Contractual (In)Security, Labour Regulation and Competitive Performance in the Port Transport Industry: A Contextualized Comparison of Britain and Spain
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8543.00127 |
| Author | Peter Turnbull,Richard Saundry |
| Date | 01 June 1999 |
| Published date | 01 June 1999 |
Contractual (In)Security, Labour
Regulation and Competitive
Performance in the Port Transport
Industry: A Contextualized
Comparison of Britain and Spain
Richard Saundry and Peter Turnbull
Abstract
Spanish ports have traditionally been derided for poor performance and
acrimonious labour relations. This situation has been reversed in recent years
through a programme of reform that has (a) created a more congenial
organizational ecology in which ®rms co-operate as well as compete; (b)
ensured the collective provision of vital production inputs such as training
and social peace; and (c) co-ordinated investment in new port capacity and
equipment. Spanish ports now match the performance of Britain's privatized
and deregulated port transport industry, where co-operation is more notable
by its absence, insecurity is rife and price competition intense. Through a
contextualized comparison of labour regulation in the two countries, it is
possible to demonstrate that an `institutionally saturated' and `politically
bargained' system of production and employment is compatible with, if not a
necessary condition for, competitive performance in the international port
transport industry.
1. Introduction
Employment insecurity breeds industrial unrest and economic inef®ciency.
These outcomes have been observed in a range of industries (e.g. Clegg
1979: 272±9; Hartley et al. 1991), but in none more so than port transport.
The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Major Ports of Great
Britain, for example, concluded that:
Richard Saundry is a lecturer in industrial relations at the University of Central Lancashire.
Peter Turnbull is Professor of Human Resource Management and Labour Relations and an
ESRC Senior Management Research Fellow at Cardiff University.
British Journal of Industrial Relations
37:2 June 1999 0007±1080 pp. 271±294
#Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Where there are no permanent employer/employee relationships there is little
cope for mutual trust, loyalty and understanding to develop between the two
sides. Where there is no security of employment and terms of employment have
to be the subject of constant bargaining, industrial unrest and strikes are bound to
¯ourish . . . Quite apart from this the system tends to breed inef®ciency.
(Rochdale 1962: para 366)
Insecurity on the waterfront derives principally from the anomalous
pattern of labour demand, attributable to the variety of cargoes handled
and the irregular arrival of vessels. Thus, labour demand will ¯uctuate
widely over the long-run business cycle, short-term seasonal peaks, the
daily oscillations of shipping and the duration of the ship's un/loading. In
the face of such variation, total labour supply will tend towards the
combined maximum daily requirements of all employers in the port,
resulting in chronic excess supply, underemployment and industrial unrest
(see e.g. Jensen 1964; Morewedge 1970: 75). In extreme cases, such as the
Port of New York, the labour market was permeated with corruption,
bribery and even organized crime (see Jensen 1974).
Understandably, there is a tendency to equate insecurity on the
waterfront, and all its associated ills, with casual employment. However,
some of the most ef®cient ports in the world, most notably North
European and Paci®c West Coast ports in the USA, operate a casual
labour market or a combination of (minority) permanent employment and
(majority) casual workers. Contractual employment status is in fact
secondary to employment security, which can be guaranteed through a
variety of labour market regulations. For example, total labour supply
might be controlled, either through (state) registration or union member-
ship, thereby eliminating, or at least mitigating, what Standing (1986: 114)
calls `labour market insecurity' (a situation of surplus labour in the
market). `Employment insecurity' or `short engagement', caused by the
ability of employers to dismiss or lay off workers with comparative ease
(Standing 1986: 114), is a de®ning characteristic of casual labour markets
and might be limited through minimum employment periods (e.g. for a
®xed shift or the duration of a vessel's stay in port) or collective
agreements that eschew compulsory redundancy. `Job insecurity', de®ned
by Standing as the ability of employers to shift employees from one job to
another or to vary job content (p. 114), might be reduced through (union)
work rules, as might `work insecurity', where employees toil `at risk' in a
dangerous or dirty working environment. Finally, `income insecurity'
(unstable earnings) can be guarded against through `attendance money'
(paying dockers when they turn up for work but none is available) or a
guaranteed minimum weekly wage. Such protections against the various
manifestations of insecurity are found in ports throughout the world (see
e.g. Couper 1986; A. A. Evans 1969; Jensen 1964: 280±3; Turnbull and
Sapsford 1999; Turnbull and Weston 1992: 387±91). The key issue,
however, is not whether the dockland labour market is subject to regu-
lation, but what forms of regulation are more or less compatible with
#Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 1999.
272 British Journal of Industrial Relations
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