Jeevani Wickramaratna v Cambridge University Chemistry Department
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH,LORD JUSTICE RIX,LORD JUSTICE BROOKE,LORD JUSTICE JONATHAN PARKER,LORD JUSTICE KEENE |
| Judgment Date | 02 November 2004 |
| Neutral Citation | [2004] EWCA Civ 1532,[2004] EWCA Civ 952,[2003] EWCA Civ 1344 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 02 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | A2/2003/2060,A2/2004/0518 |
[2003] EWCA Civ 1344
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(Mr Justice McCoombe)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2
Lord Justice Carnwath
A2/2003/2060
The Applicant appeared in person.
The Respondents did not appear and were unrepresented.
Friday, 26th September 2003
This is an application for permission to appeal against the judgment refusing an interim injunction.
The proceedings go back to the applicant's application for a studentship at the University of Cambridge in the Chemistry Department. She had previously been engaged in the Engineering Department for 2 years. Her case is that she was offered, and accepted, the post. There is an exchange of e-mails following an interview on 18th June, which certainly give an indication that there was some form of agreement between her and Dr Mitchell that she would have the studentship. However, the evidence for the university is that Dr Mitchell would not have had the authority to make the final offer, which would have had to have been confirmed by the Board and, further, that when they looked into the matter in more detail, they realised matters which made it inappropriate to confirm the offer.
That was explained to the applicant in correspondence and at a meeting with the head of the Department on 9th July. She understandably was very shocked and disappointed. She had already commenced proceedings in the Employment Tribunal relating to alleged harassment in her previous post. As I understand the correspondence, she had withdrawn those proceedings when she thought she had been offered the new post but then reinstated them. Those proceedings are not directly relevant to the present dispute, since they relate to what happened when she was in the Engineering Department. There is to be a hearing in December.
Following various attempts by her to get the matter re-opened, she began injunction proceedings in the Cambridge County Court on 12th August. She has claimed that she obtained an interim injunction from the Cambridge County Court; but certainly there is nothing which she has been able to show me which suggests that that was so. Indeed, in view of what I have seen of the proceedings, it would be very surprising if an order had been made. I think she may have misunderstood the fact that the court fixed a date for the hearing, and she may have thought that there was some sort of interim injunction granted in the meantime. There is a notice stamped by the county court of a hearing of the injunction to take place on 19th August, which to me suggests there had not been a grant of an injunction before that.
Unfortunately, she decided that she was not going to get a fair hearing in the county court. She wrote to the judge, saying that she was going to withdraw the case from the county court for that reason. She said:
"I am writing to inform you that I am withdrawing this claim from the County Court …. I feel that Cambridge University and the solicitors have very close relationships with the courts of Cambridge and this factor is biasing the proceedings against me."
She has explained to me that that was because she felt there had been delay, engineered by the other side, in issuing the injunction which she thought she had obtained.
I am afraid I find it completely impossible to accept that account. I think she has very sadly been misled. I am quite sure she would have had an entirely fair hearing from the county court and, had she proceeded there, this matter would have come before the court and would have progressed a great deal further.
However, that is water under the bridge, because she then applied to the High Court on 26th August. I have seen some suggestion by the other side that that was an abuse of process. It is not clear to me whether that issue has been sorted out, but, in any event, the matter came before McCombe J on her application for an interim injunction. He considered the matter and took the view that, while there was some evidence of a contract, it was very slender, and, furthermore, as a matter of discretion, that it would be wrong, in the circumstances, to require the University to take on the applicant —in effect a mandatory order —before the right had been established. He said:
"That cannot be a proper way of proceeding, to require parties to enter into a close personal relationship between researcher or employer on this slender evidence at this stage."
That was on 15th September.
She now renews the application before me. The decision whether to give an interim injunction, pending trial, was a matter for the discretion of the judge. The main point she makes is that the judge did not have further evidence of the agreement. This is in the shape of a form that she was given, which is an application to the EPSRC (that is, the research council) for funding. It is a form which is filled in by the University with the details of the course, and then is signed by her. Then there is another place for the form to be confirmed by the organisation or college where appropriate. Although that last entry is not signed on the document I have seen, she has told me that there is no particular problem about that. However, it does not seem to me that the document in itself does more than indicate what Dr Mitchell clearly thought on 18th June, which was that she was going to be able to take on the studentship. It does not confirm the existence of a binding agreement. It does not give any more legal validity to the exchange of e-mails than it would otherwise have had. It seems to me, therefore, that that particular point could not have affected the judge's discretion in any way. I can see no error in the judge's approach.
I understand the applicant is very concerned that she is not able to start on 1st October and that that will prejudice her chances for the future. It is very unfortunate, in those circumstances, that she decided to abandon the county court action, where it could have been dealt with more quickly; but I am afraid that that is something which I cannot alter.
Clearly, this matter will, if she proceeds with it, have to be litigated at a full hearing. I am prepared to indicate that all the proceedings should be expedited, so that it can be dealt with as quickly as possible. If that is done, I cannot see that any long-term damage to her career will be insuperable. But, unfortunately, this matter was within the judge's discretion and I am afraid I cannot intervene.
Order: Application refused.
[2004] EWCA Civ 1532
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE MACKAY)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2
Lord Justice Brooke
Vice-president of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division
Lord Justice Jonathan Parker
Lord Justice Keene
A2/2004/0518
The Appellant Appeared On Her Own Behalf
Miss SARA STABLER (Solicitor-Advocate) (of Messrs Taylor Vinters, Cambridge CB4 0DP) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
This is an appeal by the claimant, Ms Wickramaratna, against an order made by MacKay J on 8th March 2004 whereby he refused to set aside an order made by Master Fontaine on 9th October 2003 in the claimant's absence. On that occasion the Master had struck out the claim and directed that the claimant be barred from making any further applications in the matter without first obtaining the leave of the court. I will explain in due course the nature of the relief the claimant was seeking from the judge. In the event the only issue on which Rix LJ granted permission to appeal went to the question whether a High Court Master has power to make a civil restraint order. Such an order was formerly known as a Grepe v Loam order and is now known as a "limited civil restraint order" (see CPR 2.3(1) for the definition introduced by an amendment which took effect from 1st October 2004). It is now clear that a judge of any court (a term which includes a High Court Master: see CPR 2.4) has power to make a civil restraint order, but we are concerned on this appeal with the position as it stood last October. The appellant suggested that she had not had the opportunity to deploy full argument before Rix LJ, but it is quite clear from his judgment that he had a good grasp of the arguments. He heard her in the 20 minutes which is allowed under the rules and limited the grant of permission to appeal to this single ground.
So far as the background is concerned, the appellant is aggrieved about the way that she was treated by the defendant university's Chemistry Department. In March 2003 her 2-year fixed term contract with the university's Engineering Department ended —relationships became rather strained towards the end —and on 17th June 2003 she filed an application with an Employment Tribunal alleging unfair dismissal and racial discrimination. On 18th June 2003 she attended an interview in connection with her application for a postgraduate studentship within the Department of Chemistry and submitted an application for funding. On the same day she withdrew her application at the...
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