Joseph Kyle v Coventry City Council
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Newey,Lord Justice Baker,Lord Justice Underhill |
| Judgment Date | 20 November 2023 |
| Neutral Citation | [2023] EWCA Civ 1360 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CA-2023-000443 |
[2023] EWCA Civ 1360
Lord Justice Underhill
(Vice-President of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division))
Lord Justice Newey
and
Lord Justice Baker
Case No: CA-2023-000443
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT COVENTRY
Deputy Circuit Judge Gregory
Claim No. J00CV450
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Zia Nabi and David Cowan (instructed by Central England Law Centre) for the Appellant
Catherine Rowlands (instructed by Coventry City Council) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 25 October 2023
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 20 November 2023 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
In April 2022, the respondent, Coventry City Council (“the Council”), concluded that the appellant, Mr Joseph Kyle, had become “homeless intentionally” within the meaning of section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”). That decision was confirmed on review and, on 17 February 2023, Deputy Circuit Judge Gregory (“the Judge”) dismissed an appeal. Mr Kyle now, however, appeals to this Court.
The core issue is whether it was “reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy” within the meaning of sections 175(3) and 191(1) of the 1996 Act accommodation which the Council had secured for him. It is the Council's case that it was and hence that, when his behaviour there resulted in his eviction, he became intentionally homeless. Mr Kyle, on the other hand, contends that it was not “reasonable for [him] to continue to occupy” the accommodation and so that there can be no question of conduct leading to his eviction from it rendering him intentionally homeless. For the purposes of the 1996 Act, Mr Kyle maintains, he was “homeless” even when living in the accommodation that the Council had found for him.
Basic facts
As the Judge explained in paragraph 4 of his judgment (“the Judgment”), in November 2020 Mr Kyle was “48 years of age, and had a history of drug abuse to such an extent that he had been addicted to class A drugs, presumably heroin, and either then or during the period with which I am concerned was being assisted to break that addiction through a methadone script”.
On 3 November 2020, the Council accepted that section 188 of the 1996 Act applied and, accordingly, that it had a duty to secure that accommodation was available for Mr Kyle's occupation. Initially, he was found a room at 18 Wren Street in Coventry, but on 19 May 2021 he was instead provided with a room at 133 Terry Road, Coventry. At that stage, the Council wrote to Mr Kyle saying that it had been told that his behaviour at 18 Wren Street had not been in line with the rules and warning him that, if he did not follow the rules of the accommodation, the duty to provide him with accommodation would end. In August 2021, Mr Kyle relocated again, to a room at 79 St Margaret Road, Coventry, after other residents at 133 Terry Road had complained about his conduct. On this occasion, the Council informed him that it had been agreed that it would move him to alternative accommodation with a final warning. The Council also said, in a letter dated 20 August 2021, that “[a]ny placement given is done so on an emergency basis so you may be asked to move to more suitable accommodation during this stay” and that its duty to Mr Kyle would be discharged if, among other things, he was “evicted from the accommodation for such things as antisocial behaviour, smoking in the property, having guests and not abiding to the establishment rules”.
The Judge said this about 79 St Margaret Road in paragraph 5 of the Judgment:
“That property is a multi-occupation house, which provides accommodation for a number of people (how many, I do not know, but I suspect more than two and less than 10) where the occupants each have their own bedroom but share some facilities in common, such as the kitchen. It is intended to provide accommodation for people such as Mr Kyle, who are recovering drug addicts, and it is a place where they can be offered support and advice on an as-needs basis. It seems clear in those circumstances that how long anybody will spend in that particular type of occupation is very unpredictable. It may be relatively short, it may be relatively long in terms of many months.”
