Valuation : The Basis of Foreign Policy Decision-Making
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676900400106 |
| Date | 01 March 1969 |
| Author | Sten Sparre Nilson |
| Published date | 01 March 1969 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Valuation :
The
Basis
of
Foreign
Policy
Decision-Making
Sten
Sparre
Nilson
I
Introductory
Many
of
the
concepts
used
in
interna-
tional
relations
theory
suffer
from
a
lack
of
clarity.
Is
it
possible
to
contri-
bute
to
a
clarification
of
what
is
meant
by
laws
of
international
politics?
or
to
indicate
with
some
degree
of
precision
the
various
components
of
the
national
interest?
We
assume
that
statesmen
think
and
act
in
terms
of
national
in-
terest,
and
the
evidence
of
history
bears
that
assumption
out;
the
concept
of
in-
terest
is
the
main
signpost
which
helps
political
realism
to
find
its
way,
Hans
Morgenthau
asserts.’
He
explicitly
adds,
however,
that
he
does
not
pretend
to
endow
this
key
con-
cept
with
’a
meaning
that
is
fixed’.
The
question
of
its
operationalization
still
remains
unsolved.
Can
the
national
in-
terest
be
defined
in
concrete
terms,
can
it
be
measured
in
some
way
or
other?
For
instance,
how
great
is
the
interest
of
the
United
States
in
preventing
South
Vietnam
from
turning
Communist?
In
recent
years,
certain
attempts
have
been
made
to
approach
this
kind
of
pro-
blem.
George
Modelski,
in
the
conclud-
ing
section
of
his
Theory
of
Foreign
Policy,
suggests
that
a
’balance
sheet
of
foreign
policy’
should
be
drawn
up
periodically,
to
disclose
changes
in
a
country’s
assets
and
liabilities.2
In
business,
he
says,
the
balance
sheet
is
the
chief
instrument
for
judging
a
firm’s
success,
and
the
metaphor
of
the
balance
sheet
is
sometimes
being
used
in
the
appraisal
of
foreign
policy,
though
purely
as
a
metaphor.
Modelski
asks
whether
the
concept
of
a
balance
sheet
of
policy
may
not
be
given
a
more
precise
meaning
through
foreign-policy
analysis.
This
is
an
interesting
idea.
However,
if
we
are
to
pursue
Modelski’s
line
of
reasoning,
it
will
be
necessary
to
show
how
quantification
is
possible
in
the
domain
of
foreign
affairs.
Perhaps
there
are
those
who
would
be
inclined
to
re-
ject
the
comparison
with
business
ad-
ministration
out
of
hand.
The
annual
balance
sheet
of
a
firm
consists
of
a
number
of
precise
figures
referring
to
concrete
magnitudes,
such
as
the
quan-
tities
of
various
commodities,
the
prices
at
which
they
were
bought,
etc.
But
there
are
also
magnitudes
of
a
different
kind
appearing
on
a
balance
sheet.
A
thorough
examination
will
show
that
economic
precision
is
partly
illusory.
Many
important
items
are
very
hard
to
quantify
in
a
reliable
way.
What
allow-
ance
should
be
made
for
depreciation
of
the
fixed
plant
and
equipment
of the
firm?
How
soon
will
its
machinery
prove
obsolete
and
economically
use-
less ?
Which
amount
should
properly
be
ascribed
to
the
inventory?
What
about
allowance
for
doubtful
accounts?
What
is
the
value
of
patents,
or
of
the
firm’s
goodwill
and
so
on?
In
short,
the
bal-
100
ance
sheet
of
a
company
represents
no
more
than
an
approximate
financial
truth.
Perhaps
the
foreign-policy
bal-
ance
sheet
of
a
country
might
stand
comparison
with
it
and
be
made
to
re-
present
an
approximate
political
truth,
if
a
concrete
numerical
value
could
be
assigned
to
at
least
some
of
its
more
important
items.
For
instance,
how
will
the
leaders
of
the
foreign
policy
of
a
great
Power
estimate
the
value
of
its
allies?
Large
concerns
are
known
to
include
among
their
assets
the
value
of
their
shares
in
subsidiary
or
affiliated
companies.
To
take
but
one
example,
in
the
balance
sheet
of
Imperial
Chemical
Industries
Limited
of
Great
Britain,
on
31
Decem-
ber
1967,
the
book
value
of
shares
in
subsidiaries
is
given
as
250.7
million
pounds
plus
amounts
owed
by
subsidi-
aries,
87.2
million,
less
amounts
owed
to
subsidiaries,
121.4
million.
The
result
is
a
net
value
of
interests
in
subsidiaries
to
the
amount
of
216.5
million
pounds
sterling.
(The
principal
subsidiary
com-
panies
were
to
be
found
in
Britain,
Canada,
Australia,
India,
Pakistan,
The
Argentine,
etc.;
besides,
there
were
im-
portant
investments
in
’associated
com-
panies’
located
in
Britain,
Belgium.
South
Africa,
and
the
United
States.)
-
Similar
forms
of
assessment
can
be
seen
in
political
documents.
Sometimes
the
size
of
population
is
used
as
a
yardstick,
sometimes
the
gross
national
product.
In
a
book
recently
published
on
The
At-
lantic
Alliance
by
the
U.S.
Senate
Com-
mittee
on
Government
Operations,
the
editor,
Senator
Henry
M.
Jackson,
makes
an
appraisal
of
the
importance
of
the
countries
within
the
North
At-
lantic
area,
’still
the
most
decisive
re-
gion
for
the
future
of
this
nation’.
It
is
made
in
economic
terms:
’The
total
gross
national
product
of
our
NATO
allies
is
more
than
500
billion
dollars’,
the
Senator
remarks.
The
corresponding
figure
for
the
United
States
is
about
740
billion,
compared
to
some
335
bil-
lion
for
the
Soviet
Union
and
an
esti-
mated
560
billion
for
all
the
Communist
nations
combined.3
However,
a
consideration
of
the
GNP
of
various
nations
can
give
no
more
than
a
vague
indication
of
their
poli-
tical
importance.
More
systematic
valu-
ations
would
have
to
be
undertaken
if
a
formal
balance
sheet
of
foreign
policy
were
to
be
drawn
up.
An
interesting
attempt
in
this
direction
was
made
in
1963
by
Charles
Wolf,
Jr.,
who
raised
the
question
of
what
really
is
the
value
of
less-developed
countries
to
the
United
States.
While
noting
that
this
question
is
unanswerable
by
a
precise
definition,
he
says
some
very
useful
things
in
trying
to
distinguish
between
more
or
less
unsatisfactory
answers
to
it.
Wolf
does
not
refer
to
Modelski’s
idea
of
a
balance
sheet
of
assets
and
liabili-
ties,
but
he
considers
in
some
detail
those
aspects
of
the
value
of
other
coun-
tries
which
can
be
approached
quanti-
tatively.4
He
takes
the
South-East
Asian
region,
and
particularly
Laos,
as
his
ex-
ample.
The
economic
aspect
of
value
cuuld
be
approached
in
different
ways.
From
various
points
of
view,
Indonesia
ap-
pears
as
the
economically
most
impor-
tant
country
of
the
region
in
question.
There
are
certain
natural
resources
of
importance
in
Thailand
and
still
more
in
Malaysia,
which
is
rich
in
tin
and
rubber;
but
Laos
and
Cambodia
belong
to
a
poorer
area.
So
does
Vietnam;
and
not
one
of
these
five
countries
has
re-
sources
that
can
compare
in
importance
with
those
of
Indonesia.
In
1961
the
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