When risky decisions are not surprising: An application of prospect theory to the Israeli war decision in 2006
| Author | Anat Niv-Solomon |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836716640837 |
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
| Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(4) 484 –503
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836716640837
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When risky decisions are not
surprising: An application of
prospect theory to the Israeli
war decision in 2006
Anat Niv-Solomon
Abstract
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah operatives crossed into Israel and attacked a military patrol, killing three
soldiers and kidnapping two more. In retaliation to this incident Israel launched a military operation
that resulted in 34 days of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. The Israeli retaliation has been
deemed to be severe and surprising. Furthermore, a public investigation commission established
by the Israeli government implicated key decision-makers, and especially Prime Minister Olmert,
as guilty of hasty and irresponsible decision-making. This article views this case through the lens of
prospect theory, showing how the decision was made at the framing stage, and suggesting that this
decision was not hasty but, rather, was consistent with the logic of loss-aversion.
Keywords
decision-making, Hezbollah, Israel, prospect theory, second Lebanon War
On the morning of 12 July 2006, Hezbollah operatives cut the fence and crossed the bor-
der from Lebanon into Israel, where they ambushed a military patrol. In the violent inci-
dent that developed two patrol vehicles were attacked, three Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
soldiers were killed, three injured, and two were kidnapped into Lebanon. The Israeli
reaction and retaliation was severe and sparked a war that lasted for 34 days and resulted
in many casualties on both sides and widespread infrastructure and property damage.
Combat fighting between IDF and Hezbollah forces took place in Lebanon; the Lebanese
Army avoided direct involvement. Civilian life on both sides of the Lebanese–Israeli bor-
der was heavily interrupted because Israel often bombed Hezbollah targets located near
civilians, and Hezbollah aimed a rocket campaign at military and civilian targets deep
within northern Israel. The war ended with a UN guaranteed ceasefire and peacekeeping
operation which came into power on 14 August 2006 (UNSC Resolution 1701).1
Corresponding author:
Anat Niv-Solomon, College of Staten Island (CSI), City University of New York, 2800 Victory Boulevard,
2N-224, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA.
Email: anat.nivsolomon@csi.cuny.edu
640837CAC0010.1177/0010836716640837Cooperation and ConflictNiv-Solomon
research-article2016
Article
Niv-Solomon 485
This article attempts to provide a better understanding of the decision by Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert to unleash the severe retaliation for the 12 July attack and kidnap-
ping (which then led to the month-long war). Rational choice models might look for the
cost and benefit arguments for each policy option but, as is shown here, such models will
still leave us with some questions about Olmert’s decisions. Prospect theory, as sug-
gested here, draws our attention to priming by past events and a natural bias towards loss
aversion that drove the events.
Ever since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, and the parallel
capture of border positions inside Lebanon by Hezbollah forces, the situation on the
border remained tense but relatively quiet. From time to time Hezbollah would attempt
attacks on military patrols or IDF border posts, including a successful attempt to kidnap
soldiers in October 2000, but Israel followed a policy of containment and restraint and
kept any retaliatory measures to a minimum. That was the status quo in July 2006 when
the events above mentioned began to unfold. Given the background and based on all
estimations, few, including Hezbollah, expected Israel to divert from what had become
the norm and retaliate so severely. This time Israel unleashed its military might against a
relatively small militia, with clear goals to diminish the threat of Hezbollah from Israel’s
border with Lebanon. When the fighting ended, Hezbollah declared a victory because it
perceived as a significant win its ability to withstand a war with Israel, without losing its
operational capability. Hezbollah also denied Israel one of its declared goals, the return
of the IDF soldiers captured at the beginning of the war.2 On the Israeli side, evaluations
regarding the outcomes of the combat were not easily reached, and were more politically
charged. The Israeli decision to use severe retaliation was one of a number of options, but
as discussed below it was not the most expected one.
An investigative commission (the Winograd Commission), given a mandate by the
Israeli government to examine the war, concluded that decision-making leading to and
during the war was pathologically flawed. The commission had five members and was
chaired by retired Justice Eliyahu Winograd: its members were law professor Ruth
Gavison, political science professor Yehezkel Dror, and two retired Major-Generals,
Menachem Einan and Chaim Nadel. All five members of the commission were highly
respected in Israel. The Winograd Commission named both Prime Minister Olmert and
Defense Minister Peretz as primarily responsible for the war and its failures. The
Winograd Commission in its final report submitted on 30 January 2008 concluded:
Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long
war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few
thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed
full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel’s
civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response
to it. The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their
home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. After a long period of using only standoff fire
power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive, very close
to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military
gains and was not completed. These facts had far-reaching implications for us, as well as for our
enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world.3
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