Vigilance or Vigilantes: The Paulsgrove Riots and Policing Paedophiles in the Community Part 1: The Long Slow Fuse
| Date | 01 April 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1350/pojo.77.2.99.39125 |
| Author | Andy Williams,Bill Thompson |
| Published date | 01 April 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
DR ANDY WILLIAMS
Lecturer in Criminology, Institute of Criminal Justice Studies,
University of Portsmouth
DR BILL THOMPSON
Forensic Criminologist
VIGILANCE OR VIGILANTES: THE
PAULSGROVE RIOTS AND
POLICING PAEDOPHILES IN THE
COMMUNITY1
PART 1: THE LONG SLOW FUSE
This article utilises data collected from a three-year ethno-
graphic study of the Paulsgrove demonstrations against a local
child sex offender and the local authorities, which took place
in August 2000. It reassesses Silke’s (2001) examination of the
demonstrations, which suggested several ‘policing strategies’
for dealing with vigilantism. In doing so we offer an alter-
native account of the demonstrations, outlining an 18-month
aetiology which provides a wider understanding of the motiva-
tions of the protestors, as well as critically examining Silke’s
account of how the police deal with collective behaviour. We
conclude that by examining the rationales for engaging in the
protests one is able to gain a stronger understanding of the
dynamics of crowd behaviour; which inevitably would be
advantageous for future operational strategies for police offi-
cers charged with maintaining order on the streets.
Introduction
In a Police Journal article, Silke (2001) offered a useful short
review of some vigilante studies to date and the problems the
phenomenon poses for law enforcement. Having outlined the
weaknesses of existing psychological explanations with their
lack of empirical evidence (e.g. Kreml, 1976; Sederberg, 1978
cited in Silke, 2001), Silke opted for the ‘anger in normal
people’ explanation (Silke, 2000: 120), and endorsed the Shotland
and Goldstein (1984) thesis that vigilantism emerges when
crimes perceived as threatening a community’s standards gen-
erate strong victim empathy combined with a lack of confidence
in the criminal justice system. We are in general agreement with
this analysis, but are less enthusiastic about Silke’s proposal for
The Police Journal, Volume 77 (2004) 99
an ‘effective response’ to the popular support ‘vigilantes’ enjoy;
it could not work, being premised as it is on widespread but
erroneous beliefs about the Paulsgrove ‘riots’ during the summer
of 2000 (see Evans, 2003; Silverman & Wilson, 2002). While
public sympathy and support for acts of community vigilantism
are generated by ‘policing vacuums’, Silke’s strategy relegating
that ‘wider circumstance’ to the ‘long term’, and abandoning
direct confrontation in favour of exploiting media reports of
innocent targets and the vigilantes’ personal weaknesses (2001:
130–1) could prove counterproductive. As Silke offers no evi-
dence of any change in either local or national sympathy for the
demonstrations following the ‘Kessell incident’, this ‘telling
example’ of how the strategy would work is only a hypothesis,
and one that we found wanting. We suggest that the real lesson
of Paulsgrove is that community ‘vigilantism’ can only be
defused by eliminating policing vacuums through ongoing com-
munity relations and exemplary policing policies when ‘things
go wrong’. We demonstrate the viability of this by broadcasting
the real origin and nature of the Paulsgrove ‘riots’ uncovered
through an insider account and by comparing the lessons to be
learnt from what the trial judge described as ‘legitimate and legal
protests’.2with the failure of the authorities to implement a Sex
Offender Order. This can not offer a complete solution, as our
ethnographic study confirmed Johnston’s suggestion (1996) that
this would require a range of case studies, discerning viable
typologies rather than manipulating already exaggerated and
distorted news reports for the benefit of existing theories about
vigilantism’.
In short, we address four issues:
1. The real, unreported, origin of the demonstrations, as
there are vital lessons to be learnt from these;
2. The distinctions between the different groups of protest-
ors, because this creates real possibilities for dissipating
community conflict;
3. The failure of authorities to use Sex Offender Orders
which could have secured public support for Multi-
Agency Public Protection Panels (MAPPPs);
4. A very positive development from our research that
caught us by surprise, but which could help all MAPPPs,
or future systems, to fulfil a difficult and onerous legis-
lative duty (Card & Ward, 1998; Grubin, 1998; Home
Office, 2002; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2000).
100 The Police Journal, Volume 77 (2004)
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