What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war
| Author | Casper Sakstrup |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343320913092 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
What’s going on next door?
Irregular leader change in neighboring
countries, uncertainty, and civil war
Casper Sakstrup
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University
Abstract
Uncertainty about capabilities or resolve is a prominent explanation for war between states. However, we know
comparatively little about uncertainty as a cause of armed conflict between domestic actors. This article proposes that
irregular leader change in a neighboring country generates uncertainty about third-party resolve and thus increases
the likelihood of intrastate armed conflict. I argue that domestic actors take potential third parties’ capabilities and
resolve into account when bargaining, that neighboring countries are important potential third parties, and that
irregular leader change among these potential third parties results in uncertainty because there is an increased risk of
foreign policy change combined with limited access to information. With uncertain estimates of third-party resolve,
the risk of bargaining failure and armed conflict increases. Global spatial analyses spanning 1946–2014 corroborate
the argument. As expected, I find that irregular leader change in one or more neighboring countries increases the
probability of intrastate armed conflict onset. The results are robust across three different distance thresholds for
neighboring countries, using time and country fixed effects and several alternative model specifications. Overall, this
article advances our knowledge about uncertainty as a cause of civil war and sheds new light on the adverse
consequences of irregular leader change.
Keywords
intrastate conflict, leader change, third parties, uncertainty
Introduction
Uncertainty about the resolve or capabilities of an oppo-
nent or a third party is a prominent explanation for war
between states, both theoretically and empirically
(Blainey, 1988; Morrow, 1989; Fearon, 1995; van Evera,
1999; Fortna, 2003; Reed, 2003; Slantchev, 2003;
Bearce, Flanagan & Floros, 2006; Rauchhaus, 2006; Fey
& Ramsay, 2011;Slantchev & Tarar, 2011; Bas & Schub,
2016; DiLorenzo & Rooney, 2018). Some scholars argue
that uncertainty also causes intrastate armed conflict
1
(e.g. Walter, 2009). However, only a few studies have
investigated this, specifically pointing to opposition frag-
mentation (Cunningham, 2013) and third-party signals
(Thyne, 2006) as sources of uncertainty.
In this article, I uncover another major source of
uncertainty affecting the likelihood of intrastate armed
conflict: irregular leader change in a neighboring coun-
try. The theoretical argument is laid out in three parts.
First, I argue that domestic actors include potential third
parties’ capabilities and resolve when bargaining, similar
to the logic of interstate bargaining (e.g. Blainey, 1988;
van Evera, 1999; DiLorenzo & Rooney, 2018). Second,
I point to neighboring countries as important potential
third parties, since they often have opportunities
and motives to intervene in intrastate armed con flicts
(e.g. Regan, 1998; Kathman, 2010). Third, I argue that
political turnover among potential third parties, specifi-
cally irregular leader change, generates uncertainty about
Corresponding author:
cas@ps.au.dk
1
I use the terms ‘civil war’ and ‘intrastate armed conflict’
synonymously.
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(3) 539–553
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343320913092
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