Two representatives but no representation: cases from Estonia

Pages86-97
Date16 November 2007
Published date16 November 2007
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/01425450810835437
AuthorEpp Kallaste,Krista Jaakson,Raul Eamets
Subject MatterHR & organizational behaviour
Two representatives but no
representation: cases from
Estonia
Epp Kallaste, Krista Jaakson and Raul Eamets
Faculty of Economics, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discover how non-unionised representatives (NERs) are
created and what their role is in comparison to unionised representation. The authors aim to analyse
why the institution of non-unionised employee representation is created if its functions overlap with
those of the unions, including the functions of collective bargaining and information-consultation.
Design/methodology/approach – The case study involves interviews with representatives and
executive directors, as well as a survey of the employees of two companies.
Findings – The results show that when there is a weak union, the employers initiate an NER in order
to involve the whole workforce in the collective agreement. The NER is elected by employees even
though it was initiated by the employer. The roles of the two representatives do not differ much, the
main function for both being collective bargaining with some provision for information and
consultation.
Originality/value – The unique situation in Estonia, which is about to change with adoption of EU
directive 14/2002/EC, enables the analysis of cases involving two different representative institutions
with the same functions in the same company. This provides valuable input for researchers describing
in practice the behaviour of representatives and employers in this situation. It also provides
East-European policy makers some idea about how policies that address collective bargaining and the
involvement of workers should be designed.
Keywords Employee participation, Trade unions,Estonia
Paper type Case study
Introduction
CEE countries have diversified the industrial relations systems of the members of the
European Union. Traditional single and dual channel representation systems have
become complemented by systems that are somewhere between these two options. The
current paper aims to analyse specific cases in the Estonian system, where both union
and non-union employee representatives (NER) exist in the company. Both have
similar rights to represent workers in the processes of bargaining and
information-consultation. This situation deserves to be analysed as it is rare in the
European context that non-union and union employees have separate representatives
in the same company for exactly the same purposes[1].
In a situation where an NER has the same rights and very cursory election rules,
employers could use this to conclude a collective contract that guarantees industrial
peace, and is favourable to the employer, paying no heed to the employees’ opinion. To
reflect these concerns, our focus is on studying by whom and how the NER institu tion
was created, and what the rationale and effects of this institution are.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0142-5455.htm
ER
30,1
86
Received 17 January 2007
Revised 2 April 2007
Accepted 2 April 2007
Employee Relations
Vol. 30 No. 1, 2008
pp. 86-97
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
0142-5455
DOI 10.1108/01425450810835437

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