USE OF WORK SANCTIONS IN ISRAELI LABOUR DISPUTES
| Date | 01 July 1982 |
| Published date | 01 July 1982 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1982.tb00100.x |
USE
OF
WORK SANCTIONS IN ISRAELI LABOUR
DISPUTES’
BENJAMIN
W.
WOLKINSON*
ABRAHAM
COHEN~
AND
ONE aspect of Israeli labour relations is the propensity
of
unions and workers to
engage in sanctions short of a strike during a labour dispute. Since 1971 when official
tabulations of work sanctions began, one-third of all Israeli labour disputes where
unions used economic force involved the application of work sanctions.*
Partial strike activity
or
sanctions have been the subject
of
little empirical
investigation or research. This paper will partially fill the existing void by examining
characteristics
of
work sanctions, management responses to them, and the workers’
success or failure in achieving their objectives through such conduct. Additionally, it
examines the implications of work sanctions for trade union structure and collective
bargaining practices
in
Israel. In 1977 there were fifty-seven instances where workers
engaged in work
sanction^.^
The following analysis is based
on
interviews with worker
committee and management representatives who were employed
in
forty-one separate
establishments where sanctions occurred in calendar year 1977.4
INITIATION
OF
WORK
SANCTIONS
To understand the union channels that influence the institution, continuation, and
termination of work sanctions, it is useful to examine the structure
of
the Histadrut.’
At the lowest rung of the organisational ladder of the Histadrut, is the workers’
committee, a body elected by workers in each plant, and which represents the shop
level organisations. Higher up the organisational structure of the Histadrut are two
intermediate union bodies: the local labour council and the national unions. The local
labour councils are established along geographical lines, and are made up
of
representatives of all Histadrut members in a given area, irrespective of the work they
perform. The national union represents the workers in a particular occupational or
industrial group. Both intermediate labour bodies are directed by the Histadrut’s
trade union department and implement its collective bargaining policies.
The responsibilities
of
the workers’ committees are not clearly defined. The
Histadrut constitution specifies that workers’ committees
in
co-operation with the
representatives of the local labour council are the legal representatives of all the
workers at the work place before the employer. At the same time, additional
Histadrut by-laws make it clear that collective bargaining authority is vested primarily
with higher
level
Histadrut bodies. Thus, tile Histadrut constitution provides that the
national unions and the local labour councils are responsible for negotiating and
enforcing contracts6 Some acknowledgement of the role of the workers’ committee is
seen in a 1967 national agreement between Histadrut and the Employers’ Association
in which the administration
of
contracts is identified as falling within the ambit
of
the
workers’ committee.’ Additionally, Histadrut by-laws provide that sanctions may only
be called upon approval of the local labour council, the national unions, or the
Histadrut trade union department.’
Notwithstanding the constitutional by-laws
of
the Histadrut, the evidence in Table
1
discloses that most work sanctions result from employee action at the plant level which
bypasses formal union channels.
*Associate Professor
of
Labour Relations, Michigan State University
tPersonnel Director, Kupat
Holim
Hospitals. Tel Aviv.
23
1
232
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
TABLE
I
Union
Body
Initiating
Sanctions
(36
bargaining units)
No.
of
cases
8
Workers’ committee
24
Local labour council
1
National union
3
36
General workers meeting
at
plant
Histadrut trade union department
-
Source:
Responses
of
36
workers’ committee representatives.
Information on the union body initiating the sanction was obtained in thirty-six
cases. Of these, workers collectively decided to engage in sanctions in eight
(22
per
cent), while in twenty-four
(67
per cent) the workers’ committee in the facility
initiated and authorised the sanctions. Significantly, formal union channels were
responsible for the initiation of sanctions
in
only four cases, with the local labour
council calling for sanction in one instance and the national union in three. In no cases
did the Histadrut trade union department call for sanctions.
The
only deference that the employees
or
the workers’ committees afforded the
higher level Histadrut bodies was their willingness to notify them that sanctions had
been undertaken. Of thirty-six bargaining units surveyed, local labour councils were
informed in
62
per cent
of
the cases, the national union in
81
per cent and the
Histadrut trade union department in
50
per cent. This notice was, however,
insufficient to guarantee official union support
for
the sanctions. The local labour
council, the national union,
or
the Histadrut trade union department approved only
five
of
the thirty-two sanctions that had been initiated by the workers themselves
or
through their workers’ committees.
The low incidence
of
formal union authorisation of work sanctions reflects
Histadrut’s awareness that sanctions strongly destabilise labour relations. In most
instances where sanctions occur the collective agreement is still in force and the
sanctions constitute an economic weapon used by workers to force modification of the
current agreement. Of the fifty-seven sanction cases in
1977,
agreements had expired
in only nine
(15
per cent).’ For the local labour council, the national union,
or
the
Histadrut trade union department to endorse sanctions is politically and legally
fraught with difficulty for they themselves are parties to the collective agreements the
workers seek to repudiate. Thus, the Histadrut can be viewed as much a target
of
employee protests as the employer. The reluctance of official union bodies to endorse
work sanctions is reinforced by the long standing joint agreement negotiated in
1967
between the Manufacturer’s Association and the Histadrut trade union department
that parties should eschew strikes and sanctions during the term of a collective
agreement.
Only under limited circumstances will the sanction be supported. For example, in
five
cases the contracts had expired and strikes
or
sanctions were permissible forms of
economic actions. In four remaining cases official union support may have been
forthcoming because the issue over which sanctions were used concerned efforts to
prevent a deterioration in existing conditions. This could occur where management
failed to honour accepted work practices
or
engaged in action which would impose
serious economic hardship on employees. For example, in a case involving a shipping
company sanctions arose over the company’s continued preference for foreign seaman
over Israeli workers. The sanction which continued until the firm agreed to terminate
its foreign crewmen was endorsed by the national union as a necessary tactic to defend
the employment opportunities
of
its members. In another case, sanctions were
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