Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2023-03-26, IA/00998/2020
| Appeal Number | IA/00998/2020 |
| Hearing Date | 22 December 2022 |
| Published date | 14 April 2023 |
| Date | 26 March 2023 |
| Status | Unreported |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) |
Appeal Number: UI-2021-001236
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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER |
Case No: UI-2021-001236 |
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First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50449/2020 IA/00998/2020 |
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26 March 2023
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL
Between
AK (GAMBIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E Doerr, instructed by BHD Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 22 December 2022
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of his family are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or his family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
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By a decision which was issued on 22 September 2022, I found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in its decision to allow the appellant’s appeal. I set aside that decision in part in part and remade the decision on the appeal by dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the revocation of his protection status. I ordered that the decision as regards Article 8 ECHR would be remade following a further hearing, with certain of the FtT’s findings preserved. A copy of that decision is annexed to this one and the two decisions should be read in tandem.
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The hearing resumed before me on 22 December 2022. The appellant was represented by Ms Doerr of counsel, the respondent was represented by Ms Ahmed, a Senior Presenting Officer.
At the outset of the hearing, I checked that the advocates and I had the same papers. We each had the papers from the hearing before the FtT. There was a supplementary bundle and a skeleton from Ms Doerr, however, and Ms Ahmed required some additional time in which to familiarise herself with these.
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Ms Ahmed asked me to confirm whether an observation I had made at [95] of my first decision (that the appellant has no ‘meaningful family ties’ in Gambia) was a preserved finding. She noted that the appellant had stated in his latest witness statement that he claimed to have no family in Gambia. Ms Doerr accepted that questions might properly be asked on this issue and that findings were to be made. She did not seek to suggest that any finding made by the FtT in that respect was to be preserved. I was content to proceed on that agreed basis.
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As a third preliminary matter, Ms Ahmed indicated (having noted what I had said at the end of my first decision) that the Secretary of State would oppose the continuation of the anonymity order which has been in force throughout this appeal. I invited the advocates to make submissions on that point at the end of the hearing; there was no need to decide the point at an earlier stage as the hearing was not attended by anyone without a direct interest in it.
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I heard oral evidence from the appellant, in English. There were no other witnesses. I do not propose to rehearse the appellant’s evidence in this decision. I will refer to it insofar as I need to do so to explain my findings of fact.
Submissions
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Ms Ahmed relied on the Secretary of State’s decision. She submitted that there was no reason to continue the anonymity order; the appellant was not at risk in Gambia and it was important to recognise the principle of open justice, as reflected in Cokaj (anonymity orders: jurisdiction and ambit) [2021] UKUT 202 (IAC); [2021] Imm AR 1562. The appellant’s mother and sisters were refugees who should not be named publicly but there was no such risk to the appellant.
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As to whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration to The Gambia, his evidence had been untrue. His claim that his relationship with his father had broken down was a new invention, designed to meet what the appellant knew to be the respondent’s case. The evidence given by the appellant’s father at the FtT had been that their relationship had ‘rekindled’. It was not credible for the appellant to claim that he did not even know the names of family members in The Gambia and he was refusing to make frank disclosure.
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The reality was that the appellant’s father returned regularly to The Gambia and rented a house there. He could travel with the appellant and help him to reintegrate. He was a man with meaningful ties to the country which would obviously be of assistance.
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Ms Ahmed noted that much had been said about the appellant’s lack of familiarity with the Wolof and Mandinka languages but English was accepted on all sides to be the official language of The Gambia. In any event, it was not credible that he had forgotten how to speak those languages. He had grown up around The Gambian community in the UK. The appellant was a young man with skills and qualifications and he would be able to integrate into The Gambia. He was noted in the Independent Risk Assessor’s report to have a good work ethic.
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Ms Ahmed was initially minded to make a submission that Dr Knorr was not a suitably qualified expert but she was content to abandon the point in light of what had been said in GW (FGM and FGMPOs) Sierra Leone CG [2021] UKUT 108 (IAC).
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Ms Ahmed nevertheless submitted that the expert’s opinion was based on a mistaken factual basis. The appellant did, in all likelihood, have family in The Gambia and he could count, in particular on the support of his father. That had not been considered by Dr Knorr. There were parts of the report which descended into advocacy and there had been no attempt by the expert to harmonise her approach with the conclusions reached in the Upper Tribunal’s first decision, even though it had been provided to her. There was a lack of sourcing in the report and those sources which were cited provided questionable support for the conclusions reached. The report of Karen O’Reilly was similarly flawed. Her conclusions were general and speculative and there was no consideration of the role which might be played by the appellant’s father.
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What was required, Ms Ahmed submitted, was a broad evaluative judgment of the appellant’s ability to integrate. Taking account the appellant’s youth and good health, family support, education and skills and his familiarity with the languages and the culture of The Gambia, he did not meet the high threshold in s117C(4)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Lowe v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 62; [2021] Imm AR 792 did not compel any different conclusion, since it was a case decided on its facts. Ms Ahmed submitted that there was nothing on the facts of this case which warranted a conclusion that there are very compelling circumstances which were capable of outweighing the public interest in the appellant’s deportation.
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Ms Doerr relied on her skeleton argument and made the following submissions in development of it. She submitted that it was appropriate to make a general anonymity order. The decision would refer to the appellant’s family members, including minors, and there was an extant risk to them in The Gambia. The appellant’s father might also be exposed to risk when he returned to The Gambia. The appellant himself would be at risk if family members were aware of his identity.
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Ms Doerr then made five points in support of the appellant’s case that he would be in grave difficulty if returned to The Gambia. She accepted, firstly, that the question of risk was settled but she asked me to note that this was on the basis that the appellant would not resume contact with any family in The Gambia. Given what had gone before, the appellant had every reason not to turn to his family if he found himself back in The Gambia.
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Ms Doerr submitted, secondly, that the experts had adopted what was necessarily the correct starting point when they proceeded on the basis that the appellant could not access family support without placing himself at serious risk. He had no choice but to return without accessing social networks.
Ms Doerr noted, thirdly, that much had been said about the appellant’s father. Even assuming that the Secretary of State was correct, the support of the appellant’s father was insufficient to cure the very significant...
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