Who Obtains a Benefit Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and What Is Its Value?

DOI10.1177/0022018315589030a
Date01 June 2015
AuthorGavin A Doig
Published date01 June 2015
Subject MatterCourt of Appeal
It is the better course to decide any such issue, if the issue ever arises, on the particular facts of a case. It may
well be that the issue is generally fact-sensitive. It may therefore be unnecessary for this court to elaborate on
the terms of the Act, but such a decision must await a case where the issue arises (at [20]).
His Lordship also declined to speculate on whether ‘the loss of self-control had to be a total loss or
whether some loss of self-control was sufficient’ (at [20]).
It is submitted that the Crown was correct to assert that a mere ‘loss of temper’ would be insufficient,
and so too would a test based on doing ‘an atypical act’: both set the bar too low. In Richens (1994) 98 Cr
App R 43, a provocation case, Lord Taylor CJ said:
It would have been perfectly proper to emphasise that the test was not loss of temper but a sudden and tem-
porary loss of self-control which resulted in the defendant being unable to restrain himself from doing what he
did (at p 49).
Apart from the reference to the loss of self-control having to be ‘sudden’, which is emphatically not a
requirement under the loss of control defence by virtue of s. 54(2) CJA 2009, the above-quoted passage
seems to provide a perfectly acceptable template for juries to use today. Lord Taylor CJ in Richens also
observed that it would be a judicial misdirection (in the context of the provocation defence) to require a
‘complete’ loss of self-control. It is submitted that this principle should also be regarded as good law
under the CJA 2009.
Tony Storey
Who Obtains a Benefit Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and What Is Its Value?
RvRoper [2014] EWCA Crim 2476
Keywords
Confiscation, POCA, obtaining property, valuation of benefit
This appeal concerned a confiscation order made in the sum of £16,572.41 against the Appellant. He had
pleaded guilty to four counts of entering into or becoming concerned in a money laundering arrangement
contrary to s. 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (‘POCA’), and one count of transferring criminal
property contrary to s. 327(1)(d) POCA.
The Appellant had allowed his bank account to be used to launder money that a co-accused, L, had
fraudulently obtained. The four counts contrary to s. 328 POCA (Counts 3–6) concerned four cheques
totalling £11,036.46. They were obtained by L in the Appellant’s name, and paid into an account in the
Appellant’s name which had been open for some years: account number ending 107.
Three of the cheques, totalling £7,999.50, were paid in on 21 June 2010. On 25 June 2010, £7,500 was
withdrawn in cash from the account. The fourth cheque was paid in on 1 July 2010. The particulars of
Counts 3–6 spelt out the allegations: that the Appellant entered into the arrangement in respect of each
cheque knowing or suspecting that it would ‘ ...facilitate the retention, use or control of criminal prop-
erty by other persons’ (emphasis added).
The count contrary to s. 327 POCA, Count 7, concerned a further cheque for £3,537, which was paid
into a second account in the Appellant’s name: account number ending 001. Part of this sum (£1,500)
was moved to the 107 account.
The Appellant, via his defence statement, asserted that L had sole use of account 107 at the relevant
time. Therefore, even though the account was in the Appellant’s name, as were the cheques paid into it,
the Appellant had not been in effective control of the account. The Appellant’s basis of plea reiterated
this stance. The fact of his pleas indicated that he knew or suspected that L was using the account for
Court of Appeal 157

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