Ghassemian v Tigris Industries Inc.

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMr Justice Norris
Judgment Date22 July 2013
Neutral Citation[2013] EWHC 2170 (Ch)
CourtChancery Division
Docket NumberCase No: CH/2013/0147 & CH/2013/0173
Date22 July 2013

[2013] EWHC 2170 (Ch)



Royal Courts of Justice

The Rolls Building

Fetter Lane



Mr Justice Norris

Case No: CH/2013/0147 & CH/2013/0173

Tigris Industries Inc

Jonathan Upton (instructed by Housing and Property Law Partnership Solicitors) for the Appellant

Kevin Leigh (instructed by Ashfords Solicitors) for the Respondent

Hearing dates: 26 June 2013

Judgment Subject to Editorial Corrections

Mr Justice Norris

Sharooz Langroody ("Mr Langroody") is the son of Hamila Sartipy ("Mrs Sartipy") who (it is alleged) is also known as Hamila Ghassemian. Mrs Sartipy applied to register title by adverse possession to some land at 26–30 Earls Court Road. Proceedings were directed by Her Majesty's Land Registry. In those proceedings the Adjudicator dismissed the application and found that Mr Langroody had laid an "elaborate and false paper trail to support the case".


On the 25 November 2010 the Adjudicator made an order for costs in favour of Tigris Industries Inc ("Tigris"). She directed a detailed assessment and also made an interim order for £60,000 to be paid. Tigris was misdescribed in the order.


The interim costs order was not obeyed. On 16 December 2010 an interim charging order was granted over a flat registered in Mrs Sartipy's name at 56 Chatsworth Court in respect of that costs order.


When the interim charging order came back before the court to be made final, Mrs Sartipy sought to avoid that result by saying that she was not the person who had applied to the Land Registry, participated in the Adjudication proceedings and become subject to the costs order. She was ordered to attend court so that she could be cross-examined on that case. She did not do so: but at the hearing Deputy Master Bard admitted her witness statements (subject to considerations as to the weight that should be attached to them). He also heard evidence from two people who said they were directors of Tigris (Mr Ozbuluter and Mr Mustafa). They gave evidence (a) that they had in 2011 seen passport photographs of Mrs Sartipy whom they recognised as the person they had observed at a hearing before the Adjudicator on 28 September 2009 the date of the relevant hearing before the Adjudicators: and (b) that in October 2009 they had seen a photograph of Mrs Sartipy in a file belonging to the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and had identified her on that occasion. Before the Deputy Master it was accepted that Mrs Sartipy has been in England on 28 September 2009: and taking that into account the Deputy Master accepted the identification evidence. Quite separately, he found that the evidence before him supported the contention that Mrs Sartipy had authorised Mr Langroody to act for her in applying to HMLR and in the adjudication proceedings. He held that Mrs Sartipy had not made good her case that the claim was pursued by Mr Langroody as a frolic of his own without her knowledge and authority. So on the basis of the documentation the Deputy Master decided that Mr Langroody acted with Mrs Sartipy's actual authority in HMLR and in the adjudication proceedings; and he regarded the identification evidence as supporting that conclusion. A note of his judgment records

"The Defendant did authorise her son to take proceedings for her which resulted in the adjudication. Accordingly I conclude the Claimants entitlement to a final charging order is made out".


There is one further point worthy of note. Before Deputy Master Bard the case appears to have been advanced by Mr Langroody that Mrs Sartipy had transferred the beneficial ownership in 56 Chatsworth Court to a Delaware company which had then transferred that interest to Mr Langroody: and some documents were produced which it was said demonstrated this. The Deputy Master regarded that case as lacking any credibility.


The Order resulting from his decision was dated 4 July 2011. On 3 July 2011 Mrs Sartipy appealed that decision, on the grounds that the Deputy Master (a) ought not to have held that she had given Mr Langroody authority to represent her and (b) should have not accepted the evidence of Mr Ozbuluter and Mr Mustafa that they could identify her from a passport photograph. Spencer J refused permission to appeal. In paragraphs 31 and 32 of his judgment he records that it had been conceded by Leading Counsel before him that Mrs Sartipy had been in the United Kingdom on 28 September 2009.


On 30 January 2012 Mrs Sartipy applied to reopen that appeal under CPR 52.17. She now sought to rely on evidence that she could not have attended the hearing before the Adjudicator on 28 September 2009 because she was not in the country (producing a medical certificate and some banking documents). This was surprising in view of the basis on which the original hearing and the appeal had been conducted.


In support of her application to reopen the appeal Mrs Sartipy also sought to undermine the credibility of Mr Ozbuluter in relation to his evidence that he had seen a photograph of her in a local authority file in October 2009.


On 2 February 2012 Mr Justice Nicol rejected the application to reopen the appeal under CPR 52.17, concluding his judgment with the words

"There is no right of appeal from this decision which is final".


By an Appellant's Notice issued on the 27 March 2013 in CH/2013/0173 Mrs Sartipy again seeks to appeal the making of the final charging order: but this time she refers not to the Order dated 4 July 2011 but to an Order dated 30 September 2011. The order dated 4 July 2011 had continued the interim charging order, pending rectification of the costs order made by the Adjudicator to HMLR (which had misdescribed Tigris); when the costs order was rectified then the interim order would become final. The title to the Adjudicator's order was corrected and the final charging order was sealed on the 30 September 2011. It is against this version of the order that the appeal dated 27 March 2013 is brought (18 months out of time).


On 16 April 2013 I directed

a) That Mrs Sartipy's application for permission to bring this appeal out of time, for permission to adduce fresh evidence and (subject to such permissions being granted) for permission to appeal should be made at a hearing: and

b) That at that hearing the Court would consider whether there was jurisdiction to entertain the appeal having regarded to the order of Spencer J of the 16 September 2011 and the order of Nicol J of the 2 February 2012.


Although this is technically an appeal against a different order consequent upon the same judgment of Deputy Master Bard, everybody knows that (and has approached the hearing on the footing that) this is really an attempt to revisit the issue of whether Mrs Sartipy was the person who applied to be registered as the proprietor of some valuable land in Earls Court, and who lost the hearing before the Adjudicator to HMLR. The ground on which this is said to be permissible is that the final charging order granted by Deputy Master Bard was procured by fraud. Mrs Sartipy's case is that on the material now available to her she can show that the Mr Mustafa who purported to give evidence before Deputy Master Bard was not who he said he was: and that Mr Ozbuluter must have known this to be so. She also wishes to challenge (again) the photograph identification alleged to have been made in October 2009: and to assert (again) that she was not in the United Kingdom on the 28 September 2009.


I refuse to extend time for the bringing of the appeal in CH/2013/0173: and in any event I would refuse permission to appeal on the merits. In my judgment the principle of finality in litigation (whilst not absolute) has a real and independent value. It is a key part of the complex organism that is "justice". It has been decided in this case that Mrs Sartipy was the applicant for a registered title at HMLR and the applicant in the Adjudication proceedings. Permission to appeal that decision has been refused. Permission to re-open the appeal has been refused. What is effectively an application for permission to re-open the refusal of permission to re-open the refusal of permission to appeal should also be refused.


As to the extension sought, no explanation is offered as to why this appeal is being brought out of time. There is no reason apparent from the papers why an appeal against the order dated 30 September 2011 could not have been commenced earlier and joined with that against the Order dated 4 July 2011. This appeal is simply a technical device to bring back before the court the same issues that were before the court in the appeal with which Spencer J and Nichol J respectively dealt.


As to the grant of permission, having reminded myself of the low...

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1 cases
  • Ghassemian Hamila Sartipy (Aka Hamila Sartipy) v Tigris Industries Inc.
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 1 March 2019
    ...should stop it. …” 14 Other decisions by Norris J, given in his judgment dated 22 July 2013 ( Ghassemian v Tigris Industries Inc [2013] EWHC 2170 (Ch)) were not affected by the appeal to this court on the authenticity issue. In that judgment Norris J dismissed a further application by Mrs ......

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