HM Solicitor General v Jason-Steven Wong
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Cobb |
| Judgment Date | 21 November 2023 |
| Neutral Citation | [2023] EWHC 2966 (Fam) |
| Court | Family Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: FD23F00038 |
[2023] EWHC 2966 (Fam)
THE HONOURABLE Mr Justice Cobb
Case No: FD23F00038
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT 1981
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACT 1960
AND IN THE MATTER OF PART 37 FAMILY PROCEDURE RULES 2010
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Committal for Contempt: Sentence
Adam Payter (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Applicant
The Defendant was in attendance and unrepresented
Hearing dates: 21 November 2023
Approved Judgment
THE HONOURABLE Mr Justice Cobb
This judgment was delivered in public.
Introduction
Following a hearing which concluded on 25 October 2023, I found to the criminal standard of proof that Jason-Steven: Wong (hereafter ‘the Defendant’) was in contempt of court in that he:
i) Made a covert audio-recording of a substantive court hearing in adoption proceedings brought under the Adoption and Children Act 2002 conducted at the Family Court in Nottingham, sitting in private, before HHJ Watkins on 18 February 2022;
ii) Thereafter, within a few days of the court hearing, he disposed of the recording and associated documents to another with a view to their publication on YouTube.
My reasoned judgment, explaining my findings, was delivered on 27 October 2023, under neutral citation [2023] EWHC 2684 (Fam).
This hearing has been convened for me to determine sanction.
For this hearing, both the Applicant and the Defendant have filed position statements, at my request, addressing issues of sanction. The Defendant has also corresponded with me on two occasions (via my clerk) since the delivery of my last judgment. On the first occasion, on the day of the hand down of the judgment itself, he indicated that he was “formally challenging the Jurisdiction, … that you are claiming to have to make this purported Judgement”. In another he referred to the fact that “the Police interview was made under duress, and all that I have stated was coerced out of me and must be struck from the record”. He has also purported to file with the court, without leave, an ‘affidavit’ from Mr Andrew Devine which I have nonetheless read.
The Defendant has continued to challenge a number of aspects of the procedure. In order to respond constructively to at least part of that challenge I have provided him with a further redacted print out of the FamilyMan log of these proceedings. I asked him again today whether he wishes to be represented by a lawyer; he did not. During the hearing he sought to persuade me that he had been acquitted at the Nottingham Magistrates Court in November 2022. I reminded him that I have copies of the letter of ‘discontinuance’ sent by the Crown Prosecution Service to him (under the provisions of section 23 Prosecution of Offenders Act 1985) on 23 November 2022 (before the hearing in the Magistrates Court) and again on 5 January 2023 (after the hearing), and that I had already satisfied myself that this was not a situation of ‘double jeopardy’ (see §59 of my earlier judgment).
The findings of contempt are fully described in my earlier judgment. It will be noted that I rejected the Defendant's case that the hearing on 18 February 2022 was in a ‘sham’ court. I found the Applicant's case proved (see §1 and §63–67 of my earlier judgment). I repeat two important paragraphs from my conclusions:
[70] There is, arguably, no category of case within the wide range of our diverse jurisdictions (i.e., both within and outwith the family jurisdiction) which is more sensitive or private than those concerning the adoption of a young child. As I have earlier said, almost all hearings in the Family Court involving children are heard in private; the privacy law is designed for “the protection of the interests of the minor in question, not the adjudication without interference of the issues arising for decision” (see Pelling (citation above) at [40]). As Laws LJ further observed in Pelling at [43]:
“… it is an affront to justice that a judgment or proceeding should be publicised which, in the interests of the child, the court has advisedly determined should be kept private”.
This principle is enshrined in both primary and secondary legislation.
[71] The public identification of a child who has been placed for adoption following due process of law has very significant implications for that child, and for the family with whom the child is placed; it may threaten the security and confidentiality of the placement, and the emotional stability of the child and their new parents. It is, in my judgment, a most serious contempt of court to defy the long-established principle of privacy in adoption cases by covert recording of a hearing; the contempt is aggravated when the recording is published. Whether proceedings are current or completed, the protection granted by Parliament remains operational.”
Sanction: Discussion
In respect of sanction, I have a range of powers under section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
The penalty is in my discretion. In exercising that discretion, I have had in mind the Court of Appeal's comments about sentence in contempt cases in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 392 at paragraphs 57 to 71. I have also had regard to the more recent Supreme Court decision in HM Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 where Lord Lloyd Jones, Lord Hamblen and Lord Stephens in a joint judgment directed judges in these circumstances to adopt the following approach (see [44]):
“1. The court should adopt an approach analogous to that in criminal cases where the Sentencing Council's Guidelines require the court to assess the seriousness of the conduct by reference to the offender's culpability and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused.
2. In light of its determination of seriousness, the court must first consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty.
3. If the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty will suffice, the court must impose the shortest period of imprisonment which properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt.
4. Due weight should be given to matters of mitigation, such as genuine remorse, previous positive character and similar matters.
5. Due weight should also be given to the impact of committal on persons other than the contemnor, such as children of vulnerable adults in their care.
6. There should be a reduction for an early admission of the contempt to be calculated consistently with the approach set out in the Sentencing Council's Guidelines on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea.
7. Once the appropriate term has been arrived at, consideration should be given to suspending the term of imprisonment. Usually, the court will already have taken into account mitigating factors when setting the appropriate term such that there is no powerful factor making suspension appropriate, but a serious effect on others, such as children or vulnerable adults in the contemnor's care, may justify suspension”.
I bear in mind that the sanction which I impose has a primary function of marking the disapproval of the court and deterring others from engaging in conduct comprising contempt (see Patel v Patel & O'rs [2017] EWHC 3229 (Ch) at [22] and [23]). I have also had regard to the comments of Hale LJ in Hale...
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