Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2021-09-27, [2021] UKUT 260 (IAC) (R (on the application of Akber) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (paragraph 353, Tribunal’s role))

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
JudgeThe Hon. Mr Justice Lane, President, Upper Tribunal Judge Smith
StatusReported
Date27 September 2021
Published date19 October 2021
CourtUpper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Subject Matterparagraph 353, Tribunal’s role
Hearing Date06 July 2021
Appeal Number[2021] UKUT 260 (IAC)



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL

(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)


R (on the application of Akber) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (paragraph 353; Tribunal’s role) [2021] UKUT 00260 (IAC)



Field House,

Breams Buildings

London, EC4A 1WR


27 September 2021

Before:


THE HON. MR JUSTICE LANE, PRESIDENT

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH

_____________________


Between:


THE QUEEN

on the application of

ALI AKBER

Applicant

- and -


SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

______________________


Mr M Biggs

(instructed by NR Legal Solicitors), for the Applicant


Mr D Blundell QC and Mr A Mills

(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Respondent


Hearing date: 6 July 2021


____________________________


J U D G M E N T

____________________________


Paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules


  1. The importance of paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules (“Paragraph 353”) is as a “gate-keeping” function to shut out from the appeals system unmeritorious second or subsequent appeals. An appeal is generated under the current form of section 82 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) whenever a protection or human rights “claim” is made and refused. However, the Respondent is not obliged to treat repeat submissions as a “claim” leading to a “decision” generating a right of appeal in every case (Robinson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] AC 942).

  1. The words “if rejected” in Paragraph 353 specifically contemplate that the Respondent must form a view on the merits of the further submissions, in the sense that she may decide the submissions are such as to warrant the grant of leave to enter or remain (and to recognise the person as a refugee or otherwise entitled to international protection). It is only if she does not do so that Paragraph 353 requires her to determine if the (ex hypothesi) rejected submissions are a fresh claim, the refusal of which constitutes a decision falling within section 82 of the 2002 Act. It is artificial to separate the underlying merits of what is put forward from the question whether something “significantly different” is being advanced for the purposes of Paragraph 353. It is not the case, therefore, that the Respondent has “decided” a “claim” under section 82 of the 2002 Act in any case where she considers further submissions or a further application and concludes that the submissions or application do not merit the grant of leave.


  1. The end-to-end process where Paragraph 353 applies is as follows:


Stage 1: The Applicant makes human rights or protection claim.

Stage 2: That claim is refused by the Respondent, giving rise to a right of appeal under section 82 of the 2002 Act.

Stage 3: The Applicant’s appeal is unsuccessful; or the Applicant does not appeal or withdraws his appeal; or the refusal is certified under section 94 of the 2002 Act.

Stage 4: The Applicant makes second or subsequent submissions by way of written submissions or application (“the Further Submissions”).

Stage 5: The Respondent considers whether to accept or reject the Further Submissions on their merits.

Stage 6: If the Further Submissions are accepted on their merits, the Respondent grants leave/recognises Applicant’s status.

Stage 7: If the Further Submissions are rejected, the Respondent goes on to consider whether they nonetheless amount to a fresh protection or human rights claim; i.e. a categorisation decision is made.

Stage 8: If the Respondent determines that the Further Submissions do not amount to a fresh claim, she rejects them as such. No refusal of a human rights or protection claim arises, within the meaning of section 82(1)(a) or (b) of the 2002 Act. If, however, she determines that they do amount to a fresh claim, then a “decision” has been made to refuse a “claim” for the purposes of Section 82 (1)(a) or (b) of the 2002 Act and a right of appeal arises against that decision


  1. The guidance given in Sheidu (further submissions; appealable decisions; Sudan) [2016] UKUT 412 (IAC) is that if the effect of a decision is a refusal of a claim under section 82 of the 2002 Act, then there is a right of appeal even if the Respondent had intended to refuse further submissions applying Paragraph 353. That guidance turns on the interpretation of the particular decision letter under consideration in that case. In some (albeit extreme) cases such as Sheidu, the Upper Tribunal may conclude in the context of a judicial review challenge that what the Respondent actually did was not what she intended to do. Such cases are nevertheless likely to be rare.


