USING BUREAUCRACY SPARINGLY
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1983.tb00513.x |
| Published date | 01 June 1983 |
| Author | CHRISTOPHER HOOD |
| Date | 01 June 1983 |
USING BUREAUCRACY SPARINGLY
CHRISTOPHER
HOOD
’Using bureaucracy sparingly’
(UBS)
is a well-known and traditional canon of good public
administration
-
but one that has a number of meanings which are not wholly compatible
with one another. Looking at the interface between government administration and the
outside public (rather than at the internal operations of government bureaux), this essay
identifies three rather different senses of
UBS,
all
of
which are in common currency. The
implications of two of these are then explored, in terms of the kinds of preferences they
imply for the use of government’s administrative instruments. Finally, there is a
brief discussion of what the different senses of
uBS
have in common and
of
the extent to
which they have divergent implications, posing dilemmas for those who might wish
to
’use
bureaucracy sparingly’.
One well-known canon of ‘good administration’ is that of applying government
bureaucracy sparingly to the world at large. Keeping operations lean, and
achieving the desired result with the lightest possible administrative tackle is
often taken to be a key test of any administrator’s skills
-
the equivalent to a good
engineer‘s ability to combine lightness with strength. The idea that bureaucracy
(in the general sense of apparatus
of
government) should not be used
heavy-handedly has long been a feature of writing
on
the ’principles’ of public
administration (see for example Simon et a1 1950,60; Hodgkinson 1978,210).
It
can
be seen as a generalization of Adam Smith’s classic canon
of
economy as a
yardstick of good tax administration (Smith 1910,
307).
Plainly, economy may conflict at the margin with other canons of good
administration (such as ’justice’ or ’despatch’), and there may be good reasons for
preferring those other canons
in
many cases. But
it
is assumed here that using
bureaucracy sparingly (henceforth, for convenience,
UBS)
is
a
canon of good
administration, even if it is not always an overriding one, and one that applies
irrespective of the overall level of government intervention in society that
is
thought to be desirable. This article seeks to explore what such a canon might
actually mean in terms
of
the general biases which a preference for
UBS
might
introduce into administrative choice.
The discussion here is directed to
uBsat
the point where government comes into
contact with its citizens or subjects, not to the internal operations
of
government
bureaux. Probably most discussion
of
UBS
in government tends to focus on the
Christopher
Hood
is a Lecturer in the Department
of
Politics, University
of
Glasgow. An earlier version
of
this paper was presented to a seminar at the University
of
Bielefeld (Zentrum Mr interdiszipliniire
Forschung) and the author is grateful
to
Vincent Ostrom and Giandomenico Majone
for
their
comments
on
that occasion.
Public
Administration
Vol.
61
Summer 1983
(197-208)
0
1983 Royal Institute
of
Public Administration
To continue reading
Request your trial