Harry Meadows v Examining Court, Malaga, Spain
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Sir Duncan Ouseley |
| Judgment Date | 30 July 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] EWHC 2084 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/4500/2018 |
| Date | 30 July 2019 |
[2019] EWHC 2084 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Sir Duncan Ouseley
sitting as a Judge of the High Court
Case No: CO/4500/2018
Benjamin Seifert (instructed by JD Spicer Zeb) for the Appellant
Richard Evans (instructed by CPS Extradition) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 19 June 2019
Approved Judgment
Sir Duncan Ouseley, sitting as a Judge of the High Court:
This is an appeal against the decision of District Judge Goldspring sitting at Westminster Magistrates' Court on 5 November 2018 ordering the extradition of the Appellant, Harry Meadows, to Spain to face trial pursuant to an EAW. He is accused of participating in a number of bank robberies in Spain between late December 2013 and February 2014.
The issues in this appeal revolve around his deafness and associated problems, which have given rise to arguments about oppression under s25 of the Extradition Act and fitness to plead, and breach of his ECHR Article 6 fair trial rights. He also raised the particularity of the EAW in relation to his role in the robberies. The District Judge also considered his Article 8 ECHR rights and those of his children.
He is 38 years old. He was born deaf. The District Judge found that he could not read or write effectively; he could not do sign language. There are significant issues over his lip-reading and its effectiveness. His attainment of knowledge and skills have been adversely affected by his deafness. A psychologist expert said that he had “borderline intellectual ability.” He cannot communicate over the telephone. He has an alcohol and drug dependency.
He has six children by a now deceased former partner, and a seventh with his new partner. Four of his children are in care, and two live with his mother under some court approved arrangement. He too lives with his mother. He also had a son, who, aged 17, was shot dead in what the police described as a targeted shooting, in October 2017.
His surrender is sought for trial alongside seven co-Defendants. It is not clear whether they are in Spain or not. It appears that he and a number of the others were arrested in Spain, at houses where significant quantities of cannabis were found, but those are not the subject of the charges faced by Mr Meadows. The offences in question are described as follows, starting with the conspiracy offence:
“1-All through the months of December 2013 and January and February 2014, the defendants agreed to make use of a handmade explosive device made by themselves in order to seek illicit profit. The device was composed of two oxygen and acetylene bottles, a manometer, a two-tubes hose, a cable and a battery, and was intended to rob ATMs by explosing them.”
There then follows a list of 14 specific offences of which the first and fourteenth are sufficient to exemplify the particularity of the EAW; almost all are alleged to have been committed in the early mornings, in Malaga or Marbella.
“1:- The early morning of 18/12/13 the defendants set off the ATM of the banking establishment Deutsche Bank, at the road Carretera N340, Malaga. They managed to rob 9649,70 euros. As a result of the explosion, the ATM was damaged, but the damages has not yet been assessed by the experts….14:-
Finally, on 21/02/14, the defendants set off the ATM of the bank establishment Barclays Bank, at Urbanizacion Pueblo Los Arcos, Autovfa A-7, km 191 Marbella. They robbed 40,000 euros and damaged the bank establishment, which claims damages. The damages have not yet been assessed by the experts.”
The EAW continues:
“Some days before the robberies, the defendants agreed to buy an AUDI RS4 of illicit origin for the purpose of using it in their criminal activities. The exact date of the purchase is unknown. Probably in order not to be identified, they changed the number plate of the car from the Spanish 0761GZM to the new on BX06BCY, which has proved to belong to a Volvo car without registration certificate, which was equally seized from the defendants. The stolen vehicle AUDI …has been returned to its owner.” The total value of the burglaries, excluding damage to the banks was €295,218.
He was arrested and questioned in Spain; he spent some three months in custody there before he was allowed to leave subject to certain requirements, which it is not said he breached. He is not a fugitive. He was arrested in the UK in August 2017 in Liverpool, driving a scooter, when, after being passed a suspect unknown package, he rode off along the pavement and into a nearby housing estate. He was picked up shortly afterwards, and gave his name, date of birth and various addresses, according to the arresting officer's statement. He had no insurance, MOT or driving licence. When told he was under arrest for the extradition offences and cautioned, he replied that he had never been to Spain. He had explained that he was deaf, and could not do sign language, but used lip-reading, and confirmed to the officer that he fully understood what was happening. When told that he was being arrested for extradition proceedings, “he became somewhat volatile.” He said “unprompted” that he had lost his passport two years ago and had never bothered to apply for a new one. He was bailed after a week or so in custody.
The case came before District Judge Goldspring on four occasions in 2018 before judgment was delivered on 5 November 2018. He had the benefit of four expert reports and the oral evidence of three of the experts. He also had the evidence of others who had been involved with Mr Meadows, notably his mother.
The principal argument pursued for Mr Meadows was that he was and would continue to be unfit to plead. There is no specific statutory provision about the effect of unfitness to plead on extradition. This issue is dealt with under s25, which requires a person to be discharged where it appears to the judge in the extradition hearing that “the physical or mental condition of the [requested person] is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him.” As this was not a case in which the conditions would change, an adjournment to see if he would recover could not be granted; the only power would be to discharge him. It was argued that he would inevitably be found to be unfit under the Spanish procedure.
It was also contended that there was a real risk of a flagrant breach of Article 6, as that phrase is analysed in Lis and Others v Poland [2018] EWHC 2848 (Admin) at [58–63], because the Spanish trial Court had not been shown to be able to cope with the particular consequences of Mr Meadows' deafness in a way that would enable him to have a fair trial.
Unfitness to plead
The issue of unfitness to plead for extradition purposes has been considered in a number of cases. The principles are clear, and can be found in Republic of South Africa v Dewani (No. 2) [2014] EWHC 153 (Admin), D Ct, and other authorities including Lynch v High Court of Dublin [2010] EWHC 109 (Admin), and Edwards v Government of the USA [2013] EWHC 1906 (Admin). The judgment on fitness to plead is normally for the courts of the requesting state. This presupposes that the requesting state has a procedure for determining the issue. It would be comparatively unusual for extradition to be ordered of a person who was currently unfit to plead and had been unfit for some time, and there was no case in which a person had been extradited who was unfit to plead, and it was unknown when he would be fit to plead. However, if the requested person was unfit to stand trial, and was likely to remain unfit after a further period for recovery, his extradition would be oppressive if he were not to be returned to the UK, rather than face indefinite incarceration in the requesting state, perhaps after a procedure equivalent to the trial of the facts.
The Divisional Court in Dewani stated at [50–51]:
“50. We therefore accept…that the breadth of the factors to be considered under section 91 [the equivalent for Category 2 countries of s25 for Category 1 countries] include looking at the question whether it was unjust or oppressive to extradite the person at the time the request was being considered as well as looking forward to what might happen in the proceedings in South Africa if he was extradited. We must take into account all such matters, including the consequences to the requested person's state of health and age….
51. We do not, however, accept that there are any hard and fast rules; that would be inconsistent with the position that each case must be specifically examined by reference to its facts and circumstances. The only situation in which a court would most probably say it would be oppressive and unjust to return him is where it is clear that he would be found by the court in the requesting state to be unfit to plead….”
The procedure for determining whether a person is unfit to plead in a criminal trial in England and Wales is provided for in s4 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. Sections 4A and 5 deal, respectively, with what happens if someone is found unfit to plead: there may be trial of the facts, that is whether the defendant did the act charged against him; and the consequences of a finding of that he did: hospital order, supervision order, or absolute discharge.
The operation of the procedure was considered in R v Marcantonio [2016] EWCA Crim 14, [2016] 2 Cr.App.R.9, Lloyd-Jones LJ delivering the judgment of the Court. This referred to R v Walls (Robert) [2011] EWCA Crim 443; [2011] 2 Cr. App.R.6, in which Thomas LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court emphasised at [37]:
“(i) a finding that a defendant is fit to plead has the consequence that the court must determine whether he did the...
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