Douglas Belbin v Lille Court of First Instance, France
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Foskett |
| Judgment Date | 02 May 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | [2013] EWHC 1099 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 02 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/1694/2013 |
[2013] EWHC 1099 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Foskett
Case No: CO/1694/2013
Anna Booth (instructed by Arora Lodhi Heath Solicitors) for the Appellant
Adam Payter (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 15 April 2013
Approved Judgment
Introduction
The appellant is a citizen of the United Kingdom who was born on 2 November 1958. His extradition is sought by the Lille Court of First Instance, France, on a European Arrest Warrant ("EAW'") issued on 25 May 2012 and certified by the Serious Organised Crime Agency ("SOCA") on 18 June 2012.
He was convicted in his absence by Lille Magistrates Court on 24 October 2011 of an offence of conspiracy, an offence of drug trafficking and three offences of money laundering. He was sentenced to a 7-year term of imprisonment. His extradition is sought to serve that term.
On 7 January 2013, the Appellant's full extradition hearing was heard before District Judge Purdy who, on 11 February 2013 in a careful written judgment, ordered his extradition on the conspiracy allegation and the three money laundering offences only.
In relation to any issue arising under section 20 of the 2003 Act, it is clear that the Appellant will, if he chooses to seek a re-trial, be retried by a French court in a maximum period of two months after his arrival on French soil.
The only live issue before the District Judge and before this court on appeal is whether, pursuant to section 12 of the Act, the Appellant's extradition is barred because he would be entitled to be discharged pursuant to a double jeopardy argument. Section 12 provides that:
"A person's extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of the rule against double jeopardy if (and only if) it appears that he would be entitled to be discharged under any rule of law relating to previous acquittal or conviction on the assumption—
(a) that the conduct constituting the extradition offence constituted an offence in the part of the United Kingdom where the judge exercises jurisdiction;
(b) that the person were charged with the extradition offence in that part of the United Kingdom."
The contention advanced by Miss Anna Booth on the Appellant's behalf is that his appearance before Southwark Crown Court on 21 July 2011 (following his arrest on 13 July 2010) on an indictment containing two counts, one of conspiracy to supply cannabis and one of conspiracy to supply amphetamine, to the first of which he pleaded guilty and in respect of the second of which no evidence was offered resulting in a not guilty verdict being entered, ought to prevent his extradition. Her argument, based on well-established authorities, is that the case against him in France is founded on the same or substantially the same facts as those which were relevant to the case before Southwark Crown Court and, accordingly, it would be wrong to extradite him in effect to face the same set of allegations twice.
This was the argument rejected by the District Judge whose decision is supported by Mr Adam Payter on behalf of the Respondent. He contends that the District Judge was correct to conclude that the French proceedings for the conspiracy offence and the three money laundering offences do not arise out of "the same or substantially the same facts" as the proceedings in the United Kingdom although he concedes that there is, as he put it, "a limited degree of evidential and temporal overlap between the two sets of proceedings". He says (a) that the offences for which the Appellant is sought, namely, money laundering and conspiracy, are entirely different from those pursued domestically, namely, drug supply; (b) the extent of the criminality set out in the EAW is far wider than in the domestic proceedings; and (c) that it was not possible to pursue the Appellant in the United Kingdom for the offences set out in the EAW.
That comprises the essential battleground in this appeal.
Authorities referred to
I do not propose to extend this judgment by referring in detail to the various authorities to which I have been referred. They include Fofona and Belise v Deputy Prosecutor Thubin Tribunal de Grande Instance de Meaux, France [2006] EWHC 744 (Admin), Boudhiba v Central Examining Court No 5 of the National Court of Justice, Madrid, Spain [2006] EWHC 167 (Admin), Maxwell-King v The Government of the United States [2006] EWHC 3033 (Admin), Mitchell v High Court of Boulogne Sur Mer [2007] EWHC 2006 (Admin), Purcell v High Court in Dublin, Ireland [2012] EWHC 3325 and Zdinjak v Republic of Croatia [2012] EWHC 1554 (Admin). The principles are clear.
The comparison exercise
This appeal revolves around a comparison of the underlying facts of the UK proceedings and the facts underlying the case in France and it is to that comparison that I will turn after identifying what the EAW specifies as the conduct in respect of which the Appellant's extradition is sought. The summary in Mr Payter's Skeleton Argument is accurate and it is to the effect that the Appellant's extradition is sought in relation to five offences of which it is said that he is "the principal perpetrator", namely -
(i) A criminal conspiracy with a view to preparing offences punishable by ten years imprisonment (Framework list ticked for "taking part in a criminal conspiracy");
(ii) Unlawful importation and export of drugs under organised crime, unlawful possession and transport of drugs (Framework list ticked for "unlawful trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances");
(iii) Money laundering (Framework list ticked for "laundering of criminal products");
(iv) Transfer of undeclared sums of money of at least €10,000 between France and abroad without the use of an intermediary of an establishment authorised to undertake banking operations; and,
(v) Undertaking financial operations between France and abroad with funds resulting from offences under the legislation on drugs.
The narrative account of the Appellant's alleged involvement in the offences set out in Box E of the EAW can (again drawing on Mr Payter's Skeleton Argument) be summarised as follows:
(i) On 21 October 2009, French customs at Calais stopped Steven Kingsford coming from the United Kingdom in his vehicle. In the spare wheel of his vehicle French customs recovered €693,000 in cash.
(ii) Steven Kingsford was a salaried truck driver for Kent Trucking Ltd, a company that was managed by Paul Palmer. Steven Kingsford admitted that he had made three trips by vehicle from the United Kingdom to the Netherlands via France since August 2009. On those trips he transported cash from the United Kingdom at the request of his employer, Paul Palmer.
(iii) Steven Kingsford also explained that Colin Dunne, another employee of Kent Trucking Ltd also made trips for the same purpose. Colin Dunne later accepted that this allegation was correct and he had made the trips at the request of his employer, Paul Palmer.
(iv) The estimated amount of funds conveyed and laundered was more than €4 million.
(v) Paul Palmer was also arrested in France while visiting Steven Kingsford in prison. He accepted that he had given instructions to his two employees as set out above.
(vi) Paul Palmer explained that he had received instructions to make the transfers of cash to the Netherlands at the request of an individual known as 'Franck'. As a result of investigations in the United Kingdom that had begun prior to the stop and search and arrest of Steven Kingsford on 21 October 2009, and an examination of Paul Palmer's telephone data, 'Franck' was identified as the Appellant. Paul Palmer formally identified the Appellant as the individual who had given him the instructions to make the transfers of cash.
(vii) The Appellant was arrested and interviewed in the United Kingdom following a French international rogatory letter. The Appellant refused to answer any questions put.
The Appellant's alleged role can be deduced from proposition (vi) since the case advanced against him is that he is 'Franck'. On the basis of this narrative account it can be seen how it is alleged that, so far as any offences committed on French soil are concerned, he was "the principal perpetrator" in the arrangements by virtue of which cash said to be the...
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