Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date1997
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Year1997
Date1997

LORD WOOLF, MR, EVANS AND SCHIEMANN, L JJ

Local authority – duty owed to child in care – person remaining in care from tender age until adulthood – claiming damages from local authority – alleging failure to protect from emotional injury and failure to provide education or home – whether local authority under common law duty of care.

The plaintiff was in the care of the local authority from the age of 10 months until shortly before he reached the age of 18. Having reached adulthood the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the local authority for damages for personal injuries alleging that, after being placed in the care of the local authority, the local authority owed him a common law duty of care to act as a parent of the plaintiff and to show the same standard of care which would have been expected of a responsible parent. Further, the plaintiff alleged that the local authority owed a duty of care to protect him from physical, emotional, psychiatric or psychological injury; to provide education and a home; to promote a development plan for his short and long-term future; and to provide competent, suitably qualified and experienced social workers to monitor the child's welfare.

In April 1996 the Judge allowed the local authority's appeal from a decision of the district Judge and ordered the striking out of the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff appealed.

Held – dismissing the appeal: (1) The performance by the local authority of different statutory responsibilities, such as, deciding whether or not to place the child for adoption, deciding whether to place the child with particular foster parents, deciding whether to remove the child from a foster parent and taking decisions with regard to contact between the child and the child's mother and sister all involved the exercise of discretion. Legislation enacted by Parliament placed broad responsibilities upon the local authority, the consequence of which was that the local authority had a wide discretion as to the manner in which they discharged their responsibilities in relation to a child in their care. If decisions made by the local authority fell within the scope of statutory discretion given to them by Parliament they could not be held responsible in law for those actions. However, a common law duty of care could not be excluded if the decisions made by the local authority, which were the subject of complaint, were unreasonable to such an extent that they fell outside the scope of discretion conferred upon the local authority by Parliament.

(2) In order to succeed it had to be shown that the decisions taken by the local authority fell outside the scope of discretion granted to the local authority by Parliament. If such a hurdle could be established, then regard would have to be had to the principles

laid down in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. In applying those principles it could be established that the damage suffered by the child was reasonably foreseeable and that there was a sufficient proximate relationship between the child and the local authority; however, it could not be shown that it was just and reasonable for a duty of care to be imposed. It was contrary to the public interest and therefore not just or reasonable to impose a duty of care as decisions taken by the local authority were often of an inter-disciplinary nature; often required a difficult and delicate balancing of conflicting interests; and sometimes involved deciding in favour of one of two imperfect solutions. The complaints made against the local authority, upon which the child sought reliance, went to the heart of the child's action against the local authority and related to the general course of conduct and to the manner in which the local authority and their social workers performed their duties under statute rather than any particular identifiable incident. It was clear that the catalogue of errors alleged against the local authority by the child were ones which involved the local authority making discretionary decisions. The evidence showed that the child was regularly the subject of consideration with decisions being made as to what was to be regarded as the best way forward.

(3) The relationship between a parent and a child and a local authority and a child in their care could be distinguished from that which existed between school staff and pupils where the staff were providing educational services for the pupils. It was, however, wholly inappropriate that decisions taken by the local authority in place of parents should be different to decisions taken by parents about a child's future, even if the decisions were later shown to be wrong.

(4) It was not fair or just to make the local authority directly liable for the way they exercised their discretion when caring for the child. Likewise there was no justification for placing social workers employed by the local authority, when exercising the discretion vested in the local authority and making decisions on behalf of the local authority, in any different position to that of the local authority even though they could be held to be negligent in putting into operation the discretion exercised by the local authority.

Statutory provisions referred to:

CCR Ord 13, r 5(1)(a).

Children Act 1975, s 59.

Children Act 1989, s 12.

Children and Young Persons Act 1969, ss 1, 24 and 28.

Child Care Act 1980, s 18(1) and 76.

RSC Ord 18, r 19.

Cases referred to in judgment:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.

Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.

Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and Others [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358; [1990] 1 All ER 568.

Capital and Counties plc and Another v Hampshire County Council; John Munro (Acrylics) Ltd v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority and Others; The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (GB) v West Yorkshire Fire and Civil Defence Authority (1997) The Times 20 March.

H v Norfolk County Council[1997] 2 FCR 334.

R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison and Others, ex parte Hague; Weldon v Home Office [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340; [1991] 3 All ER 733.

S v W and Another (Child Abuse: Damage)[1995] 3 FCR 649.

Stovin v Wise (Norfolk County Council, Third Party) [1996] AC 923; [1996] 3 WLR 388; [1996] 3 All ER 801.

X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council; M (A Minor) and Another v Newham London Borough Council; E (A Minor) v Dorset County Council; Christmas v Hampshire County Council; Keating v Bromley London Borough Council[1995] 3 FCR 337; [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] 3 WLR 152; [1995] 3 All ER 353.

Appeal

Appeal from His Honour Judge Brandt sitting at Colchester and Clacton county court.

Allan Levy, QC and Elizabeth Anne Gumbel for the plaintiff.

Nigel Baker, QC and Brendan Roche for the local authority.

LORD WOOLF, MR.

In X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council[1995] 3 FCR 337, the House of Lords was concerned with the extent of the duty owed by local authorities to children prior to their being taken into care. This appeal concerns the extent of the duty owed by local authorities after children have been placed in the care of a local authority.

The appeal is from a judgment of His Honour Judge Nicholas Brandt given on 30 April 1996 at the Colchester county court. The Judge allowed an appeal from District Judge Skerratt and made an order striking out the plaintiff's claim for damages for personal injuries against the London Borough of Enfield.

Background facts

The plaintiff was age of 10 months when a care order was made in favour of the defendants, the London Borough of Enfield. He remained in care until June 1990 when he started to live independently at a time when he was approaching the age of 18. He is now 24, having been born on 10 October 1972. While in care he was moved on nine different occasions between placements.

Since the decision of the Judge, the particulars of claim have been reamended. The appeal is argued on the basis of that reamended pleading. This court indicated that the plaintiff could have the necessary leave to amend. The facts are taken to be those set out in that reamended pleading.

Although that pleading includes allegations of breach of statutory duty, on this appeal the plaintiff accepts that those allegations cannot as a matter of law succeed. He acknowledged that he is restricted to his claim for damages for breach of duty at common law. He relies on the alleged breach of that duty by the defendants and the defendants' employees.

The pleading alleges that the defendants were under a duty to act as a parent of the plaintiff would and to show the standard of care which could be expected of a responsible parent. There was, he alleges, a duty to protect him from physical, emotional, psychiatric, or psychological injury. In addition there was a duty to provide him with education and a home...

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