Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629816636486 |
| Author | Livio Di Lonardo |
| Published date | 01 April 2017 |
| Date | 01 April 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Valence uncertainty and the
nature of the candidate pool in
elections
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2017, Vol. 29(2) 327–350
©The Author(s) 2016
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DOI:10.1177/0951629816636486
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Livio Di Lonardo
Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University, USA
Abstract
Political parties in US politics are becoming increasingly polarized, with a growing number of
extreme candidates entering electoral races. Why would extremists challenge more moderate
opponents, since their chances of winning are supposedly very slim? I develop a model of elec-
toral competition and endogenous entry to show that extremists rely on the possibility that the
campaign might reveal information about the opponents’ quality that can induce some voters to
change their electoral decision. The weight voters place on candidates’ valence determines the
incidence of uncontested elections and the degree of asymmetry in polarization of the candi-
dates’ policy positions in contested elections. Finally, I extend the model to consider asymmetric
information about individual valence levels. I show that uncontested races are still possible in equi-
librium, that in contested races at least one candidate has high valence, and the valence-advantaged
candidate can be the one with the more extreme policy stance.
Keywords
Citizen candidates; elections; entry; extremism; valence
1. Introduction
Elections are one of the most defining moments of a democracy. They give citizens the
opportunity to have a say in the democratic life of their society by allowing them to
select representatives who will ultimately have the power to produce binding policies and
laws. When shaping their voting decision, citizens evaluate the candidates’ ideological
stances in order to ensure that the policy decisions of their future representatives will be
aligned to their best interest. If citizens only care about positional issues, then potential
candidates with policy views similar to the median voter’s preferences should be the only
ones with any sort of ambition to run for office.
Corresponding author:
Livio Di Lonardo, Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University, 10012, New York, USA.
Email: ldl297@nyu.edu
328 Journal of Theoretical Politics 29(2)
This conclusion does not fit the picture that has emerged in the last few decades in the
American political landscape. Among others, Ansolabehere et al. (2001) show how there
is consistent evidence of nonconvergence of candidates in congressional races toward the
median voter’s preferences. Both in open races and in races with an incumbent, many
candidates with relatively extreme positions compete for office. While we know that the
voters’ decision to elect extreme candidates further encourages extremism in future elec-
toral races, what is less clear is the reason why extremists enter the race for office in the
first place, especially against more moderate opponents (Hall, 2014). If extremists chal-
lenge candidates who support policies relatively close to the median voter’s preferences,
their chance of winning office should be extremely slim. Why are they willing to sustain
the cost of an electoral campaign that will most likely end up with a severe defeat? Under
what conditions are they willing to enter the competition? I argue that taking into consid-
eration non-positional issues is crucial in understanding the entry decision of extremists
and underdogs in general.
Voters usually tend to lack accurate information about the quality and other personal
characteristics of competitors, especially in the absence of an incumbent whose record in
office and personal image have been uncovered during his/her tenure. This informational
deficiency is usually filled by electoral campaigns. Electoral campaigns often generate
new and valuable information that can help the electorate evaluate each competitor’s
quality, and as such theycan radically change the electoral prospects for each competitor.
The emergence of details about the candidates’ pasts, late-breaking scandals, perfor-
mances in public debates, and particularly unfortunate comments are recurrent elements
of campaigns and are all factors that can either improve or worsen the voters’ perception
of the candidates’ quality. Additionally, there is substantial evidence documenting how
extensively votersuse candidates’ images to shape their voting decisions. Candidates and
parties that are evaluated positively by the electorate in terms of competence, integrity
and other non-policy related domains tend to fare well in the ballot box (e.g. Adams et al.,
2011; Andersen et al., 2002; Clark, 2009; Clark and Leiter, 2014; Mondak, 1995; Stone
and Simas, 2010). Moreover, the effect of candidates’ valence on the public support they
receive is larger in the months immediately before the election (Abney et al., 2013). This
confirms that the months leading up to the vote assume great importance in determining
the result that ultimately emerges from the election: candidates, who at the beginning of
the campaign were widely believed to be comfortablycr uising toward office, might all of
a sudden find themselves trailing behind.
Given the negative effects that the revelation of additional information about the can-
didates’ quality might have, potential candidates most likelywill include in their strategic
calculations the possibility that their bid for office might be severely undermined along
the campaign trail. To capture this environment, I present a model where potential can-
didates decide whether or not to enter the race for office not only on the basis of the
attractiveness of their policy stance, but also considering the impact of potential valence
shocks to each candidate’s campaign. Once the pool of candidates has emerged, the
electoral campaign begins and each candidate’s valence becomes known to all citizens.
Depending on the voters’ sensitivity to quality, the information about the candidates’
valence might radically alter the odds of winning office.
I show that extremists can join the competition in equilibrium even though they
are clearly behind in terms of initial electoral support. Importantly, extremists are not
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