Ashfield District Council v Armstrong
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice David Richards |
| Judgment Date | 11 October 2016 |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] EWCA Civ 1204 |
| Date | 11 October 2016 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | A2/2015/4036 |
[2016] EWCA Civ 1204
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM NOTTINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
(MRS JUSTICE PATTERSON DBE)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice David Richards
A2/2015/4036
Mr I Colville (instructed by Hopkins Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Appellant
The Respondent did not appear and was not represented
This is a renewed oral application for permission to appeal. It would be, if permission is granted, a second appeal. The relevant facts appear from the judgment of Patterson J, when she dismissed an appeal by the appellant tenant against an order in the County Court.
I dealt with the application for permission to appeal on the papers and in my decision dated 22 January 2016 I explained why I was refusing permission to appeal. I will not repeat what I said there, except to summarise by saying that I considered that it was a matter of construction of the order for possession in question and that in the circumstances which had arisen in this case there was to be implied an extension to the period of the possession order. I also took the view that that was an issue which did not pass the test for a second appeal, being an issue confined to the construction of the order in this case.
Mr Colville, who appeared on the appeal heard by Patterson J, has today appeared for the appellant tenant to renew the application for permission to appeal. He submits that the case raises a point of principle, namely whether a warrant for possession can be executed after the underlying order for possession has, by its terms, expired. He submits that the structure of the legislation, which in similar terms applies to both public sector and private sector tenancies, requires an express extension to the period of the possession order and that there is no scope for an implied extension of the term as a matter of construction of the possession order.
He accepts that this is essentially a technical point. If a landlord applies for a warrant for possession on the grounds that there have been relevant breaches of the tenancy, or if the...
To continue reading
Request your trial