  1. Whether a decision of the Respondent is a decision to refuse to treat submissions as a fresh claim or the refusal of what is accepted to be a fresh claim is a matter of substance and not form. The nature of the decision does not depend where in the decision letter Paragraph 353 is raised. It is necessary to look at a Paragraph 353 decision under challenge as a whole. It must be interpreted objectively, considered fairly in the round and in substance.

The Role of the Tribunal in Judicial Review Challenges to Paragraph 353 Decisions


  1. Balajigari and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] 1 WLR 4647 and R (oao BAA and Another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Dublin III: judicial review; SoS’s duties) [2020] UKUT 00227 (IAC) did not involve fresh claim decisions. As such they are distinguishable from fresh claims cases. The case law in relation to fresh claims has consistently stated that the role of the Tribunal is only to consider whether the decision is Wednesbury unreasonable or involves other public law error: (WM (DRC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] Imm AR 337).


  1. In a Judicial Review of a decision made under Paragraph 353, the Upper Tribunal is tasked with considering the Respondent’s decision for rejecting the submissions as a fresh claim. The Tribunal is not required to reach a decision for itself whether the Respondent’s decision breaches an applicant’s human rights. The position in this regard is akin to that where an appellate court or tribunal is examining the legality of the mixed legal and factual conclusion reached by a fact-finding tribunal on whether a decision violates Article 8 rights.


  1. In the event that further material comes to light, the remedy for an applicant is to make further submissions to the Respondent and not seek to place the Tribunal in the role of primary decision-maker.


  1. This is a judgment to which we have both contributed. The Applicant seeks judicial review of the Respondent’s decision dated 27 July 2020 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, the Respondent refused the Applicant’s application for indefinite leave to remain (“ILR”) in the UK based on his long residence. The Respondent also decided that the application made did not amount to a fresh claim, applying paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules (“Paragraph 353”). The effect of that conclusion is that the Applicant is unable to appeal the Decision. It is in this respect that the judicial review raises important points of principle which have implications for other cases. It is for that reason that a Presidential panel was convened with a view to providing guidance in other cases.


BACKGROUND


FACTUAL BACKGROUND


  1. The Applicant is a national of Pakistan. He arrived in the UK on 14 October 2006 with leave as a student. He subsequently switched to remain as a Tier 1 migrant. He was given leave as a Tier 1 General migrant which expired, following extension, on 15 August 2016. On 2 August 2016, the Applicant applied for ILR based on five years’ residence as a Tier 1 migrant. He subsequently varied that application to one for ILR based on ten years’ lawful residence.


  1. The application for ILR was refused on 23 February 2018. The Respondent refused the application on the basis that the Applicant had acted dishonestly by declaring a different income to HMRC for tax purposes from the earnings declared to the Respondent in the Tier 1 applications. The Respondent therefore refused the application on general grounds, under paragraph 322(5) of the Immigration Rules (“Paragraph 322(5)”).


  1. The Applicant was given a right of appeal against the 23 February 2018 decision which he exercised. Although his appeal was allowed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Bircher, following a successful appeal against that decision by the Respondent, the appeal was re-heard and dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Fisher. Although Judge Fisher did not accept the Respondent’s case that the Applicant had declared different earnings to HMRC and the Home Office, he found that the Applicant had acted dishonestly by not filing a tax return at all in the tax year 2010-11. He found that the Applicant must have been aware of this as he had not been asked to pay any tax but had done nothing about it. The Applicant’s explanation at the time for the failure was that his accountants had been negligent. Judge Fisher concluded that the Respondent had been right to...

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