THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ON WHITEHALL
| Author | ROBERT HAZELL,MARK GLOVER |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01930.x |
| Published date | 01 December 2011 |
| Date | 01 December 2011 |
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01930.x
THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ON WHITEHALL
ROBERT HAZELL AND MARK GLOVER
This article examines whether the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 has changed Whitehall.
Based on a two-year, ESRC-funded study, it evaluates the impact of FOI on five characteristics of
the Whitehall model: the culture of secrecy, ministerial accountability to Parliament, civil service
neutrality, the Cabinet system, and effective government. Proponents of FOI hoped that government
would be less secretive, more accountable and more effective; critics feared that civil servants would
lose their anonymity, and collective Cabinet responsibility would be undermined. Drawing on
interviews, media analysis, case law and official documents, the article finds that the impact of
FOI is modest at most. It is not powerful enough to do much good or much ill, and the feared
‘chilling effect’ on candour and record-keeping has not materialized. Leaks do more damage than
FOI disclosures. But ministers remain apprehensive about the effect of FOI on Cabinet records and
discussions.
INTRODUCTION: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE UK
L’autre jour au fond d’un vallon,
Un serpent piqua Jean Fr´
eron;
Que croyez-vous qu’il arriva?
Ce fut le serpent qui creva.
Voltaire’s epigram can be applied to the introduction of freedom of information (FOI) into
Whitehall. Would FOI, riding in like St George, succeed in taming Leviathan? Or would
the mandarins prevail? In the event, Whitehall proved stronger than FOI. But this was not
because the mandarins subverted FOI. Rather, it was that FOI’s transformative powers
were oversold (Hazell et al. 2010).
Proponents of the FOI Act expected positive changes: reducing the culture of secrecy,
increasing accountability, and improved decision making. Its opponents feared that civil
service neutrality, ministerial accountability to Parliament, and the Cabinet system of
government would be undermined, and the ‘chilling effect’ of freedom of information
would deter civil servants from putting frank advice in writing and cause record keeping
to decline. Most extremely articulated, FOI was seen as a threat to the Westminster system
of government in Britain, as it had been when first introduced in countries with similar
political systems, like Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Danks Review 1980; Missen
1984; Hazell 1989).
The UK came late to FOI, with the FOI Act 2000 being passed some 30 years after the
American law, and 20 years after Australia, Canada and New Zealand, which all legis-
lated in 1982. The UK followed some of these Commonwealth countries in establishing an
Information Commissioner as the main enforcement machinery, rather than having first
tier appeal to the courts (as in the US). FOI requests are free of charge, and the Information
Commissioner (whose services are also free of charge) can order disclosure, so in these
Robert Hazell is Professor of British Politics and Government and Director of the Constitution Unit, School of Public
Policy, University College London and has been adviser to the UK government and Parliament on freedom of
information. Mark Glover was in the Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London and now
works in the public sector.
Public Administration Vol. 89, No. 4, 2011 (1664–1681)
©2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,
MA 02148, USA.
THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ON WHITEHALL 1665
respects it is a liberal and open regime. Although there are numerous exemption provi-
sions, they are all qualified by a public interest test, so in that respect it is also a relatively
open regime. Indeed Cabinet papers can and have been ordered to be disclosed, which
could not happen in Canada or Australia, where they are protected by a class exemption
(Hazell and Busfield-Burch 2011).
The UK FOI Act came into force in 2005, and applied immediately to all levels of
government, from Whitehall departments to local schools. It is estimated that it applies to
over 100,000 public bodies. Central government receives around 30,000 requests a year.
From the start journalists have been prominent among requesters, and the national press
have run over 5000 FOI stories in the first five years.
The belief that FOI would transform Whitehall, for better or worse, was widely held by
academics, politicians and civil servants alike. Until now this belief has remained untested
by serious research. There is a danger that it will slip unchallenged into received wisdom
and Whitehall mythology. The danger is the greater because FOI has nowhere been the
subject of any systematic research. It is true that there have been inquiries by official
bodies, but these are formative evaluations asking whether the new law needs adjusting
(for example, see NZ Information Authority 1985; Australian Senate Standing Committee
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 1987; Canadian Standing Committee on Justice and
Solicitor General 1987; High Level Review Group on the Irish Freedom of Information
Act 2003). No FOI Act has been subject to an independent, multi method, summative
evaluation, seeking to assess whether it has achieved its objectives. That is what we set
out to do in the UK; and also to assess whether FOI has changed the way Whitehall works,
for good or for bad.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR EVALUATING FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION
Advocates of the FOI Act hoped it would transform Whitehall; critics feared it would.
Though the Act does not have a purpose clause, six main objectives can be identified from
policy documents such as the White Paper, ministerial speeches and select committee
reports (Hazell et al. 2010). The first three relate to Whitehall: increasing transparency,
stronger accountability, and improved government decision-making. The last three relate
to the public: increasing public understanding of government, public participation in
the political process, and increasing public trust in government. The performance of FOI
against these objectives is evaluated elsewhere (Hazell et al. 2010; Worthy 2010).
Evaluations should also focus on negative impacts of policy. Four main negative side-
effects of the FOI Act were feared: that it would erode ministerial accountability and
civil service neutrality, undermine the Cabinet system of government, and discourage
frank official advice or robust ministerial discussion (Hazell 1989; Hazell et al. 2010). The
framework of the ‘Whitehall model’ allows us to capture any positive or negative impact
of the FOI Act on central government.
We use the term ‘Whitehall model’ to emphasize our focus on the executive branch
of government and its interaction with the legislature through the Cabinet, rather than
the more all-encompassing ‘Westminster model’ or system (Campbell and Wilson 1995,
p. 9; Rhodes et al. 2010). The Whitehall model has a range of well known characteristics
identified in the literature: permanence, recruitment by open competition, a unified
structure, promotion by ability, neutrality, anonymity, a monopoly of advice to ministers,
ministerial accountability to Parliament, and a Cabinet system of government (for example,
Public Administration Vol. 89, No. 4, 2011 (1664–1681)
©2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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