KH (Sudan) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLord Justice Sedley,Lord Justice Moses
Judgment Date30 July 2008
Neutral Citation[2008] EWCA Civ 726,[2008] EWCA Civ 887
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date30 July 2008
Docket NumberCase No: Preliminary Points,Case Nos: C5/2007/0424, C5/2007/1264, C5/2007/1734, C5/2007/2097, C5/2006/0541

[2008] EWCA Civ 726

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE ASYLUM & IMMIGRATION TRIBUNAL

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

Lord Justice Sedley

Lord Justice Longmorelord Justice Moses

Case No: Preliminary Points

Between:
Kh (sudan) & Ors
Appellants
and
The Secretary Of State For The Home Department
Respondent

THE APPELLANTS WERE REPRESENTED BY THEIR VARIOUS COUNSEL.

Ms L GiovanettiMr R Dunlop (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

Lord Justice Sedley
1

We have begun the hearing of these 16 listed appealsapplications for permission to appeal by hearing counsel (we are grateful to them for having been selectivesparing as to how many of them addressed us) on what appeared to us to be the only two points either common to more than one case or, in one instance, capable of affecting all the cases if the point was well taken. Our conclusion follows. It will in due course be reflected in a fully reasoned judgment in due course which will form part of the decisions to be given in the 16 cases.

2

The decision of their Lordships' House in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 has neither expressly nor impliedly undermined the Country Guidance contained in HGMO (Relocation to Khartoum) Sudan CG [2006] UKAIT 0006 Baroness Hale's concurring speech in AH stresses what is uncontroversial, that no Country Guidance case is for ever; it is a factual precedent, as Laws LJ has aptly called it,as such is open to revision in the light of new facts —new either in the sense of being newly ascertained or in the sense that they have arisen only since the decision was promulgated —provided in each case that they are facts of sufficient weight.

3

HGMO can be seen to set out without demur evidence from credible sources, some of it instanced by this court in paragraph 43 of its decision in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 297, which in any one case may legitimately re-enter the fact-finding process if the data warrant it, notwithstanding the summary generic findings arrived at in paragraph 309 of HGMO.

4

We have had our attention drawn to the arguably discrepant formulations in paragraph 4 of the headnoteparagraph 309(6) of the text from HGMO. It is of course the latter which is part of the actual determination. It is to be readunderstood in the light of the findings which precede itwhich it seeks to summarise,in the light also, so far as it was accepted by the AIT, of the evidence on which these findings are based. As the AIT itself said in paragraph 266 of HGMO:

“our firm view is that asylum claims or Article 3 claims submitted by non-Arab Darfuris faced with return to Khartoum should be considered on their individual merits.”

5

Nor, in our judgment, is there anything impeachable about defining reasonable internal relocation as including any place which, provided of course it offers sufficient safety from persecution, is not unduly harsh for the individual concerned. We would not be entertaining the question but for the submissions made to us by Mr Bedford, founding himself on Article 8 of the Qualification Directive. This is captioned “Internal protection”in paragraph 1 reads:

“As part of the assessment of the application for international protection, Member States may determine that an applicant is not in need of international protection if in a part of the country of origin there is no well-founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harmthe applicant can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country.”

6

As is well-known, the House of Lords in Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5 interpreted this as requiring it to be unduly harsh to expect the appellant to relocate in the particular safe place if it was to be said to be unreasonable for him or her to do so. There is no logical problem in this extrapolation such as is capable, in our view, of even raising a question for the European Court of Justice. We do not accept Mr Bedford's submission that we can, much less should, refer to the ECJ the question whether the House of Lords have erred in adopting this meaning. It is not necessary to embark any further upon the constitutional questions involved in such an attempt to circumvent the House of Lords by going from this court to the European Court of Justice.

7

We propose, accordingly, to approach all the applicationsappeals in our present list on the footing that internal relocation to a place of sufficient safety will be reasonable unless it is unduly harsh for the individual concerned,that immigration judges are expected to follow the Country Guidance contained in HGMO unless acceptable evidence is placed before them by either party which shows it to have been incorrect or to be no longer correct in some significant respect.

