Unbowed, unbent, unbroken? Examining the validity of the responsibility to protect
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221093155 |
| Published date | 01 March 2023 |
| Date | 01 March 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221093155
Cooperation and Conflict
2023, Vol. 58(1) 81 –101
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00108367221093155
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Unbowed, unbent, unbroken?
Examining the validity of the
responsibility to protect
Johannes Scherzinger
Abstract
How has the sentiment around the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) changed over time?
Scholars have debated far and wide whether the political norm enjoys widespread discursive
acceptance or is on the brink of decline. This article contends that we can use sentiment analysis
as an important indicator for norm validity. My analysis provides three crucial insights. First,
despite the well-known fear of some scholars, R2P is still frequently invoked in Security Council
deliberations on issues of international peace and security. Second, overall levels of affirmative
language have remained remarkably stable over time. This finding indicates that R2P is far from
being obliterated. Out of 130 states, 4 international organizations (IOs), and 2 non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) invoking the norm, 65% maintain a positive net-sentiment. Third, zooming
into Libya as a case illustration of a critical juncture, we see some minor tonal shifts from some
pivotal member states. Adding the fact that interest constellations within the Permanent Five are
heterogeneous concerning the third pillar of R2P, future military interventions, sanctioned under
the norm, seem unlikely.
Keywords
intervention, norm validity, quantitative text analysis, R2P, United Nations
Introduction
How has the sentiment around the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) changed over time?
Since its official conception in 2005, scholars have debated far and wide whether the
political norm enjoys widespread discursive acceptance or is on the brink of decline.
Adopted as an outcome document of the UN world summit, all participating nations com-
mitted themselves to the R2P (Badescu and Weiss, 2010: 356). The norm asserts that each
state has a moral obligation to prevent mass atrocities from its citizens. Should a state
manifestly fail to secure its population from ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, or even genocide, other states have the responsibility to intervene using force
Corresponding author:
Johannes Scherzinger, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785, Berlin, Germany &
Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Boltzmannstraße 20, 14195 Germany.
Email: johannes.scherzinger@wzb.eu
1093155CAC0010.1177/00108367221093155Cooperation and Conflict X(X)Scherzinger
research-article2022
Article
82 Cooperation and Conflict 58(1)
if necessary (United Nations, 2005). Some scholars lauded the norm as “the most dra-
matic normative development of our time” (Thakur and Weiss, 2009: 22). Since then, the
norm has been applied in numerous documents, speeches, and, resolutions. However, it
was only once used to justify military intervention against the wishes of a host govern-
ment. In 2011, a military intervention was carried out in Libya—under the premise of the
norm—averting ensuing humanitarian catastrophe but eventually leaving it with ongoing
civil strife. Observing the aftermath of the Security Council resolution, many scholars
wondered again what the intervention would mean for the norm’s legacy (Deitelhoff and
Zimmermann, 2020; Gholiagha, 2015; Glanville, 2016; Hehir, 2012; Hehir, 2013; Morris,
2013; Thakur, 2013). While Alex J. Bellamy and Jess Gifkins viewed R2P as unharmed
(Bellamy, 2015; Gifkins, 2016), many argued that R2P had suffered existential reputation
costs (Brockmeier et al., 2016; Evans, 2014; Cronogue, 2012; Mamdani, 2011; Pape,
2012; Thakur, 2013: 72), leaving the norm diminished if not obliterated (Hehir, 2013;
Hehir, 2019). Some scholars concluded that future policymakers would refrain from cast-
ing issues in a language of R2P due to its contentious nature (Bellamy, 2012: 13; Welsh,
2019: 55). Thus, to render a verdict on the norm’s validity, scholars are looking for and
testing usable heuristics that could highlight whether a norm is in decline or actually con-
solidating (Crossley, 2018; Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, 2020; Girard, 2021).
Contributing to the same end, this article contends that we can use sentiment analysis
as an important indicator for norm validity. In line with Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, I
understand norm validity as discursive acceptance which can be operationalized as ver-
bal support or affirmatory rhetoric concerning a norm or its content (Deitelhoff and
Zimmermann, 2019: 6). I argue that automated sentiment analysis can be used to assess
the extent of positive or negative framing around the R2P to gauge actors’ tonality toward
the norm. While positive sentiment cannot be directly equated with discursive accept-
ance, sentiment that is stable in terms of its positive tonality might be a meaningful
indicator of norm validity. As such, positive tonality can be understood as a necessary but
not sufficient condition for norm validity.1 I carry out my analysis in the United Nations
Security Council2 because the Council represents a forum in which we can investigate
both the tonality of individual member states and the consensual sentiment of the most
powerful organization in world politics. Furthermore, the Security Council—tasked with
preserving international peace and security—was also responsible for authorizing reso-
lution 1973, leading to regime change in Libya. Norm scholars typically assume that
critical junctures—such as the one in Libya—are significant because they shed light on
the degree of norm consolidation. Therefore, the case of Libya, discussed in the Security
Council, is also apt for this analysis because we can trace learning effects concerning the
norm by looking at the speeches of each voting member.
My analysis provides three crucial insights. First, despite the well-known concerns of
some scholars for the significance of the principle (Hehir, 2010; Hehir, 2013; Rieff,
2011), R2P is frequently invoked in Security Council deliberations on issues of interna-
tional peace and security. Therefore, Edward Luck’s “risk of relevance” has not material-
ized since the Libyan intervention. Second, overall levels of affirmative language have
remained remarkably stable over time. This finding indicates that R2P is far from being
obliterated and instead is likely to enjoy discursive validity. Out of 130 states, four inter-
national organizations (IOs), and two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) invoking
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