Union Strategies, National Institutions and the Use of Temporary Labour in Italian and US Plants
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Author | Valeria Pulignano,Andrea Signoretti |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12131 |
British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/bjir.12131
54:3 September 2016 0007–1080 pp. 574–596
Union Strategies, National Institutions
and the Use of Temporary Labour
in Italian and US Plants
Valeria Pulignano and Andrea Signoretti
Abstract
This article analyses variation in the use of temporary labour based on a
comparison of two plants of the same US automotive multinational corporation,
one in Italy and the other in the United States. We argue that dierences in the
use of temporary labour are explained by union capacities to make trade-os
between alternative forms of flexibility as well as trade-os in the protection
of internal and external groups of workers. Union capacity is dependent
on the availability of power resources within dierent national institutional
environments. These resources are shown to influence not only the ways in
which temporary workers are used but also bargaining outcomes — including
employment conditions — benefiting them.
1. Introduction
Over the last 25 years temporary work has been increasing internationally.
In the EU15 the share of temporary workers relative to total permanent
employees increased from 10 per cent in 1990 to 15 per cent in 2007
(Burgoon and Dekker 2010). Temporary labour constitutes a flexible buer
for companies faced with uncertainty and/or order-related peaks. Moreover,
it can also be an attractive wayof reducing costs for employers: besides having
less employment security than regular workers, temporary workers generally
earn less, have less access to training and are often not eligible for social
benefits (Appelbaum 1992; Kahn 2010; Kalleberg 2003).
Comparative research shows considerable variation both within and
across countries in how the share of temporary jobs in total employment
has evolved over time (Vlandas 2013), reflecting the diversity in national
employment protection rules, dierent degrees of labour market regulation
Valeria Pulignano is at the Center for Sociological Research (CESO), Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven. Andrea Signoretti is at the Afi-Ipl Research Centre.
C
2015 John Wiley& Sons Ltd/London School of Economics. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Union Strategies,National Institutions and the Use of Temporary Labour 575
and employment structures, inter alia collective agreements. More generally,
the erosion of institutional inclusiveness in the last two decades due to the
current economic, political and social transformations (Streeck 2009) helped
liberalize the use of temporary employment in the sense of ‘commodifying
institutions’ (Holst 2014). In addition, trade union strategies shaping both
patterns and outcomes of temporary employment have been examined in an
attempt to explain its use. On the one hand, the ‘insider-outsider’ argument
claims that unions promote temporary work through their institutional
involvement at national level and through sectoral and company-level
collective agreements protecting their insider members at the expense of
outsiders, therebycontributing to segmentation (Lindbeck and Snower 1988).
This argument emphasizes the role of unions institutionally protecting
permanent workers as a key explanation for dierences in the way unions
influence the use of temporary labour. Accordingly, temporary labour is seen
as the alternative to external flexibility for permanent workers. On the other
hand, extensive research also shows that unions, albeit with varied success,
can attempt to influence external flexibility strategies by including temporary
workers in collectiveagreements through campaigning and mobilizing (Carr´
e
et al. 1995; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011; van Jaarsveld 2004).
This literature provides evidence that unions can influence the level
and form of temporary labour, and it sheds light on how unions exert
this influence in dierent institutional contexts. However, these studies
typically either examine temporary work in isolationfrom other employment
practices; or look at narrowtrade-os between a subset of external or internal
flexibility practices. Little comparative research to date has explored how
labour market institutions aect unions’ broader strategies to gain influence
over the multiple, interconnected forms of flexibility that make up a firm’s
‘employment system’.
This study addresses this question through an analysis of the strategies
unions adopted towards the regulationof temporary labour within two plants
of the same US automotive multinational corporation (MNC), one in Italy
and the other in the United States. Findings show that Italian and US
unions pursued dierent strategies in order to provide management with the
demanded flexibility while retaining employees’ control over their working
conditions. These strategies reflected distinctive trade-os between dierent
internal and external flexibility practices. Italian unions traded external
flexibility for job security for temporary workers, not opposing the use of
temporary labour but instead engaging in bargaining aimed at compensating
external with internal (including functional) flexibility for temporary workers.
This helped to improve temporary workers’ working conditions without
aecting those of the permanent workforce. In contrast, the US union
restricted the use of temporary labour, relying instead on permanent workers’
external and internal flexibility, and extending entry options to this category
under flexible conditions.
The dierent outcomes for temporary labour in the two cases were the
result of trade-os strategically made by unions in their local negotiations
C
2015 John Wiley& Sons Ltd/London School of Economics.
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