Liaqat Malik v Manchester and Salford
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lady Justice Sharp,Lord Justice Davis |
| Judgment Date | 21 February 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] EWCA Civ 815 |
| Date | 21 February 2018 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | Case No: C1/2017/2498 |
[2018] EWCA Civ 815
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Davis
Lady Justice Sharp
Case No: C1/2017/2498
Mr Rupert Bowers QC (instructed by Khans) appeared on behalf of the Applicants
Mr Andrew Bird (instructed by G L D) appeared on behalf of the Third Respondent
Judgment (As Approved)
Introduction
This matter, listed before us as a preliminary issue, relates to a proposed appeal to the Court of Appeal by the claimants from an order of the Divisional Court made on 18 July 2017. The preliminary issue had been directed by Singh LJ with a view to deciding whether the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to entertain the proposed appeal. The Divisional Court itself refused permission to appeal, one reason being that the Court of Appeal would have no jurisdiction by reason of the provisions of section 18(1)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. That is the matter which now requires to be decided by this court. If this court decides that it does have jurisdiction we would then go on to hear the application for an extension of time and for permission to appeal on the merits.
Section 18(1)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides as follows:
“1. No appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal (a) except as provided by the Administration of Justice Act 1960, from any judgment of the High Court in any criminal cause or matter …”
There can be no doubt that the proposed appeal is from a judgment of the High Court. The question is whether it is from a judgment of the High Court “in any criminal cause or matter.” I note that “cause” and “matter” have the wide definitions provided in section 151 of the 1981 Act.
Background
The background facts are set out in the decision of the Divisional Court dated 18 July 2017. They need only brief restatement by me now.
The original judicial review claim form was issued by the claimants on 7 March 2016. It related to decisions, by reference to section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to apply for, issue and execute search warrants in respect of the claimants' premises in Middlesex, Manchester and Rochdale. The underlying offences being investigated by the authorities involved conspiracy to assist unlawful immigration and conspiracy to rob. The actual relief sought in the claim form was as follows:
“1. A declaration that the entries, search and seizures made pursuant to the warrant were all unlawful;
2. An order quashing the warrants;
3. A mandatory order for the return of all material seized in the execution of the warrants and the destruction of all and any copies;
4. An order that no use be made of any knowledge gained from the unlawful searches and seizures;
5. Damages for trespass and wrongful interference with goods and/or under the Human Rights Act 1998;
6) Costs.”
It is to be noted that it has throughout been accepted, and rightly so, that such judicial review proceedings constituted a criminal cause or matter for the purposes of section 18(1)(a) of the 1981 Act.
Permission to apply for judicial review was thereafter given on the basis that the warrants had failed to comply with the requirements of section 15(6)(b) of the 1984 Act in that there was non-disclosure of material matters. On 29 November 2016, at the substantive hearing, the Divisional Court quashed the search warrants. A detailed order was made on that date. Amongst other things the court, having quashed the search warrants, declared unlawful the entries and searches effected under the warrants. Further provisions of that order included, amongst other things, these as set out in paragraph 3 and 4:
“(3) The Third Defendant shall return to the Claimants all original property seized under the Warrants within 56 days of this Order unless prior to that date the Third Defendant files an application in the Manchester Crown Court for relief under s.59(5) and (6) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, in which case paragraph (4) applies.
(4) In the event that such an application is made then the obligation to return original property seized shall be subject to any decision to the contrary of the Crown Court in the s.59 proceedings, and the decision of the Crown Court shall be in substitution for (3) above.”
Amongst other things, therefore, this order had the consequence that an application to the Manchester Crown Court under section 59 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 had to be filed by the third defendant by, as it was calculated, 24 January 2017. The third defendant did not do that. (Furthermore, it has been said that the third defendant also failed to return by the due date all the original property which had been seized under the search warrants). It appears that the third defendant only made its application to the Crown Court one day thereafter and moreover did so, it appears, by email and without any supporting materials or evidence. At all events, that application under section 59 having been made out of time to the Manchester Crown Court, the claimants filed grounds of opposition to that section 59 application. Amongst other things, those grounds of opposition specifically identified the point that the section 59 application had been filed out of time and contrary to the terms of the order of 29 November 2016.
Some four weeks or so then went by until eventually, on 10 March 2017, the third defendant's lawyers lodged an application (the application, as we are told, having the same title and case number as the judicial review proceedings) seeking retrospective variation of the time limit contained in paragraph 3 of the order of 29 November 2016. Notification of this application was, it seems, sent to a generic email address of the claimants' solicitors. A response was invited by 14 March 2017. However it appears that the solicitors never received that email. At all events, no response was filed; and in the absence of any such response Supperstone J, on the papers in the Administrative Court, on 27 March 2017 granted the order sought.
However, when the fact that the claimants' lawyers had never been informed of this then became apparent, a further...
To continue reading
Request your trial