European Integration and Pension Policy Change: Variable Patterns of Europeanization in Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12030 |
| Date | 01 June 2015 |
| Published date | 01 June 2015 |
European Integration and Pension
Policy Change: Variable Patterns of
Europeanization in Italy, the Netherlands
and Belgium
Karen M. Anderson and Michael Kaeding
Abstract
This article investigates how European welfare states respond to reform pres-
sures arising from European integration. We focus on the field of public pen-
sions and examine the impact of two institutional variables that mediate the
impact of reform pressures: the extent of public pension provision and the
number of national political veto points. We argue that, all else equal, member-
states with few veto points and a relatively small public pension sector are the
most likely cases of policy change in response to Europeanization, whereas
member-states with a high number of veto points and extensive public pension
commitments are the least likely candidates for policy change. We test these
arguments in four cases of Europeanization in three countries (Belgium, the
Netherlands and Italy).
1. Introduction
How does European integration influence the development of national
welfare states? The extensive literature on Europeanization is marked by
disagreement concerning this question. One school of thought emphasizes
the weakness of the treaty basis for EU-level social policy, arguing that the
EU’s social dimension is likely to be ‘fragmented, partial, and piecemeal’
(Lange 1992: 229). Streeck (1994) echoes this position, arguing that the
political salience of social policy hampers agreement at EU level, leaving
social policy to develop through the process of market integration and the
constraints of subsidiarity. Scharpf (2002) also points to the high political
Karen M. Anderson is at the Department of Political Science, Institute for Management
Research, Radboud University Nijmegen. Michael Kaeding is at the Department of Political
Science, University of Duisburg.
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2013. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
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British Journal of Industrial Relations
53:2 June 2015 0007–1080 pp. 231–253 doi: 10.1111/bjir.12030
salience of social policy in domestic politics, arguing that the diversity of
social policy institutions makes social policy integration difficult. A second
school of thought highlights the institutional innovations pushing social
policy integration forward, such as the open method of co-ordination
(OMC) and the incremental use of EU legislation rather than more ambi-
tious initiatives (Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009). Moreover, recent scholar-
ship demonstrates that the impact of EU initiatives on national social
policies is far from minimal (Falkner et al. 2005). Indeed, Palier and Pochet
(2005) show that the production of binding social policy directives at
EU level has increased, despite the growing importance of the OMC (cf.
Hartlapp 2012).
The analysis presented in this article enters this debate about the impact
of European integration on national social policy development, with the
argument that two institutional variables at the domestic level shape
national adaptation to European pressures for change: the structure of
existing social policy and the veto opportunities created by constitutional
structure. We investigate the impact of Europeanization on public pensions
in four cases drawn from three countries (Italy, Belgium and the Nether-
lands). We distinguish two types of European adaptational pressure on
public pension arrangements: EU gender equality law and the European
Monetary Union (EMU) convergence criterion concerning excessive budget
deficits. The former represents binding, direct pressure on domestic institu-
tions, and the latter constitutes diffuse, indirect pressure on policy struc-
tures. For both types of European pressure, we investigate cases in which
adaptational pressure was significant, so that this variable is held constant
across cases. To explain variable patterns of adaptation across cases, we rely
on two variables central to the literature on welfare state change: pro-
gramme structure and the structure of veto points. Programme structure
refers to the magnitude of public pension commitments, and veto point
structure refers to the number and type of institutionalized opportunities
that domestic actors have for influencing the legislative process concerning
pension reform. The four case studies test two core hypotheses derived from
this framework. First, countries with low levels of public pension provision
and few veto points are the most likely cases of substantial policy change in
response to European pressures. Second, countries with many veto points and
extensive public pension commitments are the least likely candidates for policy
change, even when European pressures are strong.
Our case selection is motivated by several considerations. First, our
research design includes cases representing both indirect and direct types of
adaptational pressure emanating from the European level. We argue that
both types of pressure are broadly similar in their effects on domestic
policy change, and can thus be incorporated into the same research design.
The adaptational pressures caused by European integration are many and
varied; it, therefore, makes analytical sense to focus on the magnitude of
pressure, rather than the type of pressure, absent any compelling reason
to do otherwise. Moreover, recent methodological discussions within the
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.
232 British Journal of Industrial Relations
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