[2008] EWCA Civ 887

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before :

Lord Justice Sedley

Lord Justice Longmore and

Lord Justice Moses

Case Nos: C5/2007/0424, C5/2007/1264, C5/2007/1734, C5/2007/2097, C5/2006/0541

Between :
Kh (Sudan)
Qa (Sudan)
Bk (Sudan)
Aa (Sudan)
Ka (Sudan)
Appellants
and
Secretary of State For The Home Department
Respondent

Mr B Bedford (instructed by Sultan Lloyd) for the Appellant in KH

Mr C Jacobs (instructed by Messrs White Ryland) for the Appellants in QA, BK, AK and KA

Ms L Giovanetti and Mr R Dunlop (instructed by The Treasury Solicitor) for the Respondent

Hearing dates : 10 th-13 th June, 2008

Lord Justice Sedley
1

We began the hearing of these 16 listed appeals and applications for permission to appeal by hearing counsel (we are grateful to them for having been selective as to how many of them addressed us) on what appeared to us to be the only two points either common to more than one case or, in one instance, capable of affecting all the cases if the point was well taken.

2

In HGMO (Relocation to Khartoum) Sudan CG [2006] UKAIT 00062 the AIT handed down a country guidance decision on the highly controversial question whether it was unduly harsh to expect anyone, and if so whom, to relocate from an area of Sudan to which they could not return to the displaced persons' camps around Khartoum where conditions were, on any view, deplorable. The decision was that, with discernible exceptions, it was not unduly harsh.

3

In AH (Sudan) v Home Secretary [2007] UKHL 49, Lady Hale at §27 spoke of the need in this context for a “holistic consideration of all the relevant factors, looked at cumulatively”. Mr Jacobs submits for the appellants that while the House rejected the two errors of law which had been alleged, this does not exonerate the AIT from its error of making stereotypical assumptions about the impact of poverty and the traumas of war on Darfurians. As this court had recognised in its decision in AH (§43), health conditions in the camps were appalling. The decision in HGMO flew in the face of expert evidence, including that of Accord and of Dr Walter Kalin.

4

These are all submissions with which this court might, if it were a primary decision-maker, have had considerable sympathy. But they are not grounds of appeal before us, and they did not attract either criticism or dismissal in their Lordships' House. In our judgment the decision of the House in AH has neither expressly nor impliedly undermined the country guidance contained in HGMO. Baroness Hale's concurring speech in AH stresses what is uncontroversial, that no country guidance case is for ever; it is a factual precedent, as Laws LJ has aptly called it, and as such is open to revision in the light of new facts – new either in the sense of being newly ascertained or in the sense that they have arisen only since the decision was promulgated – provided in each case that they are facts of sufficient weight. HGMO can be seen to set out without demur evidence from credible sources, some of it instanced by this court in paragraph 43 of its decision in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 297, which in any one case may legitimately re-enter the fact-finding process if the data warrant it, notwithstanding the summary generic findings arrived at in paragraph 309 of HGMO.

5

We have had our attention drawn to the arguably discrepant formulations in paragraph 4 of the headnote and paragraph 309(6) of the text of HGMO. It is of course the latter which is part of the actual determination. It is to be read and understood in the light of the findings which precede it and which it seeks to summarise, and in the light also, so far as it was accepted by the AIT, of the evidence on which these findings are based. As the AIT itself said in paragraph 266 of HGMO:

“our firm view is that asylum claims or Article 3 claims submitted by non-Arab Darfuris faced with return to Khartoum should be considered on their individual merits.”

6

Nor, in our judgment, is there anything impeachable about defining reasonable internal relocation as including any place which, provided of course it offers sufficient safety from persecution, is not unduly harsh for the individual concerned. We would not be entertaining the question but for the submissions made to us by Mr Bedford, founding himself on Article 8 of the Qualification Directive. This captioned “Internal protection” and in paragraph 1 reads:

“As part of the assessment of the application for international protection,...

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    ...a mandatory starting point for the assessment of an individual case does not outlive its utility (see Sedley LJ in KH (Sudan) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 887 at [4]). Although any appeal in the field of protection has importance for the individual appellant, country guidance cases have an import......
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