Baron Mereworth v Ministry of Justice
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE LEWISON |
| Judgment Date | 23 May 2011 |
| Neutral Citation | [2011] EWHC 1589 (Ch) |
| Court | Chancery Division |
| Date | 23 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No: HC10C04541 |
[2011] EWHC 1589 (Ch)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Lewison
Case No: HC10C04541
MS H GORE (instructed by Public Access Scheme) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
MS L JONES (instructed by Ministry of Justice (Crown Office) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
Approved Judgment
In 1926, King George V created the Barony of Mereworth by Letters Patent. The Letters Patent conferred upon the first Lord Mereworth and the heirs male of his body, lawfully begotten, "A Seat, Place and Voice in Parliament's Public Assembly and Councils" of the Crown in the United Kingdom as Barons of Parliament.
The last Lord Mereworth died in 2002 and the present Lord Mereworth succeeded to the title. On 16 August 2010, he wrote to Her Majesty the Queen stating that he was entitled to a Seat, Place and Voice in Parliament and requesting Her Majesty to issue him a Writ of Summons for the Parliamentary sittings in September 2010.
The response of the Crown Office of the House of Lords was that the result of section 1 of the House of Lords Act 1999 was that Lord Mereworth was not entitled to a Writ of Summons because he was a hereditary peer. Lord Mereworth persisted with his request and by letter of 22 October 2010, the Head of the Crown Office said that:
"If you consider that the Crown Office has withheld a writ of summons which you are entitled to receive, then, given that this is a matter relating to the membership of the House of Lords, you should contact the Chairman of the Committee for Privileges and Conduct, House of Lords, London SW1A OPW."
Lord Mereworth declined to follow that advice and instead issued a Part 8 claim form on 20 December 2010. The claim form is accompanied by Particulars of Claim verified by a Statement of Truth which constitute the matters on which Lord Mereworth wishes to rely.
The first declaration that he claims is a declaration that in consequence of the Letters Patent creating the Barony of Mereworth, he possesses and holds a seat and place in the House of Lords and has the right to have a voice in the House of Lords, that he is entitled to demand a Writ of Summons and is entitled, as of right, to receive a Writ of Summons.
The second declaration that he claims is a declaration that the court has jurisdiction to interpret the House of Lords Act 1999 and to determine whether the Act repealed Lord Mereworth's Letters Patent.
The Crown Office says that the court has no jurisdiction to grant this relief because it is within the exclusive cognisance of Parliament; but that if that is wrong, then the claim is bound to fail because the right to a Writ of Summons was removed by section 1 of the House of Lords Act 1999. Logically, the question of jurisdiction comes first because if this court does not have jurisdiction, that is the end of the matter.
The separation of powers, although not in quite the pure form that Montesquieu imagined, has always been part of our constitution. Although much of our constitution remains unwritten, part of the demarcation line between the province of the courts and the province of Parliament is written down, notably in article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 which provides that freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. Article 9 protects not only freedom of speech in Parliament but also proceedings in Parliament.
Existing in parallel with Article 9 is the principle of exclusive cognisance. The ambit of both article 9 and the principle of exclusive cognisance were recently considered by the Supreme Court in R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52. In relation to exclusive cognisance, Lord Phillips, with whom the rest of the Justices of the Supreme Court agreed, said:
This phrase describes areas where the courts have ruled that any issues should be left to be resolved by Parliament rather than determined judicially. Exclusive cognisance refers not simply to Parliament, but to the exclusive right of each House to manage its own affairs without interference from the other or from outside Parliament. The boundaries of exclusive cognisance result from accord between the two Houses and the courts as to what falls within the exclusive province of the former. Unlike the absolute privilege imposed by article 9, exclusive cognisance can be waived or relinquished by Parliament.
Where a matter falls within the internal affairs of Parliament, it is within the area of Parliament's exclusive cognisance except where legislation provides to the contrary. In my judgment, the ordinary civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts does not extend to determining the rights of members to sit in either House of Parliament and the courts equally have nothing to do with questions affecting its membership except insofar as they have been specially designated by law to act in such matters. One example of special designation is the power of an Election Court to decide whether a Member of Parliament has been duly elected. But even in that case, an Election Court is not one of the ordinary civil courts of this country; it is a special court mandated by a specific Act of Parliament. Apart from special cases like this, in my judgment, it is a matter for Parliament whether a person is entitled to sit and vote in either House.
This principle applies even where entitlement or disentitlement to sit and vote depends on a statute. As Stephen J put it in Bradlaugh v Gosset [1884] 12 QBD 271, referred to with approval in R v Chaytor:
"I think that the House of Commons is not subject to the control of Her Majesty's Courts in its administration of that part of the Statute Law which has relation to its own internal proceedings and that the use of such actual force as may be necessary to carry into effect such a resolution as the one before us is justifiable."
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