Worlds of our remembering
| Date | 01 March 2011 |
| Published date | 01 March 2011 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836710396836 |
| Author | Kuniyuki Nishimura |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Cooperation and Conflict
46(1) 96–112
Worlds of our remembering:
© The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permission: sagepub.
The agent–structure
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836710396836
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problem as the search for
identity
Kuniyuki Nishimura
Abstract
Attempts to deal with the agent–structure problem have often resulted in the introduction of
alternative forms of structuralism. Scholars have thus failed to observe the construction and
reconstruction of subjectivity, which occurs as an eternal process because of the simple fact that
each of us lives in his or her own time. This article attempts to provide an alternative approach to
the agent–structure problem by reformulating it as an issue of identity. Especially in comparison
with Lévinas, Ricoeur’s thought of memory proves helpful in grappling with the problem, not by
presupposing the coherent entity of either agent or structure, but by directing our attention
to the in-between. It also enables a nuanced analysis of social change, which always needs to be
comprehended in its tension with the leanings toward stability. A brief analysis of the literary
discourses after the Great War illustrates this point. As a whole, the article aims to recover beings’
temporality at the centre of the agent–structure problem and thus reconstruct the problem as
innately unstable agents’ search for their constantly changing identity.
Keywords
agent–structure, identity, Lévinas, memory, narrative, phenomenology, Ricoeur
Introduction
Through the past two decades of heated debates, the agent–structure problem has suc-
cessfully occupied an idiosyncratic place in International Relations (IR) (Wendt, 1987;
Dessler, 1989; Carlesnaes, 1992; Doty, 1997; Friedman and Starr, 1997; Suganami,
1999; Wight, 2006). Concerning the ways by which we understand the mutually consti-
tutive relationship between agents and structures, it has become a symbolic term desig-
nating the vicissitude of our social worlds. Scholarly discussions about the problem have
Corresponding author:
Kuniyuki Nishimura, Fukumoto-cho 421-2-106, Sakyo, Kyoto 6068361, Japan.
[email: kuniyuki.nishimura@gmail.com]
Nishimura
97
centred on the historical contingency of structural entities, especially culture and identity
(see Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996).
However, this focus on structural transformations has prevented many scholars from
paying sufficient attention to agents (see, for example, Shannon, 2005). This sounds
almost counterintuitive because agent–structure theoreticians blazed their trails by criti-
cizing excessive structuralism in IR (see Wendt, 1987). This strange leaning toward
structures seems to suggest that, with the exception of some discourse theorists, scholars
do not share the following understanding: the agent–structure problem is, despite its
name, not a problem to be solved but a framework of thinking for us to make at least
some sense of the otherwise indescribable becoming of our social worlds. Every social
theory is at least implicitly based on a certain view about the agent–structure problem
when it makes ontological assumptions about the world, without which no theory is
possible (see Hay, 2008). According to Roxanne Lynn Doty (1997: 371), the agent–
structure problem is about how to demarcate agents and structures: the two are so intri-
cately interconnected, hence the problem in analysis appears (also see Wight, 1999: 110).
We can refer to agents and structures only indirectly by first acquiring a view about what
is happening in between.
It is not a coincidence that the role of memory, an in-between, has been discussed only
marginally (see Bell, 2006). Culture and identity, or whatever are called structures, are
identifiable dynamisms in history, which are themselves products of their own interaction
with agents. Agents’ intersubjective understanding of these structures necessarily entails a
particular interpretation about to what extent and in what respect these conceptual entities
have been continuous or discontinuous in history. Agents always interpret the history of
structures in sharing an intersubjective understanding about them. Agents remember and
re-remember structures for understanding what a particular structure is in the present. On
the other hand, agents can be themselves through such an intersubjective understanding
about these structures, i.e. their grounds and the sources of their identity, which are also
the product of their own memories. Agents comprehend structures through memory while
standing on intersubjectively remembered structures. But memory would not allow agents
to comprehend the totality of structures because it does not allow them to re-experience
exactly what has happened in the past. Agents never have the total knowledge about who
they are or where they stand. The relationship between agents and structures necessarily
contains a lack. Just as ‘the past is a foreign country’ (L. P. Hartley), agents are, in their
relation with structures, the present selves who need to remember and re-remember their
grounds as the others in their own history. What we need to examine is this movement, this
search for identity, not who agents are or what structures are. Agents and structures always
reject immediate identification. Memory, as an in-between, helps us articulate them by
telling us what kinds of issues are at stake among what kinds of individuals.
