Freedom of Information in UK Law

In my judgment these three cases fall far short of establishing that an individual's article 10(1) freedom to receive information is interfered with whenever, as in the present case, a public authority, acting consistently with the domestic legislation governing the nature and extent of its obligations to disclose information, refuses access to documents.

There is much force in Lord Marnoch's observation in the Inner House that, as the whole purpose of FOISA is the release of information, it should be construed in as liberal a manner as possible: [2006] CSIH 58, 2007 SC 231, para 32. But that proposition must not be applied too widely, without regard to the way the Act was designed to operate in conjunction with DPA 1998.

Information is the key to sound decision-making, to accountability and development; it underpins democracy and assists in combatting poverty, oppression, corruption, prejudice and inefficiency. Administrators, judges, arbitrators, and persons conducting inquiries and investigations depend upon it; likewise the press, NGOs and individuals concerned to report on issues of public interest. These competing considerations, and the balance between them, lie behind the issues on this appeal.

In my view, whatever meaning is given to “journalism” I would not be sympathetic to the notion that information about, for instance, advertising revenue, property ownership or outgoings, financial debt, and the like would normally be “held for purposes … of journalism”. No doubt there can be said to be a link between such information and journalism: the more that is spent on wages, rent or interest payments, the less there is for programmes.

"Necessary" has been strongly interpreted: it is not synonymous with "indispensable" neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as "admissible" "ordinary" "useful" "reasonable" or "desirable": Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, 754, para 48.