Irina Yurievna Vilinova v Igor Ivgenievich Vilinov
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Holman |
| Judgment Date | 17 April 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] EWHC 1107 (Fam) |
| Court | Family Division |
| Docket Number | No. FD18F00029 |
| Date | 17 April 2019 |
[2019] EWHC 1107 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Holman
(sitting throughout in public)
No. FD18F00029
Mr P. Chamberlayne QC (instructed by Camilla Baldwin) appeared on behalf of the applicant.
THE RESPONDENTS did not attend and were not represented.
(As approved by the judge)
Introduction, the procedural history and the engagement of the parties
Although they have already been divorced in Russia, I will for convenience refer to Irina Vilinova as “the wife” and her former husband, Igor Vilinov, as “the husband.” Without any objection by or on behalf of the wife, I heard the whole of this case in public and I now deliver this judgment in public. This is the final substantive hearing of (i) the former wife's claims under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (“the 1984 Act”) for financial relief after an overseas divorce; and (ii) a claim now to be adjudicated upon within the Part III proceedings, by a company, Hinaly Company Limited (“Hinaly”), that the wife owes to that company an enforceable debt of £2 million plus accrued interest, pursuant to a “loan agreement” which was signed by the wife, and by the husband “on behalf of” Hinaly, in his capacity (at the time of signing) as sole director of Hinaly. The “loan agreement no. 01/2013” bears the typed date March 18, 2013, although, as I will later describe, the actual date upon which it was signed is disputed. The wife says that it is a sham.
Both parties are Russian and the husband continues to live there. The wife has clearly been habitually resident in England and Wales since in or about 2012. In 2016, in circumstances which I will later describe, the husband obtained a divorce from the wife in Russia. On 13 April 2018, in proceedings No. FD18F00029, I granted permission to the wife to apply for an order for financial relief under Part III of the 1984 Act, and gave certain consequential directions. On 24 April 2018 the very well-known firm of Mishcon de Reya solicitors, stating that they were acting for Hinaly, lodged with the London Court of International Arbitration a formal “Request for arbitration.” It named Hinaly as claimant and the wife as respondent, and sought an award that the wife pay to Hinaly £2 million plus contractual interest and costs, in reliance upon the loan agreement which bears the date 18 March 2013.
The wife issued her substantive application for financial relief after an overseas divorce in prescribed form D50F on 10 May 2018. At a hearing on 11 May 2018, of which, as the order made on that date recites, the husband had had no notice, Baker J ordered at paragraph 3 that “There be permission for the applicant to serve the respondent [viz the husband] with all documents within her substantive application under Part III… by alternative means to facilitate service by:- (a) post to the Dispute Resolution Team at Mishcon de Reya LLP [with full postal and email addresses specified] as the solicitors representing the respondent's company, Hinaly Company Limited; and (b) the personal email address last known by the applicant to be used by the respondent being [and the email address is then specified].”
A further hearing was fixed by Baker J for 18 May 2018 at which Mr Patrick Chamberlayne QC represented the wife and Mr Martin Pointer QC and Mr Joshua Viney, instructed by Mishcon de Reya, represented Hinaly. The order of 18 May 2018 recites that the respondent (viz the husband) had had notice of the hearing but did not attend and was not represented. At the hearing on 18 May 2018, at which Hinaly were so formidably represented, Cohen J, amongst other matters: (i) joined Hinaly as a party to the Part III proceedings as second respondent. They remain a full party to this day; (ii) restrained Hinaly until further order from progressing the arbitration proceedings No.183930 in the London Court of International Arbitration; (iii) ordered each of the husband and Hinaly to answer certain questions which had been put in a letter from the wife's solicitors, Camilla Baldwin, to Mishcon de Reya; (iv) gave permission to the wife to serve documents upon Hinaly by post to Mishcon de Reya or by email to the email addresses of named people within Mishcon de Reya; and (v) varied paragraph 3 of the order of Baker J of 11 May 2018 by discharging paragraph 3(a), which had permitted service upon the husband by post to Mishcon de Reya, and replacing it by service “by post to Flat 7, Gubernskogo Street 42-A, Novorossiysk, Russia” which is the flat in which the parties used to reside and where, it appears, the husband still does reside. The order of 18 May 2018 left undisturbed paragraph 3(b) of the order of 11 May 2018. The upshot is that, with effect from 18 May 2018, the wife was permitted to serve the husband by post at Flat 7 in Novorossiysk and by email to his specified last known email address.
I am quite satisfied that since 18 May 2018 right up to 5 April 2019 the wife's solicitors, Camilla Baldwin, have sent a considerable number of letters to the husband at the specified Flat 7 address, and emails to his specified email address. He has had very full notice by the methods permitted by Baker J and Cohen J of these proceedings and of all the orders made in these proceedings, and of the date of this final substantive hearing. He has never replied to, nor even acknowledged, a single one of those communications. He has never communicated directly or indirectly with the court, nor filed any document with the court. He has never attended, or been represented at, a single hearing, including the substantive hearing last week, and he is not present or represented here today. He has been in total breach since mid-June 2018 of an order to file a Form E giving full details of his property and income, and in total breach since late August 2018 of an order to answer certain questionnaires. In short, the husband has never, from first to last, engaged at all with the court or in these proceedings, nor contributed a single word or document to them.
As I said at paragraphs 16 and 17 of my recent judgment only a month ago in Hammoud v Al Zawawi [2019] EWHC 839 (Fam) in somewhat similar circumstances of non-engagement in Part III proceedings by a former husband resident abroad, “A respondent cannot simply ignore court orders and hope that the proceedings will go away.” In this case, as in that case, I must, of course, nevertheless strive to reach an outcome which is just and fair to both parties. Nevertheless, it is no fault or responsibility of anyone but the husband himself that I have had the difficult task of deciding this case without any submissions or argument on behalf of the husband; without any written or oral evidence from him; without any cross-examination on his behalf of the wife; and with very little evidence of his means, save such scraps as the wife has been able to provide or produce, perhaps most significantly from the conveyancing file of Philip Ross Solicitors to which I will later refer.
The position of Hinaly has been different. Until after a hearing on 16 January 2019 they have continued to participate vigorously and forcefully in these proceedings. They have filed statements by a member of Mishcon de Reya, Zachary Segal, dated 17 May 2018, and by Andrea Rishael Vallabh, now the sole director of Hinaly, dated 22 June 2018. Those statements essentially deal with the past and present structure of Hinaly, and of the Albatros Trust which now indirectly owns Hinaly.
Hinaly fully participated in two further interim hearings before myself on 24 July 2018 and 16 January 2019. On each occasion, Hinaly were represented by Mr Stephen Trowell QC and Mr Viney, instructed by Mishcon de Reya. The final hearing in the week of 8 April 2019 was expressly fixed by, amongst others, the clerk to Mr Trowell and Mr Viney (who are in the same chambers) on dates convenient to them.
I remember very clearly the hearing on 16 January 2019. That hearing clearly proceeded on the basis that at the request of, or with the agreement of, Hinaly the court would, at the present substantive hearing of the Part III claim, also hear all the evidence and argument in relation to the claim of Hinaly that the wife owes £2 million to Hinaly plus contractual interest, and would adjudicate upon that claim. Upon the oral application of Mr Trowell, for Hinaly, the wife gave a number of undertakings to preserve and not further diminish her assets so as to be able substantially, if not wholly, to satisfy any judgment made against her in favour of Hinaly. Both the wife and Hinaly were ordered to make disclosure by list “in relation to the alleged loan”, and Hinaly were required to answer certain interrogatories. Amongst other matters those interrogatories required Hinaly to produce the accounts or the financial records of Hinaly in the period in which the husband was the sole director of Hinaly (said to have been until 1 October 2014, so well after the date of the alleged loan), and bank statements of all bank accounts operated by Hinaly since 1 January 2013. One purpose of production of the accounts was obviously to see if the alleged loan was...
To continue reading
Request your trial