This present study attempts to situate memory squarely within the agent–structure
framework. More specifically, a phenomenological inquiry is conducted into the role of
memory with the help of Ricoeur (1988, 1992, 2004a, 2004b). The relationship between
agents and structures, as stated above, always contains a lack. Yet, this impossibility of
complete harmony evokes the feeling of instability within agents, leads to reflections
on memories and sometimes results in major structural transformations. At the centre
of the agent–structure problem is the fact that human beings are temporal beings, an
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CooperationandConflict46(1)
existence in the relentless flow of time, who always need to rely on uncertain memory
for grasping their grounds. The agent–structure problem is another name for the self’s
recurrent interrogation of her constantly changing identity. Ricoeur proves one of the
most suggestive thinkers in this regard, as his thought concerns the multiplied subject
and its construction of identity through memory. Ricoeur’s argument also leads us to
recognize the ambivalent character of our social dynamics: the coexistence of continu-
ity and discontinuity. The multiplied subject constantly changes the substance of her
identity while maintaining its form.
First, this article briefly reviews the existing works pertaining to discussions of the
agent–structure problem and uncovers their connection to phenomenology. It then clari-
fies the appropriateness of discussing Ricoeur in the context of the agent–structure prob-
lem. Next, the article examines Ricoeur by comparing him with Lévinas. These two
thinkers provide a sound and pertinent contrast, as the latter asserts the limits of memory
in the agent–structure problem, whereas the former provides a way by which to tran-
scend such limits. Last, this article illustrates the theoretical use of Ricoeur’s idea of
narrative identity by analysing autobiographies and war novels in inter-war Europe. One
of the reasons for this case selection resides in the significance of the Great War itself,
one of the most destructive wars (and thus one of the most significant cases of structural
transformation) in history. More immediately, the inter-war case best illuminates
Ricoeur’s insights. The situation in the inter-war years is remarkable in that various nar-
ratives of identity appeared as regards how to remember the past.
Phenomenology and the agent–structure problem
To understand the link between Ricoeur and the agent–structure problem, it is necessary
to start from recognizing that the problem derived from the same philosophical tradition
as did phenomenology. As some scholars have pointed out, the agent–structure problem
is a restatement of the age-old question of the relationships between individual and soci-
ety, part and whole, and subject and object (Carlesnaes, 1992: 245; Doty, 1997: 365).
This series of issues can be called the problem of totality, totality in the sense that each
aspect of the world is not observed separately but as a whole. According to Martin Jay
(1984), this problem of totality is almost the only concept that makes the Western Marxist
tradition a tradition. Thinkers of this tradition include, among others, Gramsci and
Habermas, leading thinkers of social constructivism understood in its widest sense. It is
not a mere coincidence that not a few agent–structure theoreticians have mentioned
Marx’s (2000: 329) dictum: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as
they please’ (see Dessler, 1989: 443; Carlesnaes, 1992: 255; Friedman and Starr, 1997:
3; Suganami, 1999: 380; Patomäki and Wight, 2000: 230). It can be said that agent–
structure theoreticians are those struggling with the problem of totality, whether they
advocate or deny the possibility of grasping the whole.
Marx was not the first to tackle this problem, however. Jay (1984: ch. 1) considers
Rousseau, Hegel and others as intellectual origins of Marxism. Marcuse (1999: 252) also
suggests that Marx succeeded critical elements of Hegelian philosophy....
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