Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Paul Meekey
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Swift |
| Judgment Date | 12 January 2021 |
| Neutral Citation | [2021] EWHC 34 (Admin) |
| Date | 12 January 2021 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/692/2020 |
[2021] EWHC 34 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Swift
Case No: CO/692/2020
Paul Stagg (instructed by Legal Services Directorate at the Metropolitan Police) for the Appellant
Emma Kutner (instructed by Bankside Commercial) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 3 rd November 2020
Approved Judgment
A. Introduction
On 30 June 2003 Metropolitan Police officers searched Paul Meekey's home. The search was part of Operation Kilvaxter, a major investigation into the supply and manufacture of firearms. A large quantity of firearms was seized from Mr Meekey's address (“the seized firearms”). I have been told that the value of these firearms is somewhere between £250,000 and £500,000. The seized firearms are described as being “obsolete and/or antique”, meaning that they are either chambered for obsolete calibre ammunition or are both so chambered and were made before 1939. Even though for those reasons the firearms can be described as obsolete or antique, it is not uncommon for such firearms to be used. In a statement made in these proceedings, dated 28 February 2018, Mr Anthony Miller, a senior forensic scientist with the Metropolitan Police Service Forensic Firearms Service explained that in the period 2011 to 2017 there were some 70 shooting incidents in London involving the use of firearms described as either obsolete or antique, including 7 murders.
On 28 July 2006 Mr Meekey was convicted of possession of prohibited weapons and ammunition contrary to the Firearms Act 1968 (“the 1968 Act”) he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. He was released from prison on 21 January 2010.
In proceedings at Westminster Magistrates' Court Mr Meekey sought the return of the seized firearms. It was common ground that when Mr Meekey was convicted in 2006 the trial judge made no order that the firearms be forfeited or destroyed. It was also common ground that since 13 July 2014 it has been unlawful for Mr Meekey to have possession of any of the seized firearms. On that date section 21(1) of the 1968 Act was amended with the consequence that the prohibition against possession of firearms which applies to any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years or more was extended to antique firearms. Nevertheless, Mr Meekey applied for the return of the firearms made pursuant to section 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897 (“the 1897 Act”). This provides as follows
“Where any property has come into the possession of the police in connection with their investigation of a suspected offence a court of summary jurisdiction may, on application, either by an officer of police or by a claimant of the property, make an order for the delivery of the property to the person appearing to the magistrate or court to be the owner thereof, or, if the owner cannot be ascertained, make such order with respect to the property as to the magistrate or court may seem meet.”
Mr Meekey's case was that even though he could not possess any of the seized firearms, they could at his request be delivered to a registered firearms dealer (a Mr Harry Gordon) as his agent. The case put for Mr Meekey was that he would then instruct Mr Gordon to arrange for the firearms to be sold.
Mr Meekey's application under the 1897 Act was heard by Deputy Senior District Judge Ikram. Also before Judge Ikram was an earlier application by the Commissioner made under section 52(4) of the 1968 Act for an order that the seized firearms be destroyed. Section 52(4) of the 1968 Act is as follows
“(4) A court of summary jurisdiction or, in Scotland, the Sheriff may, on the application of the chief officer of police, order any firearm or ammunition seized and detained by a constable under this Act to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.”
Following a hearing on 1 March 2019, Judge Ikram allowed Mr Meekey's application, and refused the Commissioner's application. His reasons were set out in a judgment provided to the parties on 30 July 2019. Judge Ikram rejected the Commissioner's submission that Mr Meekey's application under section 1 of the 1897 Act should be refused by reason of section 3 of the Limitation Act 1980. That section is as follows
“ 3. — Time limit in case of successive conversions and extinction of title of owner of converted goods.
(1) Where any cause of action in respect of the conversion of a chattel has accrued to any person and, before he recovers possession of the chattel, a further conversion takes place, no action shall be brought in respect of the further conversion after the expiration of six years from the accrual of the cause of action in respect of the original conversion.
(2) Where any such cause of action has accrued to any person and the period prescribed for bringing that action has expired and he has not during that period recovered possession of the chattel, the title of that person to the chattel shall be extinguished.”
The Commissioner argued that section 3(2) of the 1980 Act applied, with the consequence that well before Mr. Meekey made his application under the 1897 Act, his title to own the seized firearms had been extinguished. Judge Ikram concluded (a) that section 3 of the 1980 Act had no application in the context of an application under the 1897 Act because such an application was not a claim founded in tort (see his judgment at paragraphs 17–20); and in the alternative (b) that there had been no effective conversion of the seized firearms (judgment at paragraph 21–28). On the Commissioner's application that the seized firearms be destroyed, Judge Ikram concluded that as a matter of discretion no such order should be made (see judgment at paragraphs 32 – 45). Judge Ikram concluded in the alternative that the power under section 52(4) of the 1968 Act to order destruction did not arise in this case because there was no sufficient evidence to show that the seized firearms had been seized in exercise of powers under the 1968 Act (judgment at paragraphs 47–48).
On 7 August 2019 the Commissioner requested Judge Ikram to state a case comprising four questions of law. The judge provided the draft Case Stated on 29 October 2019. That draft was finalised at the beginning of February 2020. The Commissioner filed her Appellant's Notice on 12 February 2020. The questions posed in the Case Stated are as follows
“1. Was I entitled at paragraphs 21 to 28 of my written judgment, to decide that the limitation period under Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1980 had not expired?
2. If in fact the limitation period had expired, was I right to decide at paragraphs 10 to 20 of my written judgment, that the Limitation Act 1980, in any event, did not affect the respondent's right to make his application under the Police Property Act 1897?
3. Was I right to decide, at paragraphs 29 to 31 of my written judgment, that the respondent remained the owner of the seized items within the meaning of Section 1(1) of the 1897 Act?
4. Was I right to decide at paragraphs 47 to 48 of my written judgment that there was no evidence that the seized items have been seized under the 1968 Act and that therefore I could make no order as sought by the applicant?”
Questions 1 to 3 all go to the decision on Mr Meekey's application under the 1897 Act; Question 4 is relevant to Judge Ikram's alternative conclusion on the Commissioner's application under section 52(4) of the 1968 Act.
B. Decision
(1) Mr Meekey's application under the 1897 Act .
The first matter to address is Question 2: was the Judge correct to conclude that whatever effect section 3(2) of the 1980 Act might have for the purposes of a claim in tort, it was a provision that had nothing to say at all when it came to an application under section 1 of the 1897 Act? On this point the Judge concluded that the effect of the 1980 Act was limited to actions founded on tort, and that because Mr Meekey's claim to recover the seized firearms did not depend on any tortious cause of action, but only the right of application under section 1 of the 1897 Act, the outcome of that application could not be affected by anything contained by in the 1980 Act.
My conclusion is that this is wrong in law. Section 3(2) of the 1980 Act is, at least in the context of that Act, a somewhat unusual provision. Rather than simply providing a defendant with a defence to a claim (see and compare for example, the effect of sections 2 and 5 of the 1980 Act), section 3(2) goes further: where goods have been converted, and the period of limitation has expired, the owner's title to the goods is removed. In this way, section 3(2) of the 1980 Act has an effect going beyond the law of tort, and beyond affecting only the parties to a claim for conversion.
Mr Meekey's application under the 1897 Act rested on the premise that he continued to be the owner of the seized firearms. No doubt the case was put in this way because of the way that section 1 of the 1897 Act is formulated. That section allows magistrates (among other matters) to make orders “for the delivery of the property to the person appearing to [them] … be the owner thereof …”. Although Mr Meekey's claim that the seized firearms be returned to him rested only on the provisions of the 1897 Act, as stated above, where the conditions for the operation of section 3(2) of the 1980 Act are met, the section operates as part of the general law. Thus section 3(2) was relevant to Mr Meekey's application because it...
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