G-F (Children)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice McFarlane |
| Judgment Date | 14 January 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | [2013] EWCA Civ 50 |
| Docket Number | Case No: B4/2012/2627 |
| Date | 14 January 2013 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
[2013] EWCA Civ 50
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CAMBRIDGE COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE GREENE)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Mcfarlane
Case No: B4/2012/2627
The First Applicant mother appeared in person, assisted by a McKenzie Friend, Ms Julie Haynes.
The Second Applicant maternal grandmother appeared in person.
The Respondents did not appear and were not represented.
The court has before it this afternoon two separate applications for permission to appeal relating to the same proceedings. The case was conducted in the Peterborough County Court before HHJ Greene, and it related to three young children: K, a boy born on 10 January 2003, and therefore now just over ten years of age; A, a girl born on 22 January 2010, therefore very shortly to be three; and the youngest child, another girl called KA, born on 5 August 2011, and so now some 17 months of age. The proceedings were concluded before HHJ Greene in June 2012, and in a reserved judgment given on 26 June he summarises the evidence that the court had heard over the course of, I think, a three-day hearing earlier that month, and concluded that all three children should be the subject of care orders to the local authority; that the care plan for the eldest child, the boy, K, should be endorsed, with him going to foster care; but that the plan for the two younger children, the two girls, A and KA, would be for them to be placed for adoption, and the judge therefore made a care order in their case but went on to dispense with the consent of the two parents to adoption and made a placement for adoption order.
It is against those orders that the two applicants now seek permission to appeal. The primary applicant is the children's mother, Miss G, and the second applicant is the children's maternal grandmother, Mrs G. Both of them act in person for the purposes of these two applications, and each has filed a Notice of Appeal supported by short grounds of appeal, which are different in each of the two cases; and in the case of the grandmother, she has helpfully set out first of all in writing a number of the "factual errors" that she seeks to rely upon, and then I think more recently has prepared a six-paragraph document headed "Reasons for Appeal".
In addition, this afternoon the mother has had the benefit of assistance from Mrs Julie Haynes, a McKenzie Friend, who comes into the case late in the day, who has not seen all of the court papers but who has now read the judgment and has spent the time, unduly long as it may have been because of delays in this courtroom earlier today, that she has had available this morning and early afternoon to take the mother's instructions.
It is necessary to say something in a little more detail about what the case was about. It is a case which has, on any view, a sad history, and it is a history which goes back over a period of some years. It is plain that in the care of the elder boy, K, the mother, and indeed her mother, had had some difficulties, but they were being supported over the course of a period of time by the local authority. K was living until matters came to a head in the home of the maternal grandmother; she is a lady who has certain health difficulties herself. The events that crystallised matters in relation to her care of K arose in March 2011. On an occasion in March, emergency services were called to the house and a paramedic was so concerned as to the situation that he found, which is described in paragraph 11 of the judgment, that he made a referral to social services. Some short time after that on 31 March, social workers visited the property, and they too found the condition, to use the judge's words, "to be appalling", and at that point by agreement K went to live with his mother. Matters, however, developed; the mother was having difficulties in looking after K as matters progressed, and as time went on she of course had the care by then of young baby A. She was expecting the child who was born in August, baby KA, and the proceedings, although I do not have a clear date for them, seem to have come into existence in the summer of 2011, either before or shortly after the birth of baby KA.
A further complication was visited upon this unfortunate family by the fact that KA was born with health difficulties and required accommodation in the maternity ward throughout the whole of what remained of August and early September. It is recorded in paragraph 14 of the judgment that when KA was only some four days old, she was found on the floor of the hospital ward or room where she and the mother were, and the mother was unable to explain how or why the baby came to be in that position. There was concern that the mother may have dropped the baby, although I note that there is absolutely no record of any injury on this very young baby had she been dropped. It does not seem that the judge made any finding against the mother in that regard, but at the time it will have been a matter of concern that the mother seemingly could not explain how or why the baby came to be on the floor.
There was a further occasion on 20 August. By that time, KA was apparently ready for discharge, and I am told the plan was that she would be discharged into the mother's care. However, on 20 August KA stopped breathing whilst in the mother's care. The mother sought assistance from the medical staff nearby. The case of the stoppage of breathing was never ascertained and there was plainly no adverse finding against the mother in that regard, but the fact that this had happened caused there to be a change of plan by the medical authorities, who advised that it was no longer safe for the baby to be discharged into the mother's care. An interim care order was apparently obtained and K went to live with foster carers. She remained in foster care from that time onwards.
By then, as I say, the level of professional concern was such that the proceedings had started, and obviously the social workers had been aware of the pregnancy and the need to plan for the birth of the child and the mother's ability to care for, then, two younger children. A residential assessment was arranged at a unit called The Croft, and the mother went there on 3 October 2011 and remained there for some seven or eight weeks until 24 November. The placement at the Croft was plainly a very significant event in terms of evidence-gathering and in understanding the mother's abilities and disabilities in providing consistent and safe care to her two young children, or indeed either of them.
The judge deals with the assessment of The Croft in detail in his judgment, but it is right to say that really from the start the level of professional concern as to the mother's ability was high, and, despite quite intensive intervention and support, it remained high and led to a negative conclusion as to her ability to care for the children on her own in the community, even with support. The final report from the Croft concluded that the children would suffer significant harm if returned to the mother's care. Thus the care plan developed into the one that was put before the judge at the hearings in June.
Nothing I have said in my short summary and record of the mother's abilities or lack of abilities is in any way to be critical of her as an individual; indeed, the same can be said of the maternal grandmother. Both of them are spoken of by the judge in his judgment in very positive terms in terms of their motivation and their love for each of these three children. This is a case where if all the will in the world could deliver good and safe care to these three children they would be extremely well cared for given the high level of motivation and love that both of these two ladies have and wish to display towards the children.
Sadly, because of the disabilities which are described by the judge in his judgment separately in...
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