Emlyn Quashie (Administratrix Pendente Lite of the Estate of the Deceased Beresford Solomon) v Ayana Solomon
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lady Rose |
| Judgment Date | 30 September 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] UKPC 34 |
| Docket Number | Privy Council Appeal No 0015 of 2020 |
| Court | Privy Council |
[2022] UKPC 34
Lord Hodge
Lord Hamblen
Lord Burrows
Lord Stephens
Lady Rose
Privy Council Appeal No 0015 of 2020
Privy Council
Appellant
Anand Beharrylal KC
Siân McGibbon
(Instructed by Yaseen Ahmed & Associates (Trinidad))
Respondent
Anthony Manwah
(Instructed by Ronald Dowlath Attorneys (Trinidad))
The appellant, Ms Quashie, brings this appeal on behalf of the estate of her former partner Mr Beresford Solomon. She challenges the refusal of the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago to set aside a deed signed on 4 February 2011 by the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (“the 2011 Deed”). The 2011 Deed records that it is made between Mr Solomon on the one part and his daughter Ayana Solomon on the other part and that it conveys a one half share and beneficial interest in a parcel of land identified in a schedule to the Deed: “TO HOLD the same unto and to the use of the Daughter in fee simple to the intent that [Mr Solomon] and Daughter together hold the parcel of land as tenants in common.” The recitals to the 2011 Deed record that the Registrar is conveying the interest in the land to Ayana Solomon pursuant to a consent order of the Court of Appeal dated 7 December 1988 (“the Consent Order”) made in matrimonial proceedings between Mr Solomon and Ricarda Solomon who was his former wife and the mother of Ayana. The recitals record further that the Consent Order ordered Mr Solomon to convey to Ricarda Solomon a half share in the property; that Ricarda died without Mr Solomon having conveyed that half share to her and that he had failed or refused to convey the half share to Ayana who has called on him to do so.
In 2011, Mr Solomon issued a claim in the High Court against Ayana Solomon seeking to set aside the 2011 Deed once he became aware of it. Following a trial, Rahim J dismissed the claim on 5 November 2013. That judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal (Jamadar, Bereaux and Pemberton JJA) in the judgment handed down on 31 May 2019 and now under appeal before the Board.
The Facts
It is important to examine the facts in some detail since in the Board's view the resolution of some of the issues in this appeal turns on the proper construction of the Consent Order and hence on what the Registrar was entitled to do to implement it.
Beresford and Ricarda Solomon were married in July 1978 and their daughter Ayana was born on 18 February 1980. The property at the centre of this dispute is a parcel of land on Miller Street in Buccoo Village in the parish of St Patrick on the island of Tobago. It was conveyed in fee simple to Mr Solomon in 1980 by his grandmother. Unfortunately, the marriage broke down and Ricarda and Ayana moved out of the matrimonial home. In 1982 Ricarda petitioned for divorce and was granted a decree nisi on 26 July 1982. She was granted custody of Ayana. She applied for a settlement of property order. There was a hearing before Permanand J at which both parties were legally represented. Judgment was handed down on 17 February 1986.
The main issue at the trial was the resolution of a factual dispute as to the extent of the parties' respective contributions to the money used to buy, renovate and maintain the matrimonial home and other substantial assets. The judge referred to evidence from an estate agent and valuer, valuing the matrimonial home at about $30,000. Permanand J said:
“It is not in dispute that the land on which the matrimonial home stands has been conveyed to the husband by his grandmother – what is now in issue is whether the renovation and addition carried out to the matrimonial home were done by both the respondent and the applicant or by the respondent alone or the applicant alone and if the Court finds that the wife expended moneys, whether the same entitles her to a share in the matrimonial home.”
Ricarda testified that over the period of three years of the marriage, she spent a total sum of $122,000 for the renovation and completion of the house and the purchase of three boats and two cars. Judge Permanand recited the evidence provided by Ricarda which described how she had paid the rent on the premises where the couple lived after their marriage and how she had then contributed substantial sums to the completion of the house in which Mr Solomon had been living with his grandmother and where Mr Solomon and Ricarda then lived. The judgment goes in detail through the source of the many sums of money which Ricarda said she had contributed, for example, for the acquisition of a boat, the Zion Train, bought for deep sea fishing.
Mr Solomon's evidence before Judge Permanand was that the matrimonial home was his grandmother's house and it had been completed and renovated with money which he had saved up. More generally he contested Ricarda's account of paying for boats, cars and other items.
The judge accepted Ricarda's evidence that she had expended the sums claimed by her to repair and extend the matrimonial home. After citation of authority Judge Permanand went on:
“From the facts before this Court I find that the applicant expended moneys in the conveyance of the matrimonial home to the respondent, on renovations and extensions and furnishing of the matrimonial home. It would be inequitable for the respondent to be entitled to the whole matrimonial home when the applicant expended considerable sums of money as I have found. …
I therefore hold that the applicant is entitled to a share in the house and land. The question is what share, bearing in mind that the applicant and respondent were married on July 25, 1978, and the petition filed on August 26, 1981, and that there is one child of the family. Also the evidence reveals that the applicant has since purchased a parcel of land in order to construct a home.”
Judge Permanand held that Ricarda was entitled to one half share in the matrimonial home and in the lot of land on which the house stood and that Mr Solomon should convey to Ricarda one half share in the said house and land within six months, failing which the Registrar would be empowered to convey the half share in the house and land to Ricarda. She held also that Ricarda was entitled to a half share in various boats including the Zion Train. This was recorded in the order she made on 17 February 1986 (“the Permanand Order”).
Mr Solomon was dissatisfied with the order made by Judge Permanand and lodged an appeal. The Board has not been provided with much information about the discussions or interparty correspondence that ensued but the appeal was settled by the Consent Order made on 7 December 1988 by the Court of Appeal (Bernard CJ, and Sharma and Edoo JJA) following a hearing at which both parties were represented by attorneys. The Consent Order provided that the order made by Judge Permanand:
“be varied in:-
(1) That [Mr Solomon] do convey to [Ricarda] in trust for the child of the family AYANA SOLOMON who was born on the 18 th day of February 1980 a one half share and interest in the matrimonial property situate at Miller Street, Buccoo Point, more particularly described in Deed number 22640 of 1980 together with the building and appurtenances standing thereon within twenty-one (21) days hereof and in default that the Registrar is empowered to do so.”
The Consent Order also required Mr Solomon to pay Ricarda $7,000 being the value of a boat “in full and final satisfaction of all [Ricarda's] share and interest in the said boat”.
It is common ground that Mr Solomon did not comply with the Consent Order and that Ricarda Solomon did not take any steps to enforce it by approaching the Registrar to make the conveyance. The dispute over why Ricarda did not enforce the order during her lifetime forms the basis for the promissory and proprietary estoppel claims by Mr Solomon.
Ricarda died on 25 November 2000. In 2009 Ayana discovered the Consent Order amongst her mother's effects. She took legal advice and approached the Registrar who made the 2011 Deed as described earlier. On discovering the existence of the 2011 Deed, Mr Solomon launched these proceedings seeking a declaration that the 2011 Deed is null and void and of no effect and a declaration that Mr Solomon is the owner of the whole of the disputed property in Buccoo Village.
In the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, Mr Solomon's pleaded case was that, after the making of the Consent Order, Mr Solomon had resumed friendly relations with Ricarda and that two months later “it was agreed verbally that the Claimant would pay the monies as ordered by the Court but that the stipulation requiring the transfer of the % share and interest would not be enforced”. He had relied on this promise by paying Ricarda the $7,000 and had continued to live in sole possession of the property. Further, after an earthquake in 1997 which badly damaged the house, he built a new house on the parcel of land next to the property at a cost of about $320,000 and neither Ricarda nor Ayana had objected to that. Mr Solomon had then rented out the upper floor of the house and lived on the ground floor. He then spent a substantial sum building a second house which was built half on the land he owned and half on his grandmother's remaining land “in furtherance of the agreement and/or promise”. This agreement “and the resulting actions by the Claimant” amounted, he alleged, to a promissory estoppel as a result of which he had suffered detriment by being put to expense.
Mr Solomon also asserted that the Consent Order was no longer effective as it was more than 22 years old and was “in excess of the twelve (12) year time period for validity of Court Judgments”. At para 18a, which was inserted by way of...
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