Ups Ltd v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE LANGSTAFF |
| Judgment Date | 10 February 2011 |
| Neutral Citation | [2011] EWHC 3199 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: 1HQ/11/0022 |
| Date | 10 February 2011 |
[2011] EWHC 3199 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Honourable Mr Justice Langstaff
Case No: 1HQ/11/0022
MR TIM LAWSON-CRUTTENDEN (instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
No representation appeared for the Defendant
Approved Judgment
1.This is an application made by UPS Limited and others for summary judgment and a permanent injunction against the defendants who are all, it is said, associated with or members of a group known as Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty.
That group, known by its acronym SHAC, has on the evidential material before me been involved over some years in a campaign intended to stop Huntingdon Life Sciences pursuing their business. That business involves, says SHAC, cruelty to animals and for that reason it is maintained that protest is legitimate. It is said in the action, Particulars of Claim in respect of which were issued on 11 February 2005, that the activities of some of those associated with SHAC, and in particular the second and third named defendants, have gone beyond peaceful and legitimate protest and their acts have extended as far as criminal acts of harassment, occasional violence, damage to property, intimidation, blackmail and threats. Indeed, the second and third defendants are currently serving sentences of imprisonment of nine years imposed on 21 January 2009 at Winchester Crown Court by Butterfield J for conspiracy in connection with the campaign by SHAC.
It is said by Mr Lawson-Cruttenden, who appears for SHAC, that the threat posed by SHAC to those who supply Huntingdon Life Sciences in the course of their legitimate trading operations continue to this day, so that it is appropriate for this court both to give judgment upon the claim of 11 February 2005 and to make an interim injunction granted on 18 February 2005 by Christopher Clark J on a permanent basis.
Service
Mr Lawson-Cruttenden appears alone before the court. None of the first three defendants appear, nor does any representative of the fourth and fifth defendants to the claim. At the outset of the hearing I therefore enquired as to what if any evidence there was that those defendants had been properly served. In anticipation of this request, I had been supplied with a bundle of correspondence consisting of copies of emails and of letters to and from the first defendant and in respect of the second and third defendants. An undertaking was given to me, which will be reflected in the order, that those letters and documents would be verified by a witness statement with a statement of truth attached.
So far as the first named defendant is concerned, he has indicated that he does not wish to be involved in court cases concerning SHAC. There have been a number in recent years, some of which I will turn to later in this judgment. On 11 January 2011, he responded to an email of the day before enclosing the application notice for this hearing, saying that because of his ongoing ill-health he will not be engaging with the application for the SHAC. He was appointed to represent all persons acting as members, participants or supporters in the name of SHAC by an order of Keith J of 6 December 2007. He has not applied to the court to stand down as the appointed representative. He has indicated in correspondence that he knows that step is available to him, but he has declined to take it. Accordingly, in my view, he still technically is the representative by order of the court of SHAC. As such, he could not properly be served within the meaning of Part 6 of the CPR by email, as he was on 10 January, because he had not indicated in advance that he would be willing to accept service by such means. However, in his case I am satisfied that service within Part 6 has been achieved because a letter to him dated 19 January 2011 is contained in the documents before me which was sent, it appears, by Special Delivery and therefore I have concluded that he has properly been served.
As for the two defendants who are serving prisoners, neither has been served directly by post, but in each case on 19 January letters were sent to the governors of the prisons in which they were then incarcerated. So far as Natasha Avery is concerned, I have a letter from Her Majesty's Prison at Send which informs the court that on 21 January she personally was handed the bundles for this hearing. I regard this as personal service within Part 6. If and insofar as it is necessary to do so, I have concluded that since it is almost inevitable that the same would have happened in respect of the defendant Greg Avery, that under rule 6.16 I can effectively dispense with service or under 6.15 retrospectively make an order permitting service by an alternative method and if it is necessary to achieve proper service I do so. I am satisfied, let it be said, that there is here knowledge by the defendants of these proceedings and they have each had a reasonable opportunity to participate in them should they wish to do so. I, therefore, have no hesitation in thinking the service has been properly achieved.
I turn then to the next question: summary judgment
By Part 24(2), the court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if:
(a) it considers that…
(ii) the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim; and
(b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at trial.
Here, matters are all one way. The Particulars of Claim are verified by a statement of truth. Their contents are thus evidence before me. There has been no defence. Judgment in default of defence is not available because the defendant, number one, is a representative of others and, secondly, because of the nature of the injunctive relief sought. But there is literally no answer to the claim made and I am satisfied that on the facts in the Particulars of Claim it is appropriate to enter summary judgment and I do so.
I should add this: other cases involving SHAC or members of it give confidence as to the acceptability of the facts stated in the Particulars of Claim. This is notably so in respect of the case which resulted in the sentences to the second and third defendants. They both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to blackmail. In his sentencing remarks, Butterfield J said (page 7 of the transcript):
"You cloaked your activities with what in my judgment was a hypocritical sham pretence that SHAC, the organisation you three set up, was a vehicle for legitimate lawful protest in an area of public concern. It was nothing of the sort. It was a vehicle used to terrorise ordinary decent traders carrying on perfectly lawful businesses. You developed a highly organised, well researched and meticulously executed plan of attack. You used deception to find out which companies were actually connected with Huntingdon Life Sciences as its clients, its suppliers or contractors working for them. Once you discovered or even suspected that a company or business was connected with the laboratory, the company would be contacted, the work of HLS explained to them and they would be invited to stop trading with the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Astrazeneca UK Limted (Applicant/Claimant) v Deborah Vincent and Others (Respondent/Defendant)
...of the instant. 25 The final authority to which I need to refer at this point is the decision of Langstaff J in UPS Limited v SHAC [2011] EWHC 3199 (QB). In that case the evidence was that SHAC's activities had diminished in intensity in recent times. It should be added that the evidence be......
-
Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Aran Mathai and Others
...the relevance of the continued existence of SHAC, was given by Langstaff J at paragraph 13 of his decision in the case of UPS v SHAC [2011] EWHC 3199 (QB). He was dealing with the question of whether it is right to remain concerned about claimant companies suffering attacks from SHAC and ot......