CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, MERIT, POLITICIZATION, AND CORRUPTION: THE PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS FROM FIVE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
| Author | KIM SASS MIKKELSEN,JAN‐HINRIK MEYER‐SAHLING |
| Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12276 |
doi: 10.1111/padm.12276
CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, MERIT, POLITICIZATION, AND
CORRUPTION: THE PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC
OFFICIALS FROM FIVE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
JAN-HINRIK MEYER-SAHLING AND KIM SASS MIKKELSEN
Research on bureaucracyand corruption tends to concentrate on cross-national research taking coun-
tries as the unit of analysis. Yet national-level measures neglect large differences within countries.
This article therefore takes the perspective of individual bureaucrats. It studies how public ofcials’
experience with bureaucratic institutions affects corruption within their sphere of work. Based on
a survey of central government ofcials in ve post-communist states, the article examines how
public servants’ views on civil service laws, the quality of their implementation, merit recruitment,
and the politicization of appointments associate with rumours of kickbacks in their place of work.
The analysis shows that merit recruitment is associated with less corruption, while politicization is
associated with more corruption. In contrast, civil service laws are negatively associated with cor-
ruption only if they are properly implemented. The ndings complement and qualify country-level
research, approaching more closely the micro-foundations of the relationbetween bureaucracy and
corruption.
INTRODUCTION
The quality of public bureaucracy is widely regarded as an important determinant of
corruption (Tanzi 1998; Cardona 1999; Treisman 2000).1Recent contributions stress the
merits of the classic Weberian model of bureaucracy, in particular, the positive impact
of merit recruitment on lowering corruption (Rauch and Evans 2000; Dahlström et al.
2012). By contrast, the role of other features of Weberian bureaucracies such as separate
employment laws, formal examination systems, and permanent tenure remain contested.
Moreover, studies of the impact of public sector wage levels have led to contradictory
results (Treisman 2000; Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001; Dahlström et al. 2012; Sööt and
Rootalu 2012).
Previous studies have typically been based on cross-country analyses that are primarily
reliant on countrywide expert assessments of corruption and bureaucratic quality (e.g.
Dahlström et al. 2012; Neshkova and Kostadinova 2012). These measures are routinely
criticized for their validity; their reliance on the perception of external observers, mostly
international business elites; the difculty of comparing measurements across countries
and time; and the politicization of governance indicators by policy-makers and the media
(e.g. Andersson and Heywood 2009; Olken 2009; Rose and Mishler 2010; Thomas 2010).
In this article, we provide an alternative perspective for the study of bureaucracy and
corruption that shifts the analysis away from the national level (see also Gingerich 2013a;
Rothstein et al. 2013; Charron et al. 2014). Specically, we present individual-level data
from a survey of ministerial bureaucrats in ve East European countries and analyse the
relation between corruption and four areas of personnel management: the role of civil ser-
vice laws, the quality of their implementation, merit recruitment, and the politicization of
appointments.2
Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling is at the School of Politics, University of Nottingham, UK. Kim Sass Mikkelsen is at the Depart-
ment of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark.
Public Administration Vol.94, No. 4, 2016 (1105–1123)
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
1106 JAN-HINRIK MEYER-SAHLING AND KIM SASS MIKKELSEN
Individual citizens’ perceptions of government quality and performance are increas-
ingly being made subject to empirical research, for instance, in the context of the World
Valueand Eurobarometer surveys. However, there is still much less evidence that seeks to
capture the perspective of public ofcials, particularly central government ofcials (for
recent innovations, see Sööt and Rootalu 2012; Gingerich 2013b; Kwon 2014; for early
research on local government ofcials, see Miller et al. 2001). While we do not deny that
national-level factors matter for corruption, we would expect that within a given country
public ofcials are exposed to vastly different risks and rumours of corruption,depending
on their position and their work environment. The main purpose of this article is there-
fore to shift the focus of attention to the world of public ofcials and to ask whether the
ndings of cross-country studies still hold when taking their perspective. The change of
perspective has both theoretical and methodological benets.
On the theoretical side, claims about the causes of corruption are – as Treisman (2007,
p. 222) points out – usually focused on individuals. They are conceived as deciding
whether or not to engage in corruption, while institutional, social, cultural, and economic
factors shape and constrain their choices. Country-level studies do not, therefore, directly
test their theoretical claims but aggregate decisions of individuals within a country to then
test them by comparing across countries. By taking the perspective of individual ofcials,
we therefore provide an approach that reconciles the discrepancybetween theoretical and
empirical levels of analysis.
On the methodological side, aggregation is problematic because it neglects variation
within countries. Existing evidence (Gingerich 2013a, 2013b; Charron et al. 2014) and
the evidence we present in this article suggests that both bureaucracy and corruption
vary within countries and that within-country variation is often more prominent than
between-country variation. Gingerich (2013a) shows that the neglect of within-country
variation leads to biased estimates in country-level regressions. This means that ndings
from existing studies risk not holding if we take the level of empirical analysis closer to
their own theoretical propositions – doubtlessly a serious concern.
In addition, public ofcials are, thanks to their position, much closer to certain types of
corruption than citizens and, in particular,experts who are asked to take a general view on
corruption in a country.A small number of existing studies have relied on data from pub-
lic service providers who, along with recipients of public services, provide information on
side payments and petty extortion in the interface between citizens and public administra-
tion (e.g. Miller et al. 2001). By contrast, surveying central government ofcials should help
to reveal day-to-day problems of corruption that are scattered across the policy-making
and coordinating institutions of central government ministries and agencies.
With this background in mind, we aim to advance existing cross-country research
by providing new evidence and reassess it using an alternative approach. Our data are
drawn from a survey of ministerial bureaucrats in Poland, Latvia, Croatia, Serbia, and
Montenegro. The relation between the quality of bureaucracy and corruption is especially
salient in post-communist states that have acquired or seek EU membership. Corruption
in post-communist Europe has been an endemic problem. The communist legacy of
the past, the dual transformation to democracy and market, and the weakness of the
post-communist state have been identied as major sources of corruption (Miller et al.
2001; Karklins 2005; Holmes 2006; Kostadinova 2012).
Our analysis conrms, rst, that problems of corruption do indeed vary widely within
countries and even within institutions. Second, we nd that merit recruitment and politi-
cization are associated with less and more corruption, respectively. Moreover, the quality
Public Administration Vol.94, No. 4, 2016 (1105–1123)
© 2016 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
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