Kulwant Singh Manak v Solicitors Regulation Authority
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Holroyde |
| Judgment Date | 31 July 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] EWHC 1958 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/494/2018 |
| Date | 31 July 2018 |
[2018] EWHC 1958 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Holroyde
Mrs Justice Nicola Davies DBE
Case No: CO/494/2018
Mr Manak (in person) APPELLANT
Mark Cunningham QC (instructed by BLAKE MORGAN) for the RESPONDENT
Hearing dates: 14th June 2018
Judgment Approved
By a judgment dated 12 th January 2018 a panel of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (“SDT”) found a number of allegations of professional misconduct proved against the appellant Mr Manak. The Tribunal made an order against him in the following terms:
“1. The Tribunal ordered that [Mr Manak], solicitor, be suspended from practice as a solicitor for a fixed period of two years to commence on 15 November 2017 and it further ordered that he do pay 85% of 75% of the costs of and incidental to case number 11165A-2013, such costs to be the subject of detailed assessment unless agreed between the parties.
2. Upon the expiry of the fixed term of suspension referred to above, [Mr Manak] shall be subject to conditions imposed by the Tribunal as follows for an indefinite period:
2.1 [Mr Manak] may not:
2.1.1 practise as a sole practitioner or sole manager or sole owner of an authorised or recognised body;
2.1.2 be a partner or member of a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP), Legal Disciplinary Practice (LDP) or Alternative Business Structure (ABS) or other authorised or recognised body;
2.1.3 be a compliance officer for legal practice or a compliance officer for finance and administration;
2.1.4 hold client money;
2.1.5 be a signatory on any client account;
2.1.6 work as a solicitor other than in employment approved by the Solicitors Regulation Authority.
3. There be liberty to [Mr Manak] or [the Solicitors Regulation Authority] to apply to the Tribunal to vary the conditions set out in paragraph 2 above.”
By a notice of appeal dated 1 st February 2018 Mr Manak appeals against that decision. This is the judgment of the court, to which we have both contributed.
For convenience we shall refer to the appellant as Mr Manak, and to the respondent Solicitors Regulation Authority as the SRA.
Mr Manak, who is now 51 years of age, was admitted to the Roll of Solicitors on 15 th February 1993. At all material times he was a partner in the firm of Heer Manak, solicitors in Coventry. He was responsible for the supervision of an assistant solicitor, Mr Chahal. He was also responsible for the supervision of Miss Rajbinder Dhillon (“Miss Dhillon”), who was initially a trainee and latterly an assistant solicitor. Miss Dhillon's parents, Mr R S Dhillon and Mrs K K Dhillon (to whom we shall refer as Mr and Mrs Dhillon) were clients of the firm.
The Solicitors' Code of Conduct and Accounts Rules:
The allegations against Mr Manak covered a period of about 5 years. The Solicitors' Practice Rules 1990 were in force at the start of that period, but were later replaced by the Solicitors' Code of Conduct 2007. The allegations therefore referred to relevant provisions of both the 1990 Rules and the 2007 Code. However, for the purposes of this appeal, nothing turns on the differences in wording between the two. We shall therefore, for convenience, refer to the allegations as if the 2007 Code of Conduct (“SCC 2007”) was in force throughout. It is sufficient for present purposes to quote the following extract from the SCC 2007:
“Rule 1 Core Duties
…
1.02 Integrity
You must act with integrity
…
1.04 Best interest of clients
You must act in the best interest of each client.
…
1.06 Public confidence
You must not behave in a way that is likely to diminish the trust the public places in you or the profession.”
The Solicitors' Accounts Rules 1998 (“SAR 1998”) were in force throughout the relevant period. For present purposes, it is sufficient to quote the following provisions:
“Rule 15 – Use of a client account
(1) Client money and controlled trust money must without delay be paid into a client account, and must be held in a client account, except when the rules provide to the contrary (see rules 16 to 18).
…
Rule 22 – Withdrawals from a client account
(1) Client money may only be withdrawn from a client account when it is:
a. properly required for a payment to or on behalf of the client (or other person on whose behalf the money is being held);
…
e. withdrawn on the client's instructions, provided the instructions are for the client's convenience and are given in writing, or are given by other means and confirmed by the solicitor to the client in writing;
…
Rule 30 – Restrictions on transfers between clients
(1) A paper transfer of money held in a general client account from the ledger of one client to the ledger of another client may only be made if:
a. it would have been permissible to withdraw that sum from the account under rule 22(1); and
b. it would have been permissible to pay that sum into the account under rule 15 …”
As will be seen, these proceedings have a very long history, and the Tribunal heard evidence over a period of many days. For present purposes, however, we can summarise quite briefly the facts which gave rise to allegations against Mr Manak and also against Miss Dhillon.
The facts:
In summary, the allegations against Mr Manak related to three areas of his work as a solicitor. First, there were said to have been irregularities in a number of conveyancing transactions carried out by Mr Chahal. It was alleged against Mr Manak that he had failed adequately to supervise Mr Chahal, and that the irregularities could not and would not have occurred if Mr Manak had properly discharged his duties of supervision. Secondly, it was alleged that there was irregularity in relation to a conveyancing transaction which Mr Manak himself had carried out on behalf of Mr Chahal. Thirdly, and most importantly, there were allegations against both Mr Manak and Miss Dhillon of dishonesty, impropriety and misconduct in relation to a number of transactions in the names of Mr and Mrs Dhillon. The focus of this appeal has largely been on the findings in relation to that third area, and it is accordingly necessary for us to say a little about it.
In early 2007, Mr and Mrs Dhillon applied to re-mortgage their home in order to fund the purchase of a property in High Street, West Bromwich. They instructed Heer Manak to act for them in this regard. The mortgage offer required an undertaking by Mr and Mrs Dhillon to discharge any existing charges on their home, though it appears that none were in place at that time. On 23 rd February 2007 the mortgage advance, in the sum of £150,000, was received into the Heer Manak client account. The purchase of the property in West Bromwich was however delayed.
Between February 2007 and August 2009, seven payments were made from the mortgage advance. Transfers totalling over £27,000 were made to Mr Dhillon's bank account. £2,000 was transferred to Miss Dhillon's bank account. Other funds were used to make private loans, which were repaid. On 10 th August 2009, at a time when Heer Manak's bankers were pressing the firm to reduce its overdraft by about £60,000, a sum of £60,000 was transferred as a loan to Heer Manak. It was the case for the SRA that Mr and Mrs Dhillon did not know about these various transfers and loans, and did not authorise them. Mr Manak's case was that they had authorised the payments, or that at any rate he believed they had. He contended that it had for the most part been Miss Dhillon who handled her parents' affairs, and that he had never had any cause to suspect that she might be doing anything wrong. It was also Miss Dhillon's case that her parents had been aware of, and had authorised, the various transfers and loans. Both Mr Manak and Miss Dhillon relied on letters, said to have been signed by Mr and Mrs Dhillon, which retrospectively authorised some of the transfers and loans.
Mr Dhillon was given a document which purported to be an official copy of the Register issued by the Land Registry in respect of the High Street property. This document purported to show that with effect from 20 th September 2007, title absolute to the property was vested in Mr and Mrs Dhillon jointly. That was untrue: in fact, title was vested in the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. At the hearing before the Tribunal, it was common ground between the parties that the document was a forgery. There were issues as to who created it and who gave it to Mr Dhillon. Mr Dhillon said that he had received it from Mr Manak. Mr Manak denied that allegation. Examination of Miss Dhillon's work computer eventually provided evidence that the document had been created by her.
In 2007 or 2008, Mr and Mrs Dhillon entered into occupation of the High Street property. They did not at that stage own it. In December 2008 a representative of the Secretary of State attended the property and found Mr Dhillon in occupation. Mr Dhillon told the agent that he had bought the property. In the ensuring correspondence between solicitors, a sale of the property was provisionally agreed, and the vendor proposed, as an interim measure, that Mr Dhillon should enter into an Assured Shorthold Tenancy (“AST”). The AST was dated 25 th May 2010. It was signed by Miss Dhillon. Mr and Mrs Dhillon alleged that they were unaware of the AST, and had given no authority for it to be entered into on their behalf. More than a year later, when a representative of the vendor again attended the property, Mr Dhillon again said that he was the owner.
Eventually, completion of the purchase was scheduled to take place in September 2011. It did not however take place. Mr Dhillon's deposit of £32,000 was forfeited to the vendor.
The investigations:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Malik Mohammed Nazeer v Solicitors Regulation Authority
...the Tribunal were clearly inappropriate. Mr Williams submitted that the Tribunal had failed in its duty (as set out in Manak v SRA [2018] EWHC 1958 (Admin)) to explain why the conditions were necessary or appropriate. In my judgment, however, those reasons are to be found in paragraphs 44 ......