on the return date set following the grant of an interim injunction on an ex parte basis, on 30 March, against “persons unknown”.
The original order was based primarily upon claims to be brought to restrain infringement of privacy and possible breaches of copyright. The circumstances were stark and simple, in that during a burglary the previous night various pieces of equipment had been stolen. In particular, a laptop belonging to the Applicant was taken on which information was stored electronically, including by way of visual images. Some of these were of the Applicant and some of other persons. A friend has made an assignment of copyright to her in anticipation of this litigation (in so far as the copyright may have been vested in the friend).
It is plain that neither the persons who stole the equipment, who are still unidentified, nor any third parties to whom they may choose to pass it on would have any rights to view, use or exploit the stored material. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I should certainly proceed for present purposes on that assumption.
It is difficult to imagine what countervailing public interest or competing Convention right could possibly outweigh the Applicant's reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the stored information.
Likewise, in so far as copyright is involved, it is difficult to conceive what ground for resisting injunctive relief there could be by way, for example, of fair dealing or any other defence specific to copyright.
As to the physical objects stolen, the Applicant would plainly have a right to the return of the items, since they are her property. This is a separate issue, of course, from those arising in connection with the stored information.
The order granted on 30 March contained provisions relating to anonymity (see paragraph 3) and restricting access to the documents on the court file (see paragraph 4). There were also imposed obligations on the Respondents, once served, to provide information and deliver up the property and/or copies of anything that may have been extracted or derived from the stored material (see paragraphs 7 and 8). These provisions are continuing and would not expire on the return date.
The relief sought on the return date was concerned with the following matters:
i) The continuation until trial or further order of what Mr Spearman QC, for the Applicant, refers to as the “principal protection”; that is to say, restrictions imposed upon the Respondents preventing their dealing with, or parting with possession of, the goods identified as having been stolen in the burglary on the night of 29–30 March 2010; restrictions upon infringement of copyright; restrictions upon the use or communication of any information derived from the stolen goods and also upon revealing the fact that the Applicant had an interest in these proceedings (i.e. restraining any reference to her identity as the Applicant); and a prohibition against causing or authorising any other person to do any of those acts.
ii) An extension was sought until 21 days after the identification of the Respondents of the time within which the claim form is to be served upon them.
iii) A restriction in the following terms:
“Pursuant to CPR 25 APD 9.2, …, the Applicant shall be required to provide the legal advisers of any third party served with a copy of this Order promptly on request with (a) a copy of any materials read by the Judge, including material prepared after the hearing at the direction of the Judge or in compliance with the Order and/or (b) a note of the hearing on their written undertaking to use those documents and the information contained in those documents only for the purposes of these proceedings AND PROVIDED ALWAYS that before complying with any such request the Applicant shall be permitted to redact the name of the individual who assigned copyright to the Applicant.”
Mr Spearman made a number of submissions on points raised in correspondence with one of the legal advisers to MGN Ltd, who had been notified of the terms of the order of 30 March. It will be noted that the terms of the order set out above contain a modification to the wording of CPR 25 APD 9.2, in the sense that it was provided that the Applicant's advisers need only serve documents upon the legal advisers of a third party on the provision of a written undertaking to use the documents and information contained therein only for the purposes of these proceedings. The point raised in correspondence on behalf of MGN Ltd was that this was superfluous because, it was submitted, the Applicant's interests would be sufficiently protected by the provisions of CPR 31.22 and CPR 32.12.
First, I turn to the provisions of CPR 25 APD 9:
“Injunctions against third parties
9.1 The following provisions apply to orders which will affect a person other than the applicant or respondent, who:
(1) did not attend the hearing at which the order was made; and
(2) is served with the order.
9.2 Where such a person served with the order requests–
(1) a copy of any materials read by the judge, including material prepared after the hearing at the direction of the judge or in compliance with the order; or
(2) a note of the hearing,
the applicant, or his legal representative, must comply promptly with the request, unless the court orders otherwise.”
I next need to consider the terms of CPR 31.22(1):
“A party to whom a document has been disclosed may use the document only for the purpose of the proceedings in which it is disclosed, except where–
(a) the document has been read to or by the court, or referred to, at a hearing which has been held in public;
(b) the court gives permission; or
(c) the party who disclosed the document and the person to whom the document belongs agree.”
It was submitted by Mr Spearman that these provisions would offer his client, or any applicant in her position, no protection in respect of documents passed to a third party in accordance with CPR 25 APD 9.2 or as to the information contained in such documents. He submits,...
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