Parliamentary Privilege in UK Law

In such a case there will inevitably be an inquiry at the trial into the honesty of what the defendant had said, and if the defendant's extra-parliamentary statement is found to have been untrue or dishonest the same conclusion would ordinarily, although not always, apply to the parliamentary statement also.

In our judgment, it is clear that the introduction of a Bill into Parliament forms part of the proceedings within Parliament. To order the defendants to introduce a Bill into Parliament would therefore be to order them to do an act within Parliament in their capacity as Members of Parliament and would plainly be to trespass impermissibly on the province of Parliament.

In considering whether actions outside the Houses and committees fall within parliamentary proceedings because of their connection to them, it is necessary to consider the nature of that connection and whether, if such actions do not enjoy privilege, this is likely to impact adversely on the core or essential business of Parliament.

If the Court upheld this ground, it would have the effect of preventing the Defendant from laying an order before Parliament unless or until he had undertaken a consultation exercise, even though there was no statutory duty to consult, because otherwise he would be acting unlawfully. Thus, the consequence of allowing the Claimant's claim was an interference by the Court with Parliamentary proceedings, which was contrary to Parliamentary privilege and the separation of powers.

In my judgment, this is not an exceptional case which justifies any departure from the general rule that this Court will respect the separation of powers and so not interfere with Parliamentary proceedings. Under this legislative scheme, no justiciable decision has been made. The Minister has not yet made a draft Order in Council, unlike Smedley. In those circumstances, I do not consider it would be appropriate to reject the Defendant's submission on grounds of urgency.

In particular, it is a cardinal constitutional principle that the will of Parliament is expressed in the language used by it in its enactments. The proportionality of legislation is to be judged on that basis. The courts are to have due regard to the legislation as an expression of the will of Parliament. The court is called upon to evaluate the proportionality of the legislation, not the adequacy of the minister's exploration of the policy options or of his explanations to Parliament.