In paragraph 20 of the Judgment, the Judge said:
“The accommodation provided for Mr Kyle by Coventry City Council, through another provider, was in effect bespoke. It is sometimes described as a halfway house. It is intended to help somebody in Mr Kyle's position get back upon their feet. It is intended to provide support for recovering drug addicts. It may last for a significant period of time. Alternatively, it might be possible for such a person to move on in a relatively short time. By its very nature, it is entirely necessary for there to be flexibility in relation to this type of accommodation if the council is to fulfil its purpose of providing accommodation for somebody who is homeless and assisting that person in their future life.”
In a letter dated 2 March 2022, the Council accepted that it owed Mr Kyle the “full housing duty” under section 193 of the 1996 Act, explaining that it had decided that he was homeless, had a priority need and had not become homeless intentionally. The Council said in the letter that it “now [had] a duty to provide [him] with one suitable offer of accommodation”, that the offer had to be “suitable for [his] housing needs” and that he required “a property with 1 bedroom”. The letter also included this:
“ Temporary accommodation provided under s.193 whilst you are waiting for your property offer
How does this affect my current temporary accommodation?
As you have been provided with emergency housing by Coventry City Council under s.188 then by virtue that the main housing duty has been accepted towards you, your accommodation … will now become your accommodation under s.193.
As your accommodation is now being provided under s.193, the main housing duty to you will be discharged if:
• You have not been staying at the accommodation provided without good reason to explain your absence, or
• By act or omission you cause the accommodation to be withdrawn by being evicted from the premises due to unreasonable behaviour or behaviour that would cause harm to others.”
On 31 March 2022, the provider of the accommodation at 79 St Margaret Road made a request to the Council for Mr Kyle's eviction on the basis that he had broken into, and stolen from, other rooms there. Having referred to the fact that another resident was highly vulnerable, the author said, “I do not want to keep [Mr Kyle] in that house with him.”
On 4 April 2022, the Council sent Mr Kyle a letter (dated 2 April 2022) with the heading “Re: End of main housing duty because you have become intentionally homeless from accommodation made available for your occupation”. The Council explained that it had decided that Mr Kyle had “become intentionally homeless from the accommodation that the Council made available to meet its main housing duty to [him]”. Under the heading “Whether the accommodation was reasonable to continue to occupy”, the Council said:
“There are no facts in your case suggesting that the accommodation you lost was not reasonable to continue to occupy. There was no suggestion that you or any household member would suffer violence or abuse or that there was any risk of violence or abuse occurring.
We are satisfied the accommodation was affordable ….
We are not aware of any other factors suggesting that the accommodation may not have been reasonable to continue to occupy, in the context of homelessness.”
Mr Kyle promptly requested a review of the Council's decision, and Central England Law Centre (“the Law Centre”) made representations on his behalf. The Law Centre advanced a number of arguments in a letter dated 8 June 2022. In part, these were based on the proposition that section 3 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 had applied. The Law Centre also said this in a section headed “Reasonableness to continue to occupy”:
“We would further submit that the accommodation at the Property was not reasonable to continue to occupy.
It is important to note that there is no simple test of reasonableness; the Council can and indeed should consider all relevant circumstances when reaching a conclusion as to whether accommodation is reasonable to continue to occupy and these may include the nature of the accommodation, its condition, the position of any other occupants and indeed any other relevant circumstances.
We would refer the council to the enclosed emails from Housing Network and the continued reference to requesting an eviction and the reference ‘I do not want to keep JK in that house’ in the email dated the 31 st of March 2022.
In this case, we would submit that such an observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that the Housing Network was biased against our client, in the sense that it had reached the decision already that it would take all possible steps to exclude him from the accommodation, and also that there had been a relationship breakdown between our client and the housing provider and it was therefore not reasonable to continue to occupy.”
In a subsequent section of the letter, headed “Warnings”, the Law Centre noted that the warnings which Mr Kyle had been given had been provided to him “while he was occupying the accommodation under s188(1) rather than the subsequent s193(2) duty, and between 6 and 12 months prior to the date of the end of accommodation”. The Law Centre “submit[ted] that applicant who is occupying under the interim (s188(1)) duty cannot be considered homeless intentionally from accommodation owed under...
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