Between patronage and good governance: Organizational arrangements in (local) public appointment processes
| Date | 01 December 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852316675944 |
| Author | Giuseppe Grossi,Alessandro Sancino,Mariafrancesca Sicilia |
| Published date | 01 December 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
2018, Vol. 84(4) 785–802
!The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0020852316675944
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International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Article
Between patronage and good
governance: Organizational
arrangements in (local) public
appointment processes
Alessandro Sancino
The Open University Business School, UK
Mariafrancesca Sicilia
University of Bergamo, Italy
Giuseppe Grossi
Kristianstad University, Sweden and Kozminski University, Poland
Abstract
This article investigates whether certain organizational arrangements in (local) public
appointment processes could encourage the use of appointments as a tool of good
governance rather than as a tool of patronage. Specifically, we studied the role of six
organizational arrangements in 10 case studies of intra- and inter-organizational public
appointment processes held in Italian local government. We found that good govern-
ance (in terms of perception of overall integrity and fairness) was found in processes of
public appointments where there was independent scrutiny, and when the process
involved local councillors and/or external stakeholders – that is, actors beyond those
with the formal power to appoint. In these cases, making appointments was seen as a
tool of good governance rather than of patronage. These organizational arrangements
were more relevant than other ones such as the transparency of public advertisements,
job descriptions and educational/professional requirements, and media and public
awareness. The article describes the relevant literature and the research study, and
discusses implications for research, policy and management.
Points for practitioners
In terms of policy implications, the article discusses the importance of ensuring
transparency and some form of checks and balances in the power of making public
appointments, as well as of promoting more awareness among citizens and society in
general of the issue of public appointments. From a managerial point of view, the article
Corresponding author:
Alessandro Sancino, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK.
Email: alessandro.sancino@open.ac.uk
suggests that public managers should consider the implications of the different organ-
izational arrangements that can be used in public appointment processes to exploit the
good governance potential of public appointments.
Keywords
Corruption, good governance, Italy, local government, patronage, politicians, public
appointments, public governance, public managers
Introduction
This article focuses on the use of public appointments in Italian local government
organizations – specifically analysing the role of different organizational arrange-
ments that have been used in intra- and inter-organizational processes. Several
recent phenomena have increased the relevance of public appointments. For exam-
ple, some reforms inspired by New Public Management and New Public
Governance (Carboni, 2010; Klijn, 2012; Meneguzzo et al., 2013) resulted at the
local level in the growth of municipal corporations (Grossi and Reichard, 2008),
so-called quangos (Payne and Skelcher, 1997; Van Thiel, 2001) and/or public
agencies (Verhoest et al., 2012), as well as more generally in the creation of
many hybrid organizations (Denis et al., 2015; Grossi and Thomasson, 2015;
Skelcher et al., 2013).
This trend has been labelled variously as the ‘hollowing out of the state’
(Rhodes, 1994), ‘the appointed state’ (Skelcher, 1998) or ‘distributed public gov-
ernance’ (e.g. Flinders, 2004; OECD, 2002). Whatever the label, the effect has been
that potential places and opportunities for making public appointments have been
extended, contributing to what has been described by Vibert (2007) as ‘the rise of
the unelected’. As Watson (2004: 1) noted, the current situation of the public
sector in several countries is that there are many appointed people who manage
a huge amount of public money and make decisions that considerably impact
citizens’ lives.
Given this backdrop, the ways in which public appointments are managed rep-
resent an intriguing and relevant issue. Many authors (e.g. Bresler-Gonen, 2007;
Dahlstro
¨m, 2009; Di Mascio, 2012a; Kopecky´ , 2011; Kopecky´ et al., 2012; Mayntz
and Derlien, 1989; Scherlis, 2009) have approached the topic of public appoint-
ments from a political science perspective, studying – among other factors – the
motivations for making public appointments and/or the behaviours of politicians
and parties in making appointments, focusing mainly on central governments.
However, according to Flinders et al. (2012: 511–513), more detailed studies are
needed on this topic, especially from a public management and governance per-
spective (McTavish and Piper, 2007: 146).
1
In this article, we aim to contribute to closing this gap. Specifically, we follow
the work of Flinders (2009; 2012), Flinders and Matthews (2010), Flinders et al
(2011;2012), which highlighted some conditions that can allow appointments to be
786 International Review of Administrative Sciences 84(4)
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