Why differentiated integration is such a common practice in Europe: A rational explanation
| Author | Katharina Holzinger,Jale Tosun |
| Date | 01 October 2019 |
| Published date | 01 October 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819875522 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2019, Vol.31(4) 642–659
ÓThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875522
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Why differentiated
integration is such a common
practice in Europe: A rational
explanation
Katharina Holzinger
University of Konstanz,Germany
Jale Tosun
Heidelberg University, Germany
Abstract
With Brexit imminent, the debate on the need for differentiated integration (DI) by means of
opting-out has gained new momentum. At the same time, non-member states decide to adopt
European Union (EU) rules as exemplified by the European Neighbourhood Policy. In light of
these opposing observations, we examine the EU’s disposition to supply DI. We outline the stra-
tegic interactions of the EU member states or non-members in the context of two forms of DI:
opting-out and inducing-in. In the case of opting-out, EU member states can refrainfrom adopting
EU rules; inducing-in refers to providing non-member states with incentives to adopt EU rules.
We show that the information asymmetries inherent to the strategicinteractions result in a situa-
tion in which the EU is likely to supply opportunities to opt-out for member states to a much
greater extent than necessary. Furthermore, the EU is likely to offer more compensation to non-
member states in exchange for adopting EU rules than it would actuallyneed to.
Keywords
Differentiated integration;European Union; inducing-in; opting-out; signalling game
Corresponding author:
Katharina Holzinger, Department of Politics and Public Administration,University of Konstanz, Box 90,
Universita
¨tsstrasse 10, Konstanz,Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, 78457, Germany.
Email: katharina.holzinger@uni-konstanz.de
1. Introduction
European integration has been accompanied by debates on differentiated integra-
tion (DI). Notions such as ‘multi-speed’ Europe, ‘flexible integration’, ‘unity in
diversity’, or ‘core Europe’ have emerged, all of which share the idea that the mem-
ber states integrate to different degrees with the European Union (EU) (e.g., Dyson
and Sepos, 2010; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012; Hvidsten and Hovi, 2015;
Jensen and Slapin, 2012; Leuffen et al., 2013; Schneider, 2009). The European
Monetary Union (EMU) represents the most prominent case of DI: while some
member states refused to participate, others were not permitted to join the club
(see, e.g., Sandholtz, 1993).
Secondary law differentiation was already a reality from the very beginning of
European integration: in many cases, member states were granted exceptions from
individual rules in legal acts (see Kroll and Leuffen, 2015). More importantly, since
the Treaty of Maastricht and most notably with the Treaty of Amsterdam, DI also
became an option in primary law. Moreover, in the context of EU enlargement,
some accession candidates requested and/or were given temporary ‘opt-outs’ to
gradually adapt to the legislative requirements (Tosun, 2011). In some cases, per-
manent or temporary opt-outs were the result of incapacity, in others they were
based on deliberate choice (Warleigh, 2002).
Adding to the overall degree of DI, some non-member states chose to ‘opt-in’,
either unilaterally adapting their national policies to EU law or being induced to do
so by the EU. For processes of opting-in, Switzerland transfers EU legislation into
national law despite not being a member state (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig,
2012; Schimmelfennig and Lavenex, 2009). The EU itself supports opting-in
frequently: for example, the non-EU countries of the European Economic Area
(Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland) are required to apply the respective EU law.
Another example is the European Neighbourhood Instrument, providing financial
incentives to European neighbourhood countries in an attempt to induce them to
align their policies with the EU (Bo
¨rzel and van Hu
¨llen, 2014; Bossuyt et al., 2017).
In these cases, the EU strives to export its policies to third countries and induce
them to join in for specific sectors.
As opt-outs and opt-ins are becoming increasingly common, the EU is expected
to become more heterogeneous, rendering the assessment of the economic, political,
and social impacts of integration more complicated (De Bu´ rca and Scott, 2000). At
the same time, granting opt-outs does not seem to work as a facilitating factor of
European integration anymore. The United Kingdom has received the greatest
number of concessions and special rules in the past (Duttle 2016; Duttle et al.,
2017), and yet the British public voted against remaining in the EU in the Brexit
referendum.
In the following, we refer to all these processes uniformly as ‘DI’. We are inter-
ested in the question as to why we observe such a large degree of DI despite the
existence of one very strong motive for European integration – the harmonization
of policies and markets. Why are EU member states and the supranational institu-
tions willing to grant so many opt-outs and, at the same time, to entice others to
Holzinger and Tosun 643
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