General Medical Council v Sathananthan

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMR JUSTICE FORBES,Mr Justice Forbes
Judgment Date23 April 2008
Neutral Citation[2008] EWHC 872 (Admin),[2008] EWHC 382 (Admin)
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Date23 April 2008
Docket NumberCase No: CO/656/2008,CO/656/2008

[2008] EWHC 382 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

Before:

Mr Justice Forbes

CO/656/2008

CO/676/2008

Between:
The Queen on the Application of Kanagaratnam Sathananthan
Claimant
and
The General Medical Council
Defendant
and
General Medical Council
Claimant
and
Kanagaratnam Sathananthan
Defendant

Miss C Lambert (instructed by Radcliffes Le Brasseur) appeared on behalf of the Claimant in CO/676/2008

Miss S Plaschkes (instructed by GMC Direct) appeared on behalf of the Defendant in CO/676/2008

Miss S Plaschkes (instructed by GMC Direct) appeared on behalf of the Claimant in CO/656/2008

Miss C Lambert (instructed by Radcliffes Le Brasseur) appeared on behalf of the Defendant in CO/656/2008

(As approved)

MR JUSTICE FORBES
1

There are before the court two sets of proceedings. The first set of proceedings is a claim by

Dr Kanagaratnam Sathananthan for termination of the Interim Order of Suspension that was made by the Interim Orders Panel on 13 December 2007. There is also an application by the General Medical Council for an extension of that Order of Suspension for a period of 12 months.

2

These two matters give rise to a number of considerations that are not without their complexity. I have, however, formed a firm view as to what the outcome of the two sets of proceedings should be. I propose to give my answer in each case this afternoon, but without giving my detailed reasons for coming to the conclusion that I have. I will give my detailed reasons in writing in due course, which will be handed down in the usual way.

3

On the claim by Dr Sathananthan for termination of the Interim Order of Suspension, I have come to the firm conclusion that that claim should be dismissed. I am satisfied that an Interim Order of Suspension is an appropriate order in this case in that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public, or is otherwise in the public interest. As I have already indicated, I will give my detailed reasons for that conclusion in due course.

4

I should say at once that I accept that my jurisdiction in this matter is an original jurisdiction and the hearing before me is, in effect, a rehearing of the application for an Interim Order and I will give such weight as I consider appropriate to the conclusions and determination of the Interim Orders Panel.

5

So far as concerns the application of the GMC for an extension of the Interim Order of 13 December 2007, I am concerned at the overall length of time that processing the complaints against Dr Sathananthan has taken. The original complaint was in February 2006 and in the period that followed there were two further complaints in relation to individual patients. It is not clear whether any witness statements have been taken from any of those patients. The likelihood is that none have yet been taken.

6

The case became a great deal more complex after the correspondence and further complaint from Dr Ben Essex in the autumn of 2007. This intervention considerably widened the scope of the original complaint in a way which will become apparent when I give my detailed reasons. Suffice it to say that I am satisfied that, since October 2007, what was already a sensitive and difficult investigation became very much more complex. I accept that this has given rise to the need to carry out extensive investigations.

7

Miss Plaschkes, who appears on behalf of the GMC, very properly accepted that the statement of Miss Lesley Morgan, in support of the GMC's application for an extension of the Suspension Order, was too brief and did not give sufficient details of the further investigations that are required. Miss Plaschkes, therefore, did the best she could to outline the sort of matters that do require investigation and which do necessitate an extension of the Suspension Order. Miss Plaschkes identified the following matters: first, the patients' medical records; second, the need to obtain witness statements from patients once identified; third, the need to obtain copies of all relevant prescriptions; and fourth, expert evidence.

8

On behalf of Dr Sathananthan, Miss Lambert understandably complained of the length of time that these investigations are now going to take. In the circumstances, she submitted that if I considered it appropriate to extend the period of suspension, then I should do so for a relatively short period of time, thus bringing to bear a discipline on the GMC's conduct of the investigation and ensuring a likelihood of a reasonably early final hearing date.

9

I think there is force in Miss Lambert's submission. Accordingly, although I am persuaded that it is appropriate to extend the Interim Order of Suspension, I propose to do for a period of six months, rather than the 12 months for which the GMC has argued. I therefore make the order that the Interim Order of Suspension of 13 December 2007 is to be extended by a period of six months from 17 February 2008. Thereafter, if there is a need to extend the period beyond that the GMC will have to make a further application to the court. In such circumstances I strongly recommend that details of the required investigations, and the extent of progress that has been made, should be fully detailed in a way that was singularly lacking in Miss Morgan's witness statement for the present application.

10

I will try and get the written reasons to you through the usual channels as quickly as I possibly can. Is there anything further that I can usefully do this afternoon?

11

I think there now arises a question of costs.

MR JUSTICE FORBES
12

I think I will reserve that for the moment, if for no other reason than that there may be arguments with regard to the more limited way in which I have dealt with your application for an extension of the Suspension Order. It may be that you will be able to, once you have seen the detailed reasons, agree what is the appropriate order for costs.

13

I have taken an unusual course in this matter, I have to say. I thought about it over lunch and I recognised the need to have as early an indication of the outcome as possible. I came to the conclusion that I thought it unlikely that I would be able to give a sufficiently well structured, detailed extemporary judgment, and for those reasons have taken the course that I have, which I hope will be of assistance to you.

14

If you are able to agree matters such as costs, and the like, that flow from the detailed reasons, then there will be no need for anybody to attend on either side for the hand-down.

15

I am grateful.

[2008] EWHC 872 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FORBES

Case No: CO/656/2008

Case No: CO/676/2008

Between
General Medical Council
Claimant
and
Dr Kanagaratnam Sathananthan
Defendant
and
Between
Dr Kanagaratnam Sathananthan
Claimant
and
General Medical Council
Defendant

Sarah Plaschkes (instructed by Lesley Karen Morgan, GMC Legal) for the GMC

Christina Lambert (instructed by RadcliffesLeBrasseur) for Dr Kanagaratnam Sathananthan

Hearing date: 13 th February 2008

Mr Justice Forbes
1

Introduction. These two claims are concerned with essentially the same issue, namely whether Dr Kanagaratnam Sathananthan (“Dr Sathananthan”), a registered medical practitioner, should continue to be the subject of an interim order of suspension (“the interim suspension order”) imposed on him by the GMC's Interim Orders Panel (“the IOP”) on 13 th December 2007, pursuant to section 41A(1) and (3)(c) of the Medical Act 1983 (as amended) (“the 1983 Act”), replacing an order for interim conditional registration originally imposed by the IOP on 18 th August 2006 . In the first claim, CO/656/2008, the GMC seeks an extension of the interim suspension order for a period of 12 months from 18 th February to 17 th February 2009, pursuant to section 41A(6) and (7) of the 1983 Act. In the second claim, CO/676/2008, Dr Sathananthan seeks an order terminating the interim suspension order, pursuant to the terms of section 41A(10) of the 1983 Act. It is therefore apparent that the outcome of the first claim automatically determines the outcome of the second.

2

On 13 th February 2008, having heard the submissions of Ms Plaschkes on behalf of the GMC and Ms Lambert on behalf of Dr Sathananthan, I granted the relief sought in the first claim to the extent that I made an order extending the interim suspension order for a further 6 months. At the time I did so, I indicated that I would give my reasons later. This judgment constitutes my reasons for the order that I made on 13 th February.

3

The Legal Framework. (a) So far as material, section 41A of the 1983 Act provides as follows:

“(1) Where an Interim Orders Panel … (is) satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of the public or is otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of a fully registered person, for the registration of that person to be suspended or to be made subject to conditions, the Panel may make an order –

(a) that his registration in the register shall be suspended (that is to say shall not have effect) during such period not exceeding eighteen months as may be specified in the order (an “interim suspension order”); or

(b) that his registration shall be conditional on his...

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