Amjad and Others v Steadman-Byrne
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Sedley |
| Judgment Date | 27 June 2007 |
| Neutral Citation | [2007] EWCA Civ 625 |
| Docket Number | Case No: B3/2006/1760 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 27 June 2007 |
[2007] EWCA Civ 625
Lord Justice Sedley
Lady Justice Smith and
Lord Justice Hughes
Case No: B3/2006/1760
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE MANCHESTER COUNTY COURT
DISTRICT JUDGE JONES
No. 5MA13485
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mr P N Hinchcliffe (instructed by Messrs Keoghs) for the Appellant
Mr B Coulter (instructed by Messrs Clear Law) for the Respondent
Hearing date: Thursday 19 April 2007
This is the judgment of the court.
The appellant was the defendant in a personal injury action arising out of a low-velocity motor collision. There were three claimants. The claim was allocated to the multi-track in Manchester and released by the designated civil judge to District Judge Jones for trial.
On 14 July 2006 the district judge gave a judgment about the content of which there could be no complaint. It recorded that at trial the day before the defendant had admitted liability – which up to that point he had denied—for running into a car driven by the first claimant, but that he contended that there had been only two people in the car – the first claimant and, in the passenger seat, the second claimant. The district judge, however, found for all three claimants, accepting their testimony that, contrary to the defendant's evidence, all three had been in the car. They were awarded respectively agreed sums of £2,816, £1750 and £2000 for what were, self-evidently, minor injuries, and the defendant, or rather his insurers, was ordered to pay their costs in the sum of £11,773:65.
This would have been an unappealable end to an unremarkable case but for what had happened half way through the trial. The claimants gave their evidence during the morning of 13 July and were cross-examined in accordance with the defendant's case. Towards 1 p.m., at the conclusion of their evidence, the judge adjourned and invited counsel for the parties into his room. It is what transpired there that has brought the case to this court, with permission granted by Smith LJ on sight of the papers.
According to a note prepared shortly afterwards by counsel for the claimants, Angela Georgiou, and agreed in its essentials by Brian McCluggage, counsel for the defendant, the district judge said in substance:
(1) Having heard the claimants give evidence, he believed them.
(2) He had considered the manner in which they gave their evidence and in particular the quickness with which they responded to questions.
(3) He had warned each one of them of the consequences of his deciding that they were pursuing a fraudulent claim and had seen their reply. He did not consider the men to be dishonest.
(4) He accepted that he had not yet heard the defendant give evidence, but in view of his decision that the claimants were honest he could not see how the defendant could win.
(5) He wanted to give both counsel an indication of his thoughts.
(6) It was 'flavour of the month' for insurers to prosecute claimants with 'Asian sounding names'.
(7) He would, if necessary, say something about that in his judgment..
(8) Insurance companies are trying to send out a message about fraudulent claims to the Asian community, if there was such a thing.
(9) There were some discrepancies in the evidence given by the claimants but not such as to make him think that this was a fraudulent claim.
(10) He noted that the defendant worked for the police.
(11) Someone with a police background 'always thinks that they are right' [or 'never thinks that they are wrong'] 'and find it difficult to accept that they might be mistaken'.
(12) The defendant may or may not be mistaken, but he believes that he saw two people in the car and may have concluded that the claimants are 'at it'.
(13) He would continue to hear the case, but the defendants' counsel may wish to take instructions over the lunch break.
The only difference of recollection is that the defendant's counsel does not recall (5) featuring in the dialogue. We will return to its significance in a short while.
The appellant's case is that the judge, by saying what he said, went well beyond giving counsel an initial indication of his thinking and expressed firm views adverse to a defendant whose evidence he had not yet heard. When therefore in his judgment next day he found against the defendant, a reasonable observer knowing what we have recounted would infer that he might well have done so because of a prior prejudice in favour of the claimants and against the defendant.
The district judge has, correctly, been invited to respond. In a letter of 6 October 2006 he wrote to the Head of Civil Appeals:
“My perceived “sin” is set out in paragraph 4 of the Notice of Appeal. I do not have the court bundle in front of me as this was returned to the Claimant's representative, but from memory I believe that the evidence of each Claimant was completed at about 12.50p.m. on the 13 July 2006. I invited Counsel for the parties into my chambers and told them that I considered in the light of the evidence and the substantial cross-examination that the Claimants were telling the truth.
The trial recommenced at about 2.15p.m. No mention was made in Open Court of the discussion I had had with Counsel for the parties. Again from memory, the Defendant's evidence was completed at about 4.00 p.m. I adjourned to prepare a judgment which I gave the next day.
It is my belief that I have given judgment in accordance with the evidence heard. The Defendant's evidence given on the afternoon of the 13 th July 2006 did not persuade me that my initial reaction that these Claimants were telling the truth was wrong. This Defendant gave his evidence with such precision in relation to an incident that happened 17 months before the trial that I found myself disbelieving it. It never occurred to this Defendant that he could be wrong as to the presence of the third...
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