Government of the United States of America v Tobias Bowen
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Burnett |
| Judgment Date | 11 September 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | [2015] EWHC 1873 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/374/2015 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 11 September 2015 |
[2015] EWHC 1873 (Admin)
Lord Justice Burnett
Mrs Justice Thirlwall DBE
Case No: CO/374/2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Louisa Collins (instructed by Extradition Unit (CPS)) for the Appellant
Malcolm Hawkes (instructed by Leslie Franks Solicitors) for the Respondent
On 30 June 2015 we handed down judgment in the appeal of the Government of the United States of America against a decision of the District Judge at Westminster Magistrates' Court of 19 January 2015 whereby she discharged Mr Bowen, whose extradition had been sought. We indicated that we would deal with any application for certification of a point of law of general public importance and application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court on receipt of written submissions. On 13 July Mr Hawkes, on behalf of Mr Bowen, made those applications in writing. The appeal concerned civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders pursuant to the laws of the State of New York: [2015] EWHC 1873 (Admin). We refused to certify.
At the same time he made a concurrent application "to reopen the determination of the appeal" pursuant to Rule 17.27 of the Criminal Procedure Rules. We invited the Crown Prosecution Service on behalf of the United States to respond to this novel application and are grateful for Miss Collins' written submissions.
We indicated that we would deal with the application on the basis of written submissions.
The essence of the application is that the judgment we gave was in error in a number of respects. The submission advanced, which runs to 105 paragraphs, refers to materials not relied upon by the respondent in resisting the appeal, including evidence which was available to him but which he did not seek to adduce. It repeats arguments advanced in the appeal, some in an augmented form. We say nothing about whether the new evidence could properly have been admitted on the Fenyvesi principles: [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin). We have considered the materials but are unpersuaded that even were they before us the result would have been different. We do not accept that there is any demonstrated injustice. That said, Rule 17.27 is not designed to enable an unsuccessful party in extradition proceedings immediately to regroup after losing the appeal and to return with further developed submissions.
Rule 17.27 provides:
"17.27.
(1) This rule applies where a party wants the High Court to reopen a decision of that court which determines an appeal or an application for permission to appeal.
(2) Such a party must—
(a) apply in writing for permission to reopen that decision, as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the grounds for doing so; and
(b) serve the application on the High Court officer and every other party.
(3) The application must—
(a) specify the decision which the applicant wants the court to reopen; and
(b) give reasons why—
(i) it is necessary for the court to reopen that decision in order to avoid real injustice,
(ii) the circumstances are exceptional and make it appropriate to reopen the decision, and
(iii) there is no alternative effective remedy.
(4) The court must not give permission to reopen a decision unless each other party has had an opportunity to make representations."
The language of rule 17.27(3) mirrors precisely that of Part 52.17 of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides a similar power to reopen a final appeal following determination in the Court of Appeal. In turn, that rule reflects the common law position identified in Taylor v. Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90. The narrow scope of the application of that rule is well-established in the authorities, collected together in the notes to the rule in the White Book.
This court has considered identical language found in section 108(7) of the Extradition Act 2003 as Crim PR 17.27(3)(b)(i) and (ii), which enacted the recommendation of Sir Scott Baker in September 2011 that human rights issues arising at the end of the extradition process in Part 2 cases should be dealt with by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dempsey v Government of the United States of America
...17.27. The ambit of Part 17.27 (as it was then) was considered in detail by this Court in Government of the United States v Bowen [2015] EWHC 1873 (Admin) at [7] to [9]. We adopt that analysis of Part 17.27 as it then was – Part 50.27 as it now is. The requirements in Part 50.27(3)(b) are ......
-
Tobias Bowen v Secretary of State for Home Department (1st Respondent) The Government of the United States of America (2nd Respondent)
...article 5 rights and that there was, in any event, no real risk of civil commitment, see [44] of the judgment in Government of the United States of America v. Bowen [2015] EWHC 1873 (Admin) (' Bowen (No.1)'). 7 Following the handing down of the judgment in Bowen No.1, the Appellant sought t......
-
Andras Seprey-Hozo v Law Court of Miercurea Ciuc, Romania
...appeal process had come to an end and would give rise all too easily to additional delay…": [34]. 16 United States v. Bowen [2015] EWHC 1873 (Admin) was another Part II case. The application to reopen the appeal was made under a new rule introduced in 2014 in the Criminal Procedure Rules. ......
-
Antonia Ilia v Appeal Court in Athens, Greece
...is the need for finality in litigation (and especially in extradition cases). 33 In Government of the United States v Bowen [2015] EWHC 1873 (Admin), Burnett LJ (as he then was) emphasised the narrow scope of Crim PR r. 17.27, the relevant precursor provision. In particular, he held